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Anton Ford, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2008
The philosophy of action defines itself by reference to a pair of canonical divisions.
First, among events, a distinction is drawn between that which is a “mere event”
and that which is an “action.” Then, a second distinction is drawn among actions,
between that which is action in some qualified way—because it is unintentional, or
unconscious, or unfree, or what have you—and that which is action unqualifiedly.
“The standard approach,” as Anscombe called it, is to take for granted the genus
event, and to hunt for the differentia of action; or to take for granted the genus action,
and to hunt for that of unqualified action. The negative aim of the dissertation is to
argue against the standard approach; the positive aim is to develop an alternative.
I first distinguish three different forms of generality—forms that are associated
with the traditional ideas of an accident, a category and an essence. I then ask: What
kind of generality is exemplified by each of the two canonical divisions? The standard
approach is viable only if both divisions exemplify what I call “accidental generality.”
In fact, neither does.
The division of action into qualified and unqualified action is an example of what
I call “essential generality.” I argue that, as in all such cases, the question, “What is
unqualified action?” reduces into the question, “What is action?”
The other division is an example of what I call “categorial generality.” The
concept “action” refers to a category of a distinctively practical kind: an agent must
iv
think that what she is doing falls under this category, if, in fact, it does fall under
it. Then any attempt to describe a differentia must be circular: sooner or later it
must refer the agent’s thought; and the agent’s thought must in turn make reference
to that which it needed to explain.
On the positive account defended here, an action is a certain sort of temporally-
ordered system of ends and means. The claim is that the agent herself must think of
what she is doing as being such a system—if, indeed, it is one.
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1.0 ACTION AND THE METHOD OF
DIVISION
It is customary in the philosophy of action to proceed by a method of division; and
two divisions have always seemed especially important. The first of these is a broad
division within the class of things that happen. Some of the things that happen are
the fruit of the human capacity to act; others plainly are not. Philosophers therefore
commonly distinguish between that which is a “mere event” and that which is an
“action.” The second of the two canonical divisions is within the category of action
itself. Some actions, though they do involve the capacity to act, and therefore count
among its revelations, nevertheless involve it only indirectly or imperfectly. A further
distinction is therefore drawn, between that which is action in some qualified way—
because it is unintentional, or idle, or addictive, or subconscious, or weak-willed, or
compelled by force, or what have you—and that which is action unqualifiedly, or
action par excellence.
Event
Action
Unqualified ActionQualified Action
Mere Event
Figure 1
That both of these distinctions are legitimately drawn, and rightly placed at the
center of the discipline, is perhaps beyond dispute. But in view of these distinctions,
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the question does arise: What is the task of the philosopher of action?
One might suppose that a philosopher of action had primarily to account for the
difference between an action and a mere event, or, again, the difference between
qualified and unqualified action. And since both of the customary divisions are ex-
haustive, cutting what they divide into parts without remainder, this would amount
to explaining how actions differ from events in general, and how unqualified actions
differ from actions in general. And so, like the Stranger from Elea, one might suppose
that the philosopher’s task was to hound down the differentiae: to say what an event
must be, over and above being an event, in order to be an action, or to say what an
action must be, over and above being an action, in order to be an action in the full
and proper sense.
Some such thought is implicit in a question that was famously posed by Wittgen-
stein: “What is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I
raise my arm?”1 Wittgenstein’s question appears to be concerned with the first of the
two now familiar divisions, but it is easily redeployed in connection with the second:
What is left over if I subtract the fact that I raise my arm from the fact that I raise it
intentionally, or rationally, or freely, or . . . ? Of course, the idea of subtraction entails
the idea of a corresponding addition. Wittgenstein’s question therefore assumes a cer-
tain conception of what it is to be an action, according to which an action is, as it were,
the arithmetic sum of an event and something else. So on the model of, for instance,
this equation: 7 + x = 12, we are invited to imagine this one: event + y = action,
and also, by extension, this one: action + z = intentional action.
There is reason to think that in Wittgenstein’s own opinion, the question he
posed was deeply misguided, in which case he sought to expose it as such, and not to
inaugurate a program of research.2 Be that as it may, his question has come to serve
1For the original passage see Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (1953), §621.
2In reply to his own question, Wittgenstein writes: “When I raise my arm I do not usually try
to raise it,” §622. Whether or not it is true, the point of this remark is clearly to insist that the
difference between the action of my raising my arm and the event of my arm’s just going up cannot
be explained by appeal to an inner state of trying, or (presumably) willing, or intending—an appeal
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as a ritual starting-point for the prevailing sort of account in the philosophy of action.
Indeed, even when it is not explicitly quoted, Wittgenstein’s question appears to be
lurking in the background, setting the agenda for the field at large.
The fundamental problem of action theory is typically conceived as that of ex-
plaining the contrast between two different kinds of event.3 So, for instance, a seminal
essay by Harry Frankfurt begins with the following pronouncement:
The problem of action is to explicate the contrast between what an agent does and
what merely happens to him, or between the bodily movements that he makes and
those that occur without his making them.4
Meanwhile, the contrast that is said to be in need of explication is often portrayed as
being underwritten by a distinctive mark or property, which the philosopher of action
must identify and describe. So, for example, a seminal essay by Donald Davidson
begins with the following query:
What events in the life of a person reveal agency; what are his deeds and his doings
in contrast to mere happenings in his history; what is the mark that distinguishes
his action?5
Davidson’s query and Frankfurt’s pronouncement may be taken to imply that the
principal task of the philosopher of action is to solve a Wittgensteinian equation.
that is more or less inevitable the minute one attempts to say “what is left over.” Of course, this
does not settle whether Wittgenstein rejects one particular answer to the question “What is left
over?” or, rather, the question itself. Those who interpret Wittgenstein as a behaviorist will tend
to say that he rejects one particular answer—that he rejects an appeal to inner mental states, in
favor of an appeal to “overt behavior,” or “criteria.” This interpretation remains influential partly
because many philosophers would like to be charitable to Wittgenstein, and because they are at the
same time convinced that there is no respectable reason to reject the question outright. It seems
obvious to many philosophers both that there must be something left over, and that an account
of action must appeal to this “something,” whatever it is. This conviction sets the theme for the
discussion that is to follow. On the topic of Wittgenstein’s relation to behaviorism, see John W.
Cook, “Human Beings,” (1969).
3This conception of the problem is, of course, rejected by those philosophers who deny that
actions are events. See for instance Maria Alvarez and John Hyman, “Agents and their Actions,”
(1998); Kent Bach, “Actions are not Events,” (1980); G. H. von Wright, Norm and Action, (1963).
4Harry Frankfurt, “The Problem of Action,” (1978).
5Donald Davidson, “Agency,” (1971).
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And that is in fact what most have tried to do.6
Admittedly, the precise terms of the equation are different for different philoso-
phers. For Davidson, the starting-point is implicitly that of an event: this is what,
supposedly, will bear the “mark” of action. Other philosophers begin from something
rather more determinate. Some take for granted the idea of “behavior,” and ask
what must be added to that.7 But for others “behavior” is still too abstract. The
most common starting-point is in fact the idea of a “bodily movement.” According
to Arthur Danto, “An action [is] a movement of the body plus x . . . and the problem
. . . is to solve in some philosophically interesting way for x.”8 It is this conception
of “the problem” that sets the stage for the most popular contemporary theory of
action, according to which, as Michael Smith writes,
Actions are those bodily movements that are caused and rationalized by a pair of
mental states: a desire for some end, where ends can be thought of as ways the
world could be, and a belief that something the agent can just do, namely move her
body in the way to be explained, has some suitable chance of making the world the
relevant way.9
6For a few prominent examples, see Alvin I. Goldman, A Theory of Human Action, (1970); Gilbert
Harman, “Practical Reasoning,” (1976); John Searle, Intentionality, (1983); Myles Brand, Intend-
ing and Acting: Toward a Naturalized Action Theory, (1984); Fred Dretske, Explaining Behavior:
Reasons in a World of Causes, (1988); Carl Ginet, On Action, (1990); Alfred Mele, Springs of Ac-
tion, (1992); Michael Bratman, Faces of Intention, (1999); John Bishop, Natural Agency: An Essay
on the Causal Theory of Action, (1989); J. David Velleman, Practical Reflection, (1989), and The
Possibility of Practical Reason, (2000); Berent Enc¸, How We Act: Causes, Reasons, and Intentions,
(2003).
7The term “behavior” is used to cover anything a person can be said to do—even, for instance,
forgetting something. Kieran Setiya (2007) begins his account of intentional action as follows: “In
the course of a typical day, I do a multitude of things: I breathe almost continuously; I blink from
time to time: I look at things, pick them up, and put them down; I eat and drink; I read; I listen to
music; and I forget something I meant to bring to the office. All of this counts as my behaviour—
what I do in a minimal sense—but not all of it is done intentionally. [. . . ] In what follows, I
take for granted the idea of doing something, and ask what it is to do something intentionally,”
p. 29. Having taken for granted the idea of behavior—or, of “doing something” in the thinnest
possible sense—Setiya distinguishes two different kinds: there is, first, the exalted kind of behavior,
which goes by the name of intentional action; and then there is all the rest, the latter being “mere”
behavior. As he himself points out, his aim is to solve a familiar sort of problem: “Our question is
roughly, ‘What is left over if I subtract the fact that I raise my arm from the fact that I raise my
arm intentionally?’” Ibid., p. 24, n. 8.
8Arthur Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace, p. 5.
9Michael Smith, “The Structure of Orthonomy,” (2004), p. 165.
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On this view, the value for the variable x in Danto’s equation is a belief-desire pair
that stands to a bodily movement in the appropriate causal and rational relations.10
There is no need to multiply examples any further; anyone familiar with action
theory will recognize this as the usual method. By and large, philosophers of action
have aimed to answer a version of Wittgenstein’s question. And thus, they have
assumed what the question itself assumes: namely, that there is some describable
addendum in virtue of which an event is an action, or in virtue of which an action is
action par excellence.
*
G. E. M. Anscombe rejected this assumption and with it Wittgenstein’s question. It
is clear, moreover, that this rejection was a fundamental aspect of her thinking about
action, and not a small or peripheral thesis, which an otherwise sympathetic reader
might casually disregard. For Anscombe framed her whole account of intentional
action in explicit opposition to the idea that an action is intentional in virtue of any
“mere extra feature of events whose description would otherwise be the same.”11 The
latter formulation appears to be a reference to Aristotle’s definition of an accident
as “something which may either belong, or not belong to some self-same thing.”12
10Other philosophers take for granted something even more determinate than bodily movement:
for them, the starting-point is a purposeful or goal-directed bodily movement. The editors of a recent
collection of essays about action introduce their volume by describing a neurological disorder known
as Anarchic Hand syndrome: “Patients with Anarchic Hand syndrome sometimes find one of their
hands performing complex, apparently goal-directed movements they are unable to suppress (except
by using their ‘good’ hand). Sometimes the anarchic hand interferes unhelpfully with intentional
actions performed with the use of the other hand (it may unbutton a shirt the patient is trying to
button up). Sometimes it performs movements apparently unrelated to any of the agent’s intentions,
such as (in one notorious example) a movement resulting in picking up some leftovers from somebody
else’s plate in a restaurant,” (Roessler and Eilan, 2003, pp. 1–2). The editors ask, “What is the
nature of the control that is absent in these cases, and whose absence fuels the intuition that they are
not to be regarded as actions?” (Ibid., p. 2), and they present the essays contained in their collection
as providing some sort of answer. But the point of describing this lurid pathology is presumably to
remind the reader that there is such a thing as an event, which is behavior, and which is a bodily
movement, and which is purposeful or goal-directed, but which nevertheless fails to be an action in
the full and proper sense. In that case, presumably, the question must remain: “What is left over if
I subtract the fact that I button my shirt from the fact that I do so—archically?”
11G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention, (1963), p. 88. Cf. pp. 29–30, 84–89.
12Topics, 102b6–7.
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In that case, Anscombe rejected what might be called an “accidentalist” account of
intentional action.
Anscombe did not deny, of course, that various things are true of an action if
and only if it is intentional, so that there are, if you like, many qualities, or features,
that all and only intentional actions bear. What she denied is just that an action
is intentional in virtue of bearing the putative qualities or features. She denied,
in other words, that any such thing could explain what it is to be an intentional
action. Speaking of the familiar Davidsonian account, she says: “Something I do
is not made into an intentional action by being caused by a belief and desire, even
if the descriptions fit.”13 Anscombe is thus willing to allow, at least for the sake of
argument, that the proposed descriptions “fit” their object. Her position is that, even
if they fit, still, they do not explain.
The accidentalist account that Anscombe attributes to Davidson, and that she
herself rejects, is the product of what she calls “the standard approach” in the phi-
losophy of action.14 This approach has two steps. The first step is preliminary, but
nevertheless crucial: it is to isolate a putative genus under which the object of inquiry
falls as a species, and to suppose that the genus has already been understood—not,
perhaps, that we ourselves have understood it, but merely that it is the object of
some prior investigation. The second step yields the substance of the accidentalist
account: it is to explain how the salient species differs from everything else of the
same genus. So understood, the standard approach might be brought to bear on
either of the two canonical divisions: one might take for granted the genus event and
hunt for the differentia of action; or one might take for granted the genus action and
hunt for the differentia of, say, intentional action.
13One might question whether Davidson really held the view that Anscombe here attributes to him,
and my point is not to endorse her attribution. What matters is only that Anscombe’s interpretation
of Davidson is a common one. It is particularly common among philosophers of action who defend
accidentalist accounts. For Anscombe’s criticism of Davidson, see “Practical Inference,” reprinted
in Rosalind Hursthouse, Gavin Lawrence and Warren Quinn (eds.), Virtues and Reasons, (1995), p.
3.
14Anscombe, “Practical Inference,” (1995), pp. 2-3.
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Anscombe’s opposition to the standard approach, and to the resulting acciden-
talist account, has never attracted much attention, not even from those philosophers,
like David Velleman, who adopt such an approach, and who offer such an account,
and who cite Anscombe as a major influence.15 If her opposition is mentioned at all,
it is usually dismissed as the expression of some purported “behaviorism,” which she
is supposed to have inherited from Wittgenstein.16 Anscombe is called a “behavior-
ist,” one gathers, because she openly opposes any attempt to account for intentional
action by reference to mental states and other psychic phenomena. But to suppose
that this rejection of psychologism explains her opposition to the standard approach
is in fact to invert the order of her thought, and to overlook the fundamental object
of her criticism. For Anscombe’s claim is categorical: according to her, there is no
feature—none whatsoever—in virtue of which an action is intentional. It follows as
a mere trivial consequence of this claim that an action is not intentional in virtue
of this or that particular feature. So, to take one instance, on par with any other:
an action is not intentional in virtue of its being related thus-and-so to the agent’s
“inner states.” Anscombe does not deny the existence of a definitive extra feature be-
cause she rejects a psychological account; rather, she rejects a psychological account
because she denies the existence of a definitive extra feature.
Of course, if that is true, then for the same reason that Anscombe rejects psychol-
ogism, she must also reject behaviorism. After all, it also follows from her categorical
claim—and every bit as trivially—that an action is not intentional in virtue of its
being related thus-and-so to the agent’s “overt behavior.” Psychologism and behav-
iorism involve exactly the same commitment to a definitive extra feature, and differ
over the question which feature is definitive. Both are thus equally good examples
of the standard two-step approach, whereby we first isolate the genus of action, and
then ask what distinguishes the special object of our interest from “action in general,”
15See Velleman 2000 and 2007.
16For the charge of behaviourism, see for example Setiya 2007, p. 26.
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or from “action just as such.”17
In fairness, though, it must be said that if Anscombe’s rejection of the standard
approach has been misunderstood or neglected, she herself is in some part to blame,
offering, as she does, almost nothing by way of explanation or defense. In fact she
gives only one short argument. This appears in a single dense paragraph of Intention,
§19, where she claims to establish that “we do not add anything attaching to the
action at the time it is done by describing it as intentional.”18 The argument itself is
tremendously obscure.19 But even if it could be clarified, and were sound, it would
not tell decisively against the standard approach. For even if it somehow proved that
there is no extra feature in virtue of which an event is an action, it would not explain
what is most difficult to understand: namely, how there could fail to be one.
What maintains the standard approach in its dominant position is not the idea
that there is an extra feature, of the sort that Anscombe denied, so much as the idea
that there must be one, as a matter of logical necessity. After all, one thinks, there
clearly is a difference between action and everything else that happens. Well, then,
mustn’t there be something that makes for the difference? Something in which the
difference consists?——And if so, then is this not the explanation? And if not, then
what is?
17For Anscombe’s views on Wittgenstein and behaviorism, see her “Analytic Philosophy and the
Spirituality of Man,” (2005).
18Anscombe, Intention, (1963), p. 28.
19The details of Anscombe’s argument are discussed by Rosalind Hursthouse in “Intention,”
(2000), and by Candace Vogler, Reasonably Vicious, (2002), pp. 213–229. It is perhaps worth
noting that, however the questions of detail are ultimately resolved, Anscombe’s argument will still
be hampered by its limited scope, which is restricted to intentional action. The problem is that
intentional action is not the only privileged kind of action towards which philosophers are wont to
take the standard approach. There is also what Frankfurt calls “whole-hearted action” and what
Velleman calls “autonomous action”—to mention just two examples among many. These and other
similar kinds of action ultimately require a different treatment from intentional action, because they
are opposed to a different sort of deficiency. Unintentional action fails to be action in the full and
proper sense because it fails to express the will directly ; by contrast, action that is not e.g. “whole-
hearted” or “autonomous” fails to be action in the full and proper sense because it fails to express
the will perfectly. This distinction will be developed in Chapter 3, below.
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*The question how to approach a distinction, if not by a method of division, is one
that is raised by Marx in The German Ideology :
Man can be distinguished from the animals by consciousness, by religion, or by
anything else you please. He begins to distinguish himself from the animals the
moment he begins to produce his means of life, a step that is required by his
physical organization. By producing his means of life, man indirectly produces his
material life itself.20
The central opposition, here, between the ways that man “is distinguished” from the
animals, and the way that man “distinguishes himself,” is easily taken for a mere
rhetorical extravagance. What, after all, does it mean to say that man “distinguishes
himself”? The polemical thrust is fairly clear. Marx confronts, or so he believes, a
legitimate distinction illegitimately drawn. There are many ways of understanding
the gulf between a human being and a mere brute, which, though they may appeal
to genuine differences, are superficial and arbitrary. And a theory founded on such is
an unscientific dogma. But there is a certain way of understanding the distinction,
whose special claim to legitimacy is that it is not imposed on the world by a theorist.
It is, in some sense, operative through, and creative of, the very object that the theory
is about. So that the object of the theory “distinguishes itself.” This, I say, is the
polemical thrust. The content of the claim is more difficult to pin down.
For Marx, the special importance of production derives from its causal role in
maintaining human life. What explains the existence of human beings is in large part
the production of food, clothing and shelter. Were it not for this, there would not be
the kind of thing that a theorist prides himself on distinguishing from the animals—
by appeal to religion or whatever you please. It is by producing their means of life
that human beings maintain themselves, as the special kind of thing they are, from
day to day, and from generation to generation. “Man begets man,” as Aristotle says.
20Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, (1998), Part I, p. 37.
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But then, “Horse begets horse,” as Aristotle also says. The self-sustaining char-
acter of human life-activity is by no means uniquely human. Every kind of organism
procures its means of life. And yet, presumably, not every kind of organism “dis-
tinguishes itself.” In that case, there must be something special about the kind of
activity by which human beings maintain their lives, and the kind of lives maintained
by this activity.
Part of what it means to say that man “distinguishes himself” may be that man
himself apprehends the distinction between the animals and himself.21 That is cer-
tainly not true of a horse. And such a proposal forestalls the worry that what is
said to be “special” about a human being’s self-maintenance may itself be chosen
arbitrarily. For it assures us that the distinction is drawn by the very thing that is
distinguished. And if the drawing of this distinction belongs to the thing itself, then
it has not been imposed arbitrarily by a theorist.
But this requires care. For Marx explicitly rejects the attempt to distinguish man
by appeal to “consciousness.” This, he thinks, is just another spurious differentia. So
if part of the point of Marx’s claim is that man himself apprehends the distinction be-
tween himself and the animals, the importance of this cannot be that man apprehends
the distinction theoretically, in his ideas about himself—in the thought, for instance,
that he is no mere brute—the importance must be that he does so practically, in
action, in producing his means of life, and through his means of life, himself.22 Then
21Compare Hegel: “Man is a thinker, and is universal, but he is only a thinker inasmuch as the
universal exists for him. The animal is also in itself universal, but the universal does not exist for it
as such; for it only the singular exists. The animal sees something singular, for instance, its food, or
a man . . . . Nature does not bring Nous to consciousness of itself until man first doubles himself so
as to be a universal for a universal. This first happens when man knows that he is ‘I’,” Encyclopedia
Logic, 24, Zusatz 1.
22Shortly before the German Ideology, Marx had written: “Yet the productive life is the life of
the species. It is life-engendering life. The whole character of a species—its species character—is
contained in the character of its life-activity; and free, conscious activity is man’s species character.
[. . . ] The animal is immediately one with its life-activity. It does not distinguish itself from it. It
is its life-activity. Man makes his life-activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness.
He has conscious life-activity. It is not a determination with which he directly merges. Conscious
life-activity directly distinguishes man immediately from animal life-activity. It is just because of
this that he is a species being. Or rather, it is only because he is a species being that he is a conscious
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what proves the validity of this distinction, in contrast to others that might be drawn,
is that this one alone is presupposed by the real existence of what is distinguished.
Whether this is in fact the significance of Marx’s claim that man “distinguishes
himself,” I will not venture to say. I offer it only as a model of what I would like to say
about action. For the gulf that separates what we are from other things in the natural
world is akin to the gulf between what we do and the other things that happen. Action
can be distinguished from other events by belief, by desire, or by anything else you
please—but action, I think, distinguishes itself. The agent, in acting, draws precisely
that distinction which philosophers of action have attempted to explain. She herself
must think of what she is doing as an action, and as intentional, and not as a mere
event. In that case, the apprehension of action’s distinctive character is operative in
the genesis of any event that has this character. An action is, thus, the kind of thing
whose real existence requires it to be thought of as the kind of thing it is.
*
Or so, at least, I will argue. The argument will proceed as follows. In Chapter 2, I will
distinguish three different forms of generality. They are associated, respectively, with
the traditional ideas of an accident, a category and an essence; I therefore speak of
generality as either accidental, categorial or essential. The purpose of this preliminary
foray into extra-practical territory is to raise the following question: What kind of
generality is exemplified by each of the two canonical divisions drawn in the philosophy
of action?
Both of the divisions present us with a contrast between something somehow gen-
eral and something more specific: on the one hand, event and action; on the other
hand, action and unqualified action. And in each case, the philosopher inquires about
that which is more specific. But whether it is possible to do so by means of the stan-
dard approach must depend, in each case, on which form of generality is exemplified.
being, i.e., that his own life is an object for him. Only because of that is his activity free activity,”
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 113.
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It will emerge in the preliminary discussion of our three different forms that one kind
of species-genus relation is mediated by an accident, and that, consequently, a species
of this kind can be explained by reference to genus and differentia. However, it will
also emerge that the other two forms are not so mediated, and that, consequently,
they defy a method of division.
The recognition of two non-accidental forms of generality will enable us to under-
stand the otherwise quite perplexing claim that an action is not intentional in virtue
of “an extra property which a philosopher must try to describe.”23 And once we have
seen what it would amount to for Anscombe’s claim to be true, we will have overcome
the greatest obstacle to accepting that it is true. For, as I mentioned, what secures
the position of the standard approach is above all just the appearance that there could
not fail to be an “extra feature.” But we will have encountered two different ways for
there not to be anything of the sort.
If there are, indeed, two forms of genus-species relation that are unmediated by
an accident, then the standard approach in the philosophy of action depends on a
significant, but uncritical assumption. The assumption is that each of the two canon-
ical divisions presents us with an example of accidental generality. For it is only on
this assumption that the standard approach is viable. If, however, the assumption is
false, then the differences between one accidentalist theory and another—between, for
example, the “belief-desire” model associated with Davidson and the “hierarchical”
model championed by Frankfurt—these differences will turn out to be of very little
significance, because no such theory can succeed in explaining its object.
Of course, I do not intend to leave it an open question. The negative aim of
this dissertation is to vindicate Anscombe’s claim that the standard approach in
the philosophy of action “leads us into inextricable confusions, and we must give it
up.”24 I will argue that there is no definitive extra feature, either of action, or of any
privileged kind of action that a philosopher might care to discuss, the reason being
23Anscombe, Intention, (1963), p. 84.
24Ibid., p. 29.
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that neither of the two canonical divisions is a case of accidental generality.
I will treat the divisions in reverse order, starting in Chapter 3, with the distinction
between qualified and unqualified action. The aim of this chapter is to argue that
action theory is, in the first instance, ideal action theory. My position will be that
the fundamental case of action—the one that exhibits its “essence,” if you like—is
an action that is both intentional and also free from any defect or disturbance. In
that case, the question “What is unqualified action?” is ultimately reducible to the
question “What is action?” This is a possibility that we will have been prepared for
by the preliminary discussion of essential generality.
In Chapter 4, I will turn to the distinction between a mere event and an action.
The argument that this distinction cannot be understood by reference to an extra
feature will occupy me for the rest of the dissertation. The leading idea will be that
the concept “action” refers to a category that is practical in the following sense: an
agent must deploy it in the course of bringing about whatever could fall under it. A
practical category is one that, in Marx’s phrase, “distinguishes itself.” If “action”
refers to such a category, then any attempt to describe a definitive extra feature is
doomed to circularity. For a complete description of the putative feature must refer to
the agent’s thought, and the agent’s thought must in turn make reference to precisely
that which it wanted to explain.
The circle that arises in connection with an agent’s thought is, I think, just a
special instance of a general, and not entirely unfamiliar phenomenon. It is in general
the case that one falls into circularity whenever one tries to explain what is categorially
more determinate by reference to its determinable genus and a differentia. The scope
of this phenomenon is one we will survey in the preliminary account of categorial
generality.
But this position is sure to encounter considerable resistance. For it amounts to
the suggestion that a certain thesis defended by many—perhaps most—philosophers
of action is incompatible with the method they employ. In general, philosophers of
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action profess to believe that action is essentially self-conscious. But the argument
entails that this is in fact what dooms the standard approach.
Overcoming the resistance will require us to consider what it is to represent an
event as an action. The reason that a circle arises—according to the account of
Chapter 4—is that an agent, in acting, must think of herself as doing precisely that:
acting. Chapter 5 takes up the question what is involved in thinking of an event
as an action, rather than a mere event. Certainly it cannot require a person to
deploy the predicate “. . . is an action.” But if not as part of the explicit content of
an agent’s thought, then in what other way does the category of action inform the
agent’s thinking? I will argue that in order to think of an event as an action, one must
think of it as having a distinctive kind of internal complexity. It is its possession of
a certain temporal and purposive structure that characterizes an event as an action.
The description of this structure is the main business of Chapter 5.
This dovetails with the positive aim of the dissertation. For my argument against
the standard approach is at the same time an argument for a certain alternative.
According to Anscombe, the task of the philosopher of action is to display what she
calls “a form of description”25—“an order which is there wherever actions are done
with intentions.”26 Unfortunately, her remarks about this are just as elusive as her
argument against an extra feature. One aim of Chapter 5 is, thus, to clarify and
motivate the alternative approach.
Having tried to explain what it is to think of an event as an action, I will return,
in the Conclusion, to the acting subject herself, and specifically to her thought that
what she is doing is acting. For if action is a practical category, then all that is
essential to it must be represented in the agent’s own thought.
25Ibid., p. 84.
26Ibid., p. 80.
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2.0 THREE FORMS OF GENERALITY
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Anscombe’s rejection of the standard approach is predicated on the claim that inten-
tional action cannot be explained by reference to “any mere ‘extra feature’ of events
whose description would otherwise be the same.”1 But the meaning of this is not
immediately clear.
To many it will seem that there must be an extra feature in virtue of which an
event is an action, and in virtue of which an action is intentional; and this will seem to
be the case for reasons having nothing to do with the philosophy of action or ethics,
but purely as a matter of logical or metaphysical necessity. All sides agree that every
action is an event, but not every event is an action; and every intentional action is
an action, but not every action is intentional. Let us say that B is a “species” of A,
and that A is conversely a “genus” of B, if something’s being B entails that it is A,
but something’s being A does not entail that it is B. Then if the standard approach
in practical philosophy appears, at first blush, utterly beyond criticism, the reason is
in some part simply this, that action is a species of event, and intentional action of
action.
But this alone cannot explain the allure of the standard approach. By itself,
the fact that action is a species of event, and intentional action of action, does not
support the standard approach in the least. It does, however, if it is combined with
1Anscombe, Intention, (1963), p. 88.
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the following common reflex assumption: that wherever there is a contrast between a
species and its genus, there must also be a differentia in terms of which to understand
the contrast. This idea appears at once so innocent and obvious that any claim to
the contrary is apt to be met with bafflement. One is simply sure there must be
something the presence of which accounts for the specificity of the species, and the
absence of which explains the generality of the genus; and it is, at bottom, this idea
that gives the standard approach its air of unquestionable legitimacy.
The aim of the present chapter is to dispute the common reflex assumption—to
show that, in fact, there is not, for every difference, a differentia. I will attempt to
describe three irreducibly different ways in which a species may fall under its genus.
In the course of this discussion, it will emerge that one the three types of genus-species
relation is mediated by a differentia; but also, importantly, that the other two are
not. The result will be that only a species of the first variety can be explained by
means of a two-step approach, whereby we first isolate the genus, and then identify
a distinguishing mark. Species of the other two varieties defy explanation by genus
and differentia; and their defiance takes a characteristic form: if one tries to explain
them by means of the standard approach, the resulting account is inevitably circular.
2.2 ACCIDENTAL GENERALITY
There is, as I said, one type of species-genus relation that is mediated by a differentia.
To borrow a famous example from Aristotle, every snub nose is a nose, but not every
nose is snub: so snub nose is a species of nose. No special difficulty is posed by the
equation: nose + x = snub nose. What is left over, if you subtract the fact that
Socrates has a nose from the fact that he has a snub nose, is whatever it is to be
concave. So here there is a definitive extra feature. Or, to take another example, this
time from Chisholm, every brother is a male, but not every male is a brother. Again,
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there is a straightforward solution to the equation: male + y = brother . What is left
over, if you subtract the fact that I am a male from the fact that I am a brother, is
whatever it is to be a sibling.
Let us consider the equations nose + concavity = snub nose and male + sibling =
brother in a little more detail. That which is represented by the first term of each
equation—i.e. the genus—is independent from that which is represented by the other
two terms. It is “independent” in the following sense: in order to explain what a nose
is, one need not mention, much less explain, what concavity is, or what a snub nose
is; and in order to explain what a male is, one need not mention or explain what a
sibling is, or what a brother is. Meanwhile, that which is represented by the second
term of each equation—i.e. the differentia—enjoys exactly the same independence.
One need neither explain nor even mention what a nose is, or what a snub nose is, in
order to explain what concavity is; and one need neither explain nor mention what a
male is, or what a brother is, in order to explain what a sibling is. By sharp contrast,
that which is represented by the third term of each equation—i.e. the species—is
utterly dependent on that which is represented by the other two terms. In order to
explain what a snub nose is, one must not only mention, but explain both what a
nose is and what concavity is; and in order to explain what a brother is, one must
mention and explain both what a male is and what a sibling is.
Where the contrast between a species and its genus is mediated by an independent
quality, or “accident,” and where, consequently, a two-step approach is required to
account for the species, I will call the latter an accidental species. And the relation
of an accidental species to its genus is what I will call accidental generality.
The account of an accidental species presupposes that of its genus, because the
species is itself a secondary, or derivative kind of thing. Something belongs to an
accidental species in virtue of belonging to the relevant genus, and not the other way
around. Something is a snub nose in virtue of being inter alia a nose; it is not a nose
in virtue of being a snub nose. And someone is a brother because he is a male, a male
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who happens to be a sibling; he is certainly not a male because he is a brother. Here
the genus is not only logically more abstract than its species, but also metaphysically
more fundamental. This is one important form of generality and specificity. It is not,
however, the only form.
2.3 CATEGORIAL GENERALITY
2.3.1 The Categorial Species and its Genus
Every horse is an animal, but not every animal is a horse: so horse is a species of
animal—as indeed one would expect. But to the question, “What is left over if I
subtract the fact that Bucephalus is an animal from the fact that he is a horse?” no
answer is forthcoming. For the question assumes that Bucephalus is a horse in virtue
of something additional to—and thus separable from—his animality, whereas in fact
his being a horse is nothing but the determinate form that his animality takes. In
that case, however, there is no solution to the equation: animal + x = horse. Or, to
take another example, everything red is colored, but not everything colored is red.
About this case, A. N. Prior writes:
[W]e do sometimes call “the red” and “the blue” species of “the coloured”; though
we do not do so [. . . ] because the red possesses some quality added to or conjoined
with its colour, and the blue possesses some different quality added to or conjoined
with its colour—some quality which, in each case, might have been given first, and
“coloured” added on afterwards. The colour of what is red is its redness; and the
colour of what is blue is its blueness; we can say that the red and the blue agree
in being coloured, but of their difference we can only say either that their colour is
different, or that one is red and the other blue.2
If “the color of what is red is its redness,” then no version of Wittgenstein’s question
is legitimate, here, because no value can solve for the equation: color + y = red .
2A. N. Prior, “Determinables, Determinates, and Determinants (I),” (1949a), pp. 5–6. And
compare his “Determinables, Determinates, and Determinants (II),” (1949b).
18
Following W. E. Johnson, and others, Prior calls red a “determinate” and color a
“determinable.”3 And though I will sometimes speak this way myself, I will in general
prefer the terms “categorial species” and “categorial genus,” as these tend to give some
indication—if only a very vague one—of the kind of specificity and generality that is
at issue.4
No quality can account for the contrast between a categorial species and its
genus—or, at any rate, no quality that is logically independent of the species. Con-
cavity, the quality that distinguishes a snub nose from all the rest, is not a quality
unique to snub noses: it belongs to many other sorts of thing, and has, as it were,
a life of its own. But now, if there is a quality that distinguishes a horse from all
other animals, it is a quality that nothing could possibly have—except a horse. On
the one hand, obviously, no other animal could have it, or else the quality would not
be distinctive. On the other hand, less obviously, nothing could have it except an
animal. It is true that a horse differs from an octopus in various respects, and that in
3The locus classicus of the determinable-determinate relation is the eleventh chapter of John-
son’s Logic, Vol. 1, (1921), pp. 173–185. Before Johnson, Brentano discussed the relation—the
discovery of which he attributed to Aristotle—under the name “one-sided detachability” (or some-
times “one-sided separability”); see The Theory of Categories (1981), pp. 111–116; and Descriptive
Psychology (1982), pp. 12–19. Brentano’s view is discussed by Chisholm in “Brentano on One-Sided
Detachability,” (1987), pp. 153–159. Chisholm introduces the idea to action theory in “Adverbs and
Subdeterminates,” (1985), pp. 324–328. For a general discussion of the topic, see Prior’s two articles
of 1949, cited above. See also John Searle, “Determinables and the Notion of Resemblance,” (1959);
David Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs, (1997), pp. 48–63; and Eric Funkhouser, “The
Determinable-Determinate Relation,” (2006), pp. 548–569. The idea has been put to work outside
of action theory by, for instance, Stephen Yablo, “Mental Causation,” (1992); see also Timothy
Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits, (2000), 1–48.
4A word about terminology. The relation between nose and snub nose shares something in
common with the relation between color and red ; and it is most natural to characterize what is
common by saying that the first term in each pair is general and the second is specific; I therefore
speak of a “genus” and of a “species” in both sorts of case. In order to mark that something is
different in the second sort of case, I have elected to speak of a “categorial genus” and of a “categorial
species.” I used to speak instead of a “determinable genus” and a “determinate species,” but gave
it up. The problem with the latter is that the adjective “determinate” is a synonym for “specific,”
and “determinable” is a synonym for “specifiable,” which just means “general.” And it obviously
carries no information to speak of a “general genus” and of a “specific species,” which is what the
terms “determinable genus” and “determinate species” amount to.
Not everything that I call a “categorial species” is itself a category, in the traditional sense: horse,
for example, is not. But horse is a determination of a category—namely, substance—and on these
grounds it is fitting, I think, to call it a categorial species.
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many of these it also differs from an iceberg: e.g. in respect of its weight, smell, tex-
ture, volume, temperature and flamability. But a horse also differs from an octopus
in ways that it could only differ from another animal: e.g. in respect of its organs
and members, and in respect of its manner of nourishing itself, and of reproducing,
and of moving itself from place to place. The latter are differences internal to the
genus. Just as what is red and what is blue differ in respect of color, and what is a
square and what is a circle differ in respect of shape, and what is over here and what
is over there differ in respect of place, so, too, what is a horse and what is an octopus
differ in respect of animality. And this is the respect that matters, if what we aim to
understand is the nature of a horse; this is the respect in which we must reveal it as
“distinct.” Now given that only what is an animal can be alike or different in respect
of animality, and given that whatever is indistinguishable from a horse in respect of
animality is a horse—given all that, it is clear that if there is, in fact, a quality that
distinguishes a horse in the salient respect, this must be a quality that nothing could
possibly have except a horse. And similarly, if there is, in fact, a quality “added to
or conjoined with” a thing’s being colored, in virtue of which it is red, this must be
a quality that only a color could possess, and only red among colors.
No such quality could ever fulfill the explanatory function of a differentia, because
it is logically dependent on the explanandum. Since such a quality can only belong
to one kind of thing, an account of the quality will have to make reference to this
very kind of thing: there is, by hypothesis, no other way for the intellect to grasp it.
But then it will be circular to appeal to such a quality in an account of the kind of
thing to which it belongs.
Because of this, an account of a categorial species must be altogether different from
an account of an accidental species. It is necessary, as we saw in the previous section,
to proceed from a prior understanding of the genus, nose, to a posterior understanding
of the species, snub nose, by way of an understanding of an independent quality. But
there is no similar passage from animal to horse, or from colored to red. Thus the two-
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step approach, by which we first explain (or assume) the genus, and then distinguish
the object of inquiry from everything else within that genus, is impossible with respect
to a categorial species.
The need, here, for a different kind of account reflects a different metaphysical
order: whereas an accidental species is posterior to its genus, a categorial species is
prior. Earlier we saw that something belongs to an accidental species in virtue of
belonging to the relevant genus: a person is a brother, for instance, because he is
inter alia a male. But something belongs to a categorial genus in virtue of belonging
to one or another categorial species thereof. So, for instance, a surface is colored
because it is red, or because it is blue; it is not red, or blue, because it is colored.
And Bucephalus’ being a horse does not consist in his being an animal; rather, his
being an animal consists in his being a horse. The categorial species, though less
abstract, is more fundamental than its genus.
W. E. Johnson marks the same contrast where he distinguishes two different ways
in which several species can be joined under a common genus: in one kind of case,
the similarity of the species is the ground of their unity; in another kind of case, their
difference is the ground. The obvious kinship of a snub nose and an aquiline nose
derives from something they share in common: viz. being a nose. But, according to
Johnson, “what is most prominently notable about red, green and yellow is that they
are different, and even, as we may say, opponent to one another.”5 The contrariety, or
“opponent” difference, of red and green is to be contrasted with the “mere otherness,”
as Johnson puts it, of e.g. red and square. Johnson continues:
What is here true of colour is true of shape, pitch, feeling-tone, pressure, and so
on: the ground for grouping determinates under one and the same determinable is
not any partial agreement between them that could be revealed by analysis, but the
unique and peculiar kind of difference that subsists between the several determinates
under the same determinable, and which does not subsist between any one of them
and an adjective under some other determinable.6
5Johnson, Logic, Vol. I, (1921), pp. 175–176.
6Ibid., p. 176.
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Johnson’s point is not, I think, to deny that there is similarity as well as difference
among the species of a categorial genus. His point is simply that their difference is
the predominating element: it is that through which alone we see them as similar.
These considerations show, I think, that the bare concept of a species is, in the
words of Kit Fine, “insensitive to source.”7 If all we know is that A is a genus of
which B is a species, it always makes good sense to ask: What is the source of the
truth of it that, as we know, every B is at the same time also an A? Is it the case
that something is a B, because it is, among other things, an A? Or is it, perhaps,
that something is an A, because it is, for instance, a B? Does the species in question
transpire from its genus, or the genus from its species?
It must be borne in mind that nothing depends on any putative example of catego-
rial generality; all that matters, here, is the reader’s recognition of a second intelligible
pattern—a pattern that could in principle receive many diverse instantiations. Even
if it is false, it is at least intelligible, and therefore also arguable, that human being is
a categorial species of rational being, water of liquid, four of number, private property
of property, bread of food, knife of instrument, chess of game, seeing of knowing, and
walking home of going home. And the history of philosophy is rich with apparent
examples. Take, for instance, Frege’s distinction between concept and object. These,
he says, are “logically simple” and cannot be given proper definitions.8 But they
surely could be given proper definitions, and not just Frege’s “hints,” if they were
accidental species of some common prior genus—if, that is, we could first grasp of
the nature of an “entity,” and if we could then divide the class of such things in two,
distinguishing the ones with holes from the ones without.9
7See Kit Fine, “Essence and Modality,” (1994), p. 9.
8Gottlob Frege, “Concept and Object,” (1952), 42–43.
9This point is made by Michael Thompson in, “The Representation of Life,” in Action and Life,
(2008), Chapter 2. In that essay, Thompson addresses the question whether life can be given a real
definition. Thompson argues against the idea that organism is an accidental species of material
substance. His view is (as I would put it) that the former is a categorial species of the latter, and,
moreover, that the former is a logical category, just as the latter is said to be in a tradition that
descends from Aristotle. Thompson’s view will be discussed below, in Section 2.3.2.
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Or take Aristotle’s doctrine of the categories. It is a well-known thesis of his that
no differentia mediates the contrast between being and, for instance, being human,
or being six feet tall.10 Thus we cannot explain what substance is, or what quantity
is, by first explaining “being in general,” and then pointing to an attribute of being
that distinguishes one way of being from the rest. To paraphrase Prior, we can say
that substance and quantity agree in being categories, but of their difference we can
only say either that their category is different, or that one is substance and the other
quantity.
Consider as a final example the distinction we are presently drawing, the distinc-
tion between categorial species and accidental species. These latter would appear to
be categorial species, not accidental species, of species. In that case, the notion of
generality and specificity with which we began is itself an abstraction—an abstraction
that transpires from various prior concrete forms of generality and specificity. And if
there are, in fact, such prior concrete forms, it ought to be clear that they cannot be
given proper definitions, or subjected to analysis: it is only through the perception
of their “unique and peculiar kind of difference”—triggered, perhaps, by an artful
array of examples—that we are so much as able to form the idea of a kinship or bond
between them.11
Suffice it to say that if there is any such thing as a categorial species, then the
common reflex assumption is false: there is not, for every difference, a differentia;
not every contrast drawn between something somehow general and something more
specific is mediated by an extra feature; and not every object of inquiry is suited to
a method of division.
10The Aristotelian dictum that “being is not a genus” means, I think, that being is not what I
would call an accidental genus. See Posterior Analytics, 92b14; see also Metaphysics, B.3, 998b22.
11If accidental species and categorial species are categorial species of species, then it is hopeless
to try to expound the contrast by drafting a list of conditions that are necessary and sufficient for
a species to be categorial. The latter project, which was first undertaken by Searle (1959), was
later developed by John Woods, “On Species and Determinates,” (1967); it has been criticized by
Richmond H. Thomason, “Species, Determinates and Natural Kinds,” (1969).
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2.3.2 The Irreducibility of this Form
But is this really a second form of genus-species relation, or might it somehow be
reducible to the first? One reason to be suspicious is that many of the formulas that
philosophers use to explain the idea of categorial generality seem not, in fact, to secure
its logical distinctiveness. When introducing the categorial genus, one inevitably
wants to say, for example, that there is no such thing as color in the abstract, or
color in general, but only specific colors, like red and blue and yellow. However, this
leaves it unclear why one should not also say that there is no such thing as a nose in
general, but only a nose of this or that shape: after all, every nose is either concave,
or convex, or some shape in between. It does not help to add that a snub nose and an
aquiline nose differ in respect of something that is unrelated to their genus—namely,
shape—whereas red and blue differ in respect of color. For what is to prevent one
from saying that noses of different shape differ, not only in respect of shape, but also
in respect of being a nose?
Another reason to be suspicious is that attempts to elucidate categorial generality
tend to focus on the example of color. They do so, presumably, because it is in
connection with color that the existence of a second form of genus-species relation
seems most plausible. Faced with the question, “What distinguishes red from other
colors?” we are stunned and speechless; we gape. But we have no difficulty answering
the question, “What distinguishes a snub nose from other noses?” And this is a very
striking contrast. It is natural to think that what explains our inability to answer
the first question is the fact that there is nothing that stands to a color as concavity
stands to a snub nose. But this is perhaps too quick. If we cannot say how red is
different from other colors, the explanation may just be that color is a subject on
which we can say hardly anything. We cannot give a discursive account of red, either
by reference to genus and differentia, or by any other means—we simply cannot give
one. It therefore proves little that, when we try to say what differentiates a color, we
find ourselves at a loss for words.
24
Besides, color is an exceptional case. One typically has something, and often a
great deal to say about how a categorial species is different from its congenerics. Sissy
Jupe, in the Dickens novel Hard Times, “was thrown into the greatest alarm” when
asked to give the definition of a horse—much to her schoolmaster’s horror: “Girl
number twenty unable to define a horse! Girl number twenty possessed of no facts,
in reference to one of the commonest animals!” And yet, however things may stand
with Sissy Jupe, we do not expect a philosopher to be dumbstruck, but to reply in
the manner of white-eyed Bitzer:
Quadruped. Graminivorous. Forty teeth, namely twenty-four grinders, four eye-
teeth, and twelve incisive. Sheds coat in the spring; in marshy countries, sheds
hoofs, too. Hoofs hard, but requiring to be shod with iron. Age known by marks
in mouth.12
But now, what has Bitzer given, if not the definition of a horse, by reference to genus
and differentia? For let us suppose that what Bitzer says is true, and that the qualities
he adduces really do distinguish a horse from all other animals. In that case, it is
difficult to see how his mention of them is any different from the mention of concavity
in connection with a snub nose. So perhaps after all there is something “left over”
when we subtract the fact that Bucephalus is a horse from the fact that he is animal:
the metaphysical remainder is just whatever would answer to a true account of the sort
provided by Bitzer. In that case, there cannot be any deep distinction between the
way that horse is related to animal and the way that snub nose is related to nose.13
12“Thus (and much more) Bitzer,” in Chapter 2 of Hard Times, by Charles Dickens.
13This is evidently Searle’s opinion (1959). He treats the relation between being an animal and
being a specific kind of animal as a paradigm case of accidental generality. Here is the way he
introduces the contrast between the two kinds of generality (note that he uses “species” as I use
“accidental species”): “A species is marked off within a genus by means of differentia. Thus, e.g., the
class of humans (species) is included within the class of animals (genus) but marked off from other
classes within that class in that each human possesses other properties—forty-eight chromosomes, a
certain shape, etc. (Philosophers always say that the differentia is rationality. It is not of course but
for shorthand let us suppose that it is)—which constitute the differentia. And it is the possession
of these differential properties as well as membership of the genus which entails of each human
that it is human. No analogous specification of a species via differentia exists for the relation
of determinates to determinables. Both species and determinates are included within genus and
determinable respectively—all humans are animals and all red things are coloured—but whereas we
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And this is a problem that arises systematically. Whenever one has something to say
about what differentiates the species, determinate specification threatens to collapse
back into the accidental.14
What we need to consider in the face of this threat is the logical character of what
one has to say about how a categorial species is different from its congenerics. Recall
that the original argument for the distinctiveness of categorial generality depended
on the idea that the contrast between a categorial species and its genus cannot be
drawn by reference to a quality that is independent of the species. If that is right,
then although it may be possible to adduce a list of qualities distinctive of a categorial
species, the adduced qualities must be such as to logically depend on the species; in
that case, however, they cannot contribute to a non-circular account of it.
Of course, this would have to be argued case by case. We find the material for
two such arguments in Michael Thompson’s essay, “The Representation of Life.”15
In that essay, Thompson attempts to give what he calls a “logical” treatment of the
idea of life—an account on which an organism is, not just different, but categorically
different from other kinds of substance. Thompson is opposed to the idea that “living
things are just some among the concrete individuals we think about, marked off from
others in quite definite ways.” On his view, thought about the living is characterized
by a distinctive form, rather than just a distinctive content, and his positive aim is to
articulate that form. His corresponding negative aim is to argue that life cannot be
given a real definition, or metaphysical analysis. According to him, it is impossible
to explain what it is for something to be alive by refernce to a list of qualities that
can say “all humans are animals which are rational”, how could we fill the gap left for a differntia in
“all things are coloured things which are . . . .”? The only word which presents itself as a candidate
is “red” itself!” p. 142.
14The problem here is not that categorial generality will cease to be of interest if it turns out
that the only examples of it are ones like color, about which we are utterly speechless. After
all, philosophers who have recognized determinability only in a narrow range of cases have still
considered it an important logical phenomenon—and rightly so. The problem is rather that we risk
being distracted by idiosyncratic features of certain examples. If our speechlessness about color is
not essential to categorial generality, then we do well to consider examples about which one has
something to say. Otherwise, we are bound to misunderstand even the case of color.
15In Thompson 2008.
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differentiate the living. If he is right, there is no solution to the equation: substance +
x = organism.
In arguing for this negative point, Thompson considers a list of qualities that
might be thought to differentiate an organism. The list is drawn from a stan-
dard college biology textbook and includes such things as that organisms are highly
organized—meaning, roughly, that they have many parts—and that they grow, and
move and reproduce. One by one, Thompson argues that the items on the list fail
to contribute to a real definition, and always for the same reason. The reason is (as
I would put it) that a characteristic like growth is itself subject to determination.
Organisms grow, but so does the national debt; so does an icicle; and so does a pile
of dirty laundry. What is characteristic of an organism is presumably not something
common to every sort of growth—supposing even that there is something common—
but a certain particular kind of growth. And there seems to be no way of specifying
this kind except by appeal to the idea of an organism. For what is characteristic of
an organism is, as one might say, organic growth.
If the genus substance is related to the species organism in exactly the same way
that growth is related to organic growth, and movement to organic movement, and
part to organic part, then it seems impossible to define an organism by reference to
any of these terms—nor, indeed, by reference to a conjunction of all of them. Suppose,
for instance, that we tried to define an organism as a substance having parts. The
“parts” to which we appealed would have to be understood either determinately or
determinably. If our appeal was to specifically organic parts—i.e. to organs—then
our attempt to give a real definition would be ruined by circularity. On the other
hand, if we appealed to “parts” in the generic sense that cars and poems both have
parts—invoking what is common to a carburator and a stanza—our account would
fail for the opposite reason, namely, that it was too abstract. In the latter case it
would contain too little information to satisfy the metaphysical ambition which led
us to search for differentiae in the first place. After all, someone who knew only that
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an organism is a substance with “parts,” generically understood, would have no idea
what an organism is.
Nor does it help to conjoin the qualities that are supposed to differentiate life. For
each of them must be understood either determinably or determinately. If any is taken
determinately we fall back into the circle; so all must be taken determinably. Suppose,
then, that we tried to defined an organism as a substance associated with generically-
understood “parts,” generically-understood “movement” and generically-understood
“growth.” Rather than reducing the original obscurity, this merely compounds it by
multiplying the respects in which we must cleave to abstraction. For now we must
frame a conception of a substance that has “parts” in a sense broad enough to cover
the parts of a crystal and those of a wristwatch, and that “moves” in a sense broad
enough to cover the movement of a comet and that of a wind-blown leaf, and that
“grows” in a sense broad enough to cover the growth of a stalactite and that of a star.
The more determinable qualities we invoke—the more complete and many-sided our
abstraction—the more it becomes clear that we have failed to advance beyond the
general idea of a material substance.
If an argument of this general shape is sound, then the list of qualities distinctive
of life cannot contribute to a real definition: the items on the list are all in the same
boat, logically speaking, as what they are meant to distinguish.
It is part of Thompson’s doctrine that the logical category denoted by “life” is a
category of forms of life. To represent something as alive—and thus, as falling under
the genus organism—is, he thinks, to see it as belonging to a concrete life-form, or
species, like horse. On Thompson’s view, the relation between being a horse and
being an animal is very different from that between being an organism and being
a substance: with substance and organism we have two categories, one of which is
subordinate to the other; with organism and horse we have a category and a concrete
form—a form that is, though indeed something general, at the same time also in
certain way particular; the sort of thing that used to be called an infima species. But
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this difference need not prevent its being the case that we have, here, two examples of
categorial generality. And, in fact, there seem to be a number of striking similarities.
Consider, for instance, that someone attempting to define a horse will inevitably
appeal to the horse’s parts and vital processes: one will say, like Bitzer, that a horse
has four feet and forty teeth, and that it eats grain and sheds in the spring. But the
appeal to a part or vital process can only contribute to a real definition if something’s
being a “foot,” say, or “eating,” is available to thought in advance of its being that
of a particular kind of animal. Such an appeal thus quietly assumes that something’s
being a “foot” is like its being “four in number,” or that something’s being “shedding”
is like its being “in April.” And this assumption appears unjustified. For whatever it
is that leads one to say (ineptly) that there is no such thing as an animal in general,
but only an animal of this or that kind, will also make one want to say that there is no
such thing as a foot in general, but only that of, e.g., a horse, a clam or a mosquito.
And while it is true that each of these animals has a foot—and each as much as any
other—their feet are as different as the animals themselves, and different in the same
way. Being a foot, like being an animal, would seem to be something determinable,
so that the genus foot is related to the species equine foot in exactly the same way
that the genus animal is related to species horse. In that case, if we tried to define
a horse as a four-footed animal, the “foot” to which we appealed would have to be
understood either determinably or determinately. But if what we appealed to was
something common between the feet of every footed creature, it would be too abstract
to serve the purposes of a real definition: it would not carry enough information to
adequately characterize the equine foot. But how can one specify what is distinctive
about a horse’s foot without appealing to—a horse?
Let us try. In order to distinguish the equine foot from other feet, we might
try saying that a horse has, in particular, a hoofed foot. But so of course do other
animals. The genus hoofed foot is evidently one of the same sort as foot. And just
like foot, the genus hoofed foot is related to the species equine foot as a determinable
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to a determinate. We might then try saying that a horse has, not just a foot, and not
just a hoofed foot, but a hoofed foot of such-and-such a size and of such-and-such a
shape. But this does not seem to help. For even if there were no animal apart from a
horse whose foot fit the given description, this would only show the poverty of earthly
fauna. As a matter of fact, there is more than one kind of animal in existence with
hoofed feet; but this is only a contingent profusion in the variety of species: the horse
might have been the only one. And if, as a matter of fact, the horse is the only kind of
an animal in existence with hoofed feet of such-and-such a size and of such-and-such
a shape, this is nothing but a contingent deficiency. After all, another such an animal
might have evolved, and might still yet. It happened once, why shouldn’t it happen
again? And if it did happen again, then, just in virtue of its separate genesis, the
animal in question would not be a horse, and its foot would not be a horse’s foot. But
the same must go for any other merely physical or chemical description of a horse’s
foot. It must always define a categorial genus under which something other than a
horse’s foot could conceivably fall. This is not the case with respect to an accidental
species: a nose that is concave is ipso facto a snub nose; a sibling that is male is
ipso facto a brother. But, obviously, one cannot define a horse as an animal with
feet of such-and-such a sort, if this description might apply equally well to an animal
that is not a horse. And this is a problem that will arise with respect to any vital
part or process: it will be impossible to shore up the purported “definition” against
counter-examples, because there will always be the recalcitrant possibility of another
categorial species falling under the same categorial genus.
It seems, then, that the only way to say what differentiates the vital part or process
of a horse is by reference to a horse. But, on pain of circularity, we cannot appeal to a
horse in the definition of one. Then whether we are considering the relation between
animal and horse or that between substance and organism, the attempt to define
the categorial species by reference to genus and differentia appears to founder for the
same reason: we cannot frame a sufficiently determinate conception of the differentia
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that is logically independent of the species.
In the end, the case of color is really not so exceptional after all. It is true that we
can say much about the distinctive character of a horse, and nothing about that of
redness. But what we can say about a horse does not contribute to a real definition—
and so, from a certain point of view, may as well be nothing. Like the color red, a
horse is not the sort of thing that has a definition; and should someone nevertheless
ask us to provide one, the only appropriate response would be the stunned silence of
girl number twenty.
*
These considerations may help to explain some of the things that philosophers have
wanted to say about the contrast between categorial and accidental generality. Earlier
I noted the tendency to characterize the generality of a categorial genus by saying, for
instance, that there is no such thing as an animal in general, but only an animal of
this or that kind, or that there is no such thing as a color in general, but only different
colors. What a claim like this expresses, I think, is that the species in question are
prior to the genus, and not the other way around. The distinctive priority of such a
species consists in the fact that, as we have just seen, it is differentiated by qualities
that cannot be characterized independently of it. If a species of this sort were not
available to thought in advance of its genus, we could not think of it at all.
But the question arose whether the same thing could also be said about a paradigm
case of accidental generality—whether one could say, for instance, that there is no
such thing as a nose in general, but only a nose of this or that shape. If successful,
such a move would assimilate the relation between animal and horse to that between
nose and snub nose. The answer is that the same thing cannot be said, because, in
the relevant sense, there is such a thing as a nose in general.
The question “What is it?” if asked in reference to Socrates, might receive the
answer: A fleshy, Greek, pale human being. But there is intuitively another way of
hearing the question on which the true answer is simply: a human being. For that
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is what he really is, or what he is most of all. This, at any rate, was Aristotle’s
judgment:
If one is to say of the individual man what he is, it will be in place to give the
species or the genus (though more informative to give the species than the genus);
but to give any of the other things would be out of place—for example, to say pale
or runs or anything like that.16
According to Aristotle, there is a certain sense of the question “What?” in answer to
which it is relevant to mention both that Socrates is an animal, and that he is a human
being, but not that he is fleshy, Greek or pale. This is consistent with acknowledging
the obvious sense in which the statement “Socrates is a Greek human being” is more
specific and informative than “Socrates is a human being.” The point is just that
there is a way of hearing the question “What?” according to which the first statement
is not more informative—according to which the most informative thing that one can
say about Socrates is that he is a human being. To be indifferent to a difference is
sometimes appropriate. And if Aristotle is right, then, although every human being
is Greek, or Persian or what have you, there is an important sense in which every
human being is a human being in general, or a human being simpliciter.
The same point could be put by saying that a Greek and a Persian differ only
accidentally, and not in respect of what each of them is. If there were anything like a
science of the human, it would be indifferent to the contrast between a Greek and a
Persian—as indifferent as chemistry is to the contrast between gold from China and
gold from Peru. All gold is from someplace or other, but not to the chemist: to the
chemist, all gold is gold in general. Chinese gold and Peruvian gold do not differ in
16Categories, 2b30. And compare: “It is clear, too, on the face of it that the man who signifies
what something is signifies sometimes a substance, sometimes a quality, sometimes some one of the
other types of predicate. For when a man is set before him and he says that what is set before him
is a man or an animal, he states what it is and signifies a substance; but when a white colour is set
before him and he says that what is set there is white or is a colour, he states what it is and signifies
a quality. Likewise, also, if a magnitude of a cubit be set before him and he says that what is set
there is a cubit or a magnitude, he will be describing what it is and signifying a quantity. Likewise,
also, in the other cases; for each of these kinds of predicate, if either it be asserted of itself, or its
genus be asserted of it, signifies what something is,” Topics, 103b27-34.
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respect of what each of them most of all is; they do not differ with respect to being
gold—no more than a persian and a Greek differ in respect of their humanity.
And as with Socrates so also with his nose. The question “What is it?” might
elicit the answer: a pale, Greek, concave human nose. But there is a sense of the
question according to which the true answer is simply: a human nose. Those who
study the anatomy of the nose are utterly indifferent to the difference between one
that is pale and one that is dark, or between one that is Greek and one that is Persian,
or between one that is concave and one that is convex. Such differences are nothing to
an anatomist, because they are not differences in respect of being a nose—or, if you
like, in respect of nasality. If the anatomist is right to be indifferent to such differences,
then there is such a thing as a nose in general. A nose in general is what every actual
particular nose—whether snub, or aquiline or something in between—really is, or is
most of all.
To say this is not, of course, to explain the relevant sense of the question “What?”
but only to point out that the question is intelligible: one sees the kind of indiffer-
ence to a difference that it calls for. And in doing so, one cannot help but register
the distinction between categorial and accidental generality. After all, that to which
the question “What?” requires us to be indifferent is precisely an accident, or extra
feature—the sort of quality that mediates the contrast between an accidental species
and its genus. This means that the contrast between categorial and accidental gen-
erality is presupposed by the intelligibility of the relevant sense of this question.
It also brings out the intimate relation between these forms of generality. I sug-
gested earlier that categorial species and accidental species are categorial species of
species. If that is true, then they are categorial species of a very special sort, and
constitute what we might call “reciprocal forms,” in that the understanding of each
must make reference to the other. In this respect, they are like Frege’s categories of
concept and object, and like Aristotle’s categories of action and passion. Not every
pair of categorial species is like this. The tarantula and the horse are, we have sup-
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posed, two categorial species of animal, each of which could exist, and be understood,
without the other. But it is in some sense through reflection on categorial generality
that we come to understand the accidental, and vice versa. And just as each of these
two forms sheds light upon the other, both of them are illuminated by a third.
2.4 ESSENTIAL GENERALITY
2.4.1 The Essential Species and its Genus
All pure gold is gold, but not all gold is pure: so pure gold is a species of gold. And
every perfect circle is a circle, but not every circle is perfect: so perfect circle is a
species of circle. Nevertheless, it is pointless to ask, in either case, “what is left
over” if the genus is subtracted from the species. For there is nothing extra that
gold must be, over and above being gold, in order to be pure: the “purity” of pure
gold is just its being gold—gold and gold alone. There is, then, no solution to the
equation: gold + x = pure gold . And similarly, there is no solution to the equation:
circle + y = perfect circle. For, again, there is nothing that a circle must be, over
and above being a circle, in order to be perfect: the “perfection” of a perfect circle
is its unimpeachable circularity. I will call a species of this third variety an essential
species.
It came out in the previous section that the contrast between a categorial species
and its genus cannot be drawn by reference to a quality that is independent of the
species. The situation now is precisely the reverse: the contrast between an essential
species and its genus cannot be drawn by reference to a quality that is independent
of the genus.
Suppose, for instance, that there was some quality that distinguished pure gold
from all other gold. The only “other” gold is impure, so the imagined quality would
have to distinguish pure gold from impure gold. But the difference between pure
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gold and impure gold is that the latter is composed, in part, of something that is not
gold. So the quality would have to determine, for each part, whether it was gold or
not. But if there was in fact a quality that could discriminate between what is gold
and what is not, this would be the differentia of gold, which is the genus. Or, again,
suppose there was a quality that distinguished a perfect circle from all other circles.
The difference between a perfect circle and an imperfect circle is that the latter is,
in some respect, not circular. So the imagined quality would have to determine, for
every respect in which a shape can fail to be circular, whether it was circular or not.
And if there was in fact a quality that could make the required discrimination, this
quality would be the differentia of circle, which again is the genus.
A two-step approach is therefore impossible. We began by observing that one
must explain an accidental species by first explaining its genus and then explaining
its differentia. Next we observed that one cannot explain a categorial species as one
would an accidental species, because even if a categorial species had a differentia, it
would be impossible to explain this “quality” until we had explained the species: so
an account of the differentia would come too late. The point to observe now is that
one cannot explain an essential species as one would an accidental species, because
even if an essential species had a differentia, there would be nothing left to say about
it once one had finished explaining the genus: so an account of the differentia would
come, as it were, too early.
This reflects a third distinctive order of priority. An essential species is neither
posterior to its genus, like an accidental species, nor prior to its genus, like a categorial
species. If, as it seems, to be pure gold is to be gold and gold alone, then there cannot
be any priority, either way, between the species pure gold and the genus gold. And
if to be a perfect circle is to be in no way uncircular, then the species perfect circle
is neither more nor less fundamental than the genus circle. In that case, an essential
species and its genus are coeval.
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2.4.2 The Irreducibility of this Form
2.4.2.1 Positive, Negative and Doubly-negative The suspicion will perhaps
have formed that essential generality is nothing but an illusion. In everyday life, we
are happy to say that a wedding ring is gold, though we admit that it isn’t pure
gold; and similarly, we are happy to say that the ring is a circle, though we admit
that it isn’t a perfect circle. But this, it seems, is only a loose way of speaking.
Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as impure gold or an imperfect circle. Even
schoolchildren know that, from the point of view of chemistry, all gold is pure, and
that from the point of view of geometry, every circle is perfect. And so it seems that
from a scientific point of view, there is no logical space, and thus no distinction to be
drawn, between the essential species and its genus. But if a species and its genus are
the same, then, strictly, there is no species and there is no genus to speak of.
This line of thought presents itself as an objection, but in fact it is only another
way of describing what needs to be understood. For there is, indeed, a striking
contrast between “loose” and “strict” ways of speaking—between, on the one hand,
what is good enough for ordinary talk, and, on the other hand, what rises to the need
of a rational discipline. But the most striking thing about this contrast is that it only
emerges in a certain sort of case. No one is of the opinion that “strictly speaking”
to be a nose is to be a snub nose, or that “strictly speaking” to be an animal is to
be a horse. What needs to be understood is precisely the form of generality that
underwrites a contrast between “disciplined” and “undisciplined,” or “rigorous” and
“lax,” or “scientific” and “vulgar” modes of thought and expression.
The contrast in question applies across an astonishingly wide domain of objects;
we do well, therefore, to diversify our menu of examples. Arguably, the same abstract
structure that joins together gold, impure gold and pure gold is also exemplified by
each of the following trios.
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X ∼X ∼∼X
human body lifeless human body living human body
human body unhealthy human body healthy human body
human hand deformed human hand undeformed human hand
human being vicious human being virtuous human being
doctor incompetent doctor competent doctor
law unjust law just law
contract invalid contract valid contract
inference invalid inference valid inference
calculation incorrect calculation correct calculation
word meaningless word meaningful word
appearance knowledge-withholding appearance knowledge-conferring appearance
judgment false judgment true judgment
Figure 2
With respect to each of the listed trios, there have been philosophers, at one time
or another, who have held that the “primitive” or “original” or “fundamental” con-
ception of what is in the leftmost column is in fact a conception of what is in the
rightmost column; or that to explain the former is to explain the latter; or that,
“strictly and philosophically speaking,” to be the former is to be the latter. It is
possible, of course, that all of these philosophers were wrong, and that none of the
listed trios exhibit the relevant asymmetry. But it does not matter. What matters,
again, is not the purported examples themselves, but only the form they purport to
exemplify.
As a first step towards understanding this form, it will be useful to focus on
the opposite of an essential species—what we might call an “inessential species.”
Examples of this belong in the center column of the chart above, the column marked
“∼X.” One cannot help but notice that the noun phrases appearing in this column
all contain adjectives with a decidedly “negative” character. Let us therefore begin
with that.
Medieval philosophers used the term “alienans adjective” in reference to an ad-
jective that changes, or alienates, the sense of the noun it qualifies—as, for instance,
the adjective “false” in “false teeth” changes what would otherwise be understood by
37
“teeth.” Now it is the mark of an alienans adjective, A, that we cannot infer salva
veritate that what is true of an N (‘N’ being a noun) is also true of an AN.17 Human
teeth grind and tear; but it does not follow that false ones do; and, as Peter Geach
has observed, it does not follow that bad ones do.18
Of course, the relation between false teeth and teeth is different than that between
bad teeth and teeth, and it will be necessary to consider the difference. But these
two relations also have something striking and important in common, namely this:
it follows, just from the fact that teeth are false, that they lack something of the
character of teeth; and the same thing follows, just from the fact that teeth are bad.
This is not true of an accidental species or of a categorial species. It does not follow
just from the fact that a nose is snub that it lacks something of the character of a nose.
Nor does it follow just from the fact that an animal is a horse that it lacks something
of the character of an animal. But an inessential species always lacks something of
the character of its genus: it is always either an “alienated species,” like bad teeth, or
an altogether “alien species” like false teeth.
2.4.2.2 The Alienated Species Let us first consider what I have called an
“alienated species,” and let us continue to focus on the variety of “alienation” that is
exemplified by bad teeth. (We will soon see that other varieties exist.) Bad teeth are
defective teeth: they are bad in relation to their kind. Geach and others have noted
that a defect typically exemplifies some more determinate form; thus a thing’s defec-
tiveness may consist in its being e.g. corrupted, deformed, diseased, wilted, warped,
17In discussions of the alienans adjective, one typically finds examples of two very different sorts.
On the one hand there is e.g. “counterfeit” in “counterfeit money” and “porcelain” in “porcelain
egg” and “rocking” in “rocking horse.” On the other hand there is e.g. “putative” in “putative
father” and “accused” in “accused murderer.” All of my examples are of the first sort. Now in both
sorts of case it is true that we cannot safely infer that what holds good of an N also holds good of
an AN—but it is true for different reasons. In the first sort of case (which I am discussing) it is true
because it follows, just from the fact that an N is an AN, that it is not “really” an N. In the second
sort of case (which I am ignoring as irrelevant) it is true because it does not follow, just from the
fact that an N is an AN, that it “really” is an N.
18Peter Geach, “Good and Evil,” (1956), pp. 33–42.
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erroneous, rotten or broken. And all such forms of defect are the product of privation.
Aristotle distinguishes two senses of privation, one more anemic, one more ro-
bust.19 In the anemic sense, a thing is deprived of whatever it does not possess: so
a blind man, an oyster and a lime tree are all deprived of sight. In the robust sense,
however, a thing can be deprived only of what is proper to its kind: so while a blind
man is deprived of sight, an oyster and a lime tree are not. Thinking of a thing as
deprived, in the latter sense, depends on having a conception of the kind of thing it
is. Thus, in judging that a man without sight is missing sight—i.e. that something
is amiss with his not having it, so that his lack of sight constitutes a defect or dis-
ability—we must refer, at least implicitly, to a conception of his nature, according
to which a human being has the power to see. And similarly, the judgment that an
oyster without sight is not thereby bereft of it depends on the judgment that vision
is not proper to its kind.
Now in both of the senses distinguished by Aristotle, privation is a kind of clash
or contrariety.20 And, obviously, the opposite of lacking something is having it. But
the different senses of “privation” correspond to different senses of “possession.” In
the anemic sense, possession and privation are both of something external to a thing’s
own nature. So, for instance, while a circle may in fact “possess” a certain color (e.g.
red), whether it “has” the color or “lacks” the color makes no difference at all, as far
as its being a circle is concerned. Or, again, whether or not a human nose “possesses”
a certain shape (e.g. concavity) does not bear on its status as a human nose. Here
the contrariety is between, on the one hand, a thing’s just happening to have some
trait, and, on the hand, its just happening not to have it. This form of opposition is
defined by the fact that it does not touch on the nature of a thing, one way or the
other.
But privation in the robust sense is one pole of an opposition, the opposite pole
of which is precisely the nature of that which is deprived. This is not to deny that
19Metaphysics, 1022b25.
20Categories, 11b15-13b35.
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privation is opposed to possession. But what is meant by “possession,” in the robust
sense, is a thing’s possession of its nature, or of its character as the kind of thing it is.
A blind man lacks the character of a human being in just this respect, that he cannot
see; and in this respect he is deprived. Privation here consists in a thing’s being out
of accord with some aspect of its own nature; and it is contrary to a thing’s not being
thus out of accord.
If privation, in either sense, is something somehow “negative,” then possession, in
either sense, is something somehow “positive.” But it follows from what has already
been said that this “positive” character must be very different in the two sorts of
case. Anemic possession is of something that is not missing when it is absent, or,
equivalently, of something that is superfluous when present. But robust privation is
not of a would-be extra something. And consequently, robust possession is not the
possession of a surplus. It does not involve a thing’s having anything apart from, or
additional to, what is contained in its own nature. Possession, here, only requires
that a thing be what it is—in an undiminished, undistorted, unqualified way. It is
the neutral position between some potential deficiency and some potential excess, or
the maintenance of an order against a possible disturbance. Its “positive” character
is entirely exhausted by the annulment of a “negative” antithesis. And so we might
say it is doubly-negative.
Now a defect is the product of privation in the robust sense. And this has the
significant result that a thing’s being a good one of its kind does not involve its being
anything over and above the kind of thing it is. For we said that defect is a type of
badness : it is badness-relative-to-a-kind. And whatever is opposed to defect is the
corresponding type of goodness : it is goodness-relative-to-a-kind. What, though, is
the opposite of defect? Just as the opposite of being flawed is being unflawed, or
flawless, the opposite of being defective is being undefective, or defectless. Like being
unflawed, being undefective is a matter, not of a thing’s having a certain “positive”
character, but only of its not having some “negative” one. Thus the goodness that is
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antithetical to defect is not something extra.
And yet there are kinds of alienation other than defect. Impure gold is not
defective: gold is not bad in virtue of being mixed with something else, and it is not
good in virtue of being unmixed. Nor is an imperfect circle defective: a circle is not
bad in virtue of being lopsided, and it is not good in virtue of being un-lopsided. But
impurity is to a chemical kind, and imperfection is to a geometrical kind, something
like what defect is to a living kind. Notice that just as there is no such thing as being
defective or undefective simpliciter, but only qua horse or hoof or stomach, likewise,
there is no such thing as being pure or impure simpliciter, but only qua gold or lead
or silver, and likewise, there is no such thing as being perfect or imperfect simpliciter,
but only qua circle or triangle or square. In general, an alienated form is what falls
away from its own ideal. And this “falling away from the ideal” is found even outside
of a normative context—that is, even where concepts like “good” and “bad” have no
straightforward application.
2.4.2.3 The Alien Species In all of its varieties, an alienated species fails to
exhibit the nature of that of which it is a species. The same is true of what I have
called an “alien species,” like false teeth or fool’s gold. There is obviously a difference
between an alienated species and an alien species—e.g. between bad teeth and false
teeth, or between impure gold and fool’s gold. But now, what is the difference?
The natural answer—and in the end a fine one—is that bad teeth, like good teeth,
are teeth, whereas false teeth are not teeth; and that impure gold, like pure gold, is
gold, whereas fool’s gold is not gold. But we cannot, I think, just help ourselves to
such a form of words. For someone might object that both of these claims are either
wildly paradoxical or else flatly contradictory. On the face of it, one seems to want
to say that what are admittedly teeth (albeit false ones) are not teeth; and that what
is admittedly gold (albeit a fool’s) is not gold.
Of course we can make it known that the second appearance of the word “teeth”
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in the statement, “False teeth are not teeth” is intended to be heard in a special,
rigorous sense. And to this end we can introduce one or another of several common
“rigor-operators”: we can say that false teeth are not “really” or “truly” or “literally”
or “strictly speaking” teeth; or we can say, with emphasis, that they are not teeth; or
we can say that they are teeth, all right, but teeth “in name only.” But this is not
illuminating. For the problem is to understand what operation we hereby perform.
It is worth remembering that this is in fact the second appearance of a rigor-
operator. Earlier, it came to mind to say—indeed, to object—that impure gold is
not “strictly speaking” gold. But in the present context, where it is a question of
distinguishing impure gold from fool’s gold, it comes to mind to say that impure gold
is “strictly speaking” gold. This looks like a contradiction, but of course it is not.
The accumulated wisdom of our common sense could be summarized in the claim:
Fool’s gold is not really gold; impure gold and pure gold are really gold; and pure
gold is really, really gold. We are now, I think, in a better position to understand the
earlier desire to say that an alienated species, like impure gold, is not “really” what
it purports to be. And doing so will shed light on the present desire to say that an
alien species, like fool’s gold, is, again, not “really” what it purports to be.
The slogan of natural law theory—that an unjust law is not a law—has seemed
paradoxical to many jurists. John Austin dismisses it as “stark nonsense”: the claim
is, he says, “an abuse of language”; it is “not merely puerile, it is mischievous.”21 This
was not because Austin failed to consider the possibility that the words “lex iniusta
non est lex” might have some special, “strict” interpretation. No, his view was that
justice is not internal to the nature of a law, but something extra, an accident, which
requires a separate account. To deny this, he thought, was “to confound what is with
what ought to be:”22
The existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another. Whether it be or
be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed standard,
21John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, Lecture V, (1832), p. 185.
22Ibid., 184.
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is a different enquiry.23
Without passing judgment on the truth or falsity of the natural law slogan, we ought
to be able to see that at least it is not nonsense, and that Austin’s division of inquiries
really is beside the point.24 The slogan “an unjust law is not a law” is in point of
form the same as the apparently intelligible slogan “impure gold is not gold.”
It would be obvious what to reply, if someone denounced the slogan “impure gold
is not gold” on the grounds that the existence of gold is one thing and its purity
or impurity another. We would concede that the question whether some particular
ring is gold (rather than, say, pyrite or silver or platinum) is indeed distinct from the
question whether it is pure gold. But we would nevertheless insist that the question
what it is to be gold and the question what it is to be pure gold constitute a single
scientific inquiry. And if it were asked why, in that case, a ring of impure gold is said
to be “gold” at all, we could reply, simply, that a ring of impure gold has a lot of
pure gold in it.
No one today would suggest, in the manner of Austin, that chemists are guilty
of confounding what gold is with what it ought to be. Yet, the science of chemistry
treats the question “What is gold?” as though it were in the first instance identical
with the question (as we on the street would put it) “What is pure gold?” If it
seems outrageous to accuse chemists of confounding an “ought” with an “is”, this
is not just because a normative concept like “ought” has no application to chemical
kinds. Normative concepts certainly do apply to the object of anatomy. And just
open any anatomy book: every limb and organ, there, every bone and muscle, every
cell, is shown to be exactly where it ought to be, doing exactly what it ought to do.
No defect is portrayed, no deformity, no disability, no disease. In the first instance,
anatomy identifies the question “What is the human body?” with the question (as
23Ibid., 184.
24For discussion of the non est lex slogan, see Norman Kretzmann, “LEX INIUSTA NON EST
LEX: Laws on Trial in Aquinas’s Court of Conscience,” (1988), and Mark C. Murphy, “Natural Law
Jurisprudence,” (2003).
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we would put it, in our loose way) “What is the healthy human body?” But it is
outrageous to suggest that anatomists therefore confound what a human body is with
what it ought to be. And our judgment that anatomical practice is right to prioritize
the undefective body is intelligibly expressed by the slogan: an unhealthy human
body is not a human body.25
Of course it is a question whether the injustice of a law is rightly conceived as a
defect. If so, then the fundamental account of a law’s nature will have to abstract
from this privative condition, as that of a human liver abstracts from liver disease.
And if not, not. But it would take some showing either way; and the position cannot
just be dismissed as nonsense.
Now this was to shed light on a different sort of case. If anatomy is primarily
concerned with the healthy human body, it is exclusively concerned with the living
human body. Anatomists do look at corpses, of course, but not for the sake of
understanding corpses: they study the living through the lifeless. Assuming that
anatomy is not radically mistaken about what is involved in explaining the nature of
its object—namely: the human body—the fact that anatomy is exclusively concerned
with the living human body shows, in the most striking possible way, that the living
of a living human body is not something external to its nature. For that the nature
of which anatomy explains does exist except as alive.
Aristotle famously held that a lifeless human body is a human body in name alone.
He sometimes expressed this view by saying that a lifeless body is as little a body as
a body carved in stone. This, too, has often been received as flagrant nonsense. But
in fact the Aristotelian slogan that “a lifeless human body is not a human body” is an
intelligible expression of the judgment that a scientific understanding of the human
body properly has nothing whatever to do with corpses.
There is, after all, the following striking parallel. Just as anatomy’s understanding
25The slogan is admittedly dramatic—but then, it is a slogan. The drama is anyway of highly
intelligible sort. We are all familiar with the honorific use of words according to which it makes good
sense to say, for instance, “His friends are not friends,” and to ask, for instance, “You call that an
argument?”
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of the human body is primarily of the healthy body, and exclusively of the living body,
so, also, chemistry’s understanding of gold is primarily of pure gold, and exclusively
of real gold. Like the “living” in “living human body,” the “real” in “real gold” could
seem to signify a surplus—something external to the nature of gold. But from the
point of view of chemistry, it very clearly does not. Meanwhile, the slogan “fool’s gold
is not gold” would seem to be a natural expression of the judgment that a scientific
understanding of gold properly has nothing whatever to do with fool’s gold.
It may seem that we have not advanced beyond our original claim that fool’s gold
is not “strictly speaking” gold. For it looks as though we have just replaced “strictly
speaking” with “scientifically speaking”—and thus substituted one rigor-operator for
another. And in a way that is right. Part of the point was to bring a statement
like “fool’s gold is not gold,” or “a lifeless human body is not a human body,” into
contact with some obviously legitimate, obviously systematic, investigation into the
nature of things.
But the preceding discussion has also put us in position to see something im-
portant about the relation between an alien and an alienated species. Only a living
human body falls under the standard by reference to which bodies are judged healthy
or unhealthy. Corpses are neither healthy nor unhealthy. And only real gold falls
under the standard by reference to which the purity or impurity of gold is judged.
Measured against that standard, fool’s gold is neither pure nor impure.
We can now finally state the difference between an alienated species of something
and an alien species of the same thing: an alienated species of X is that which is of
merely secondary concern in a scientific account of X, while an alien species of X is
something that is of no concern in such an account. Or equivalently: an alienated
species of X is that which bears and exhibits the nature of X, but does so imperfectly,
whereas an alien species of X is something that does even bear this nature. The “not”
in “impure gold is not gold” or in “an unhealthy body is not a body” means: not
primarily, or not in the first instance. Whereas the “not” in “fool’s gold is not gold”
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or “a lifeless body is not a body” means: not at all, or not even in the last instance.
2.4.2.4 The Essential Species as Unalien and Unalienated Despite the ev-
ident difference between them, both types of inessential species share the striking
characteristic that they are opposed, or contrary, to an essential species. There are
two ways to lose sight of this common characteristic: the first is to suppose that
only an alienated species bears any relation to the relevant genus; the second is to
suppose that only an alien species stands to the genus in a relation of opposition or
contrariety.
Because an alien species, like fool’s gold, does not bear the relevant nature, there
is some temptation to think that it really has nothing to do with that of which it
is a species. But not so. The relation between fool’s gold and real gold is not like
that between a river bank and a savings bank. It is a mere accident of the English
language that the latter are both called “banks”: a true account of the one need
not mention the other. But it is no accident that fool’s gold and real gold are both
called “gold.” In any language, a true account of fool’s gold must refer to the real
stuff—supposing, at least, that by “fool’s gold” we mean, not some other chemical
substance, like pyrite, but rather: whatever is mistaken for, or passed off as, gold.
Note, however, that the dependence is not reciprocal: in order to explain what real
gold is—as I presume that chemists do—one need not mention fool’s gold. Nor is it
a coincidence that lifeless and living human bodies are both called “human bodies.”
In order to explain what a lifeless human body is, we must refer, in any language, to
a living one. But in order to explain a living human body—as again I presume that
anatomists do—we need not mention a lifeless one.
So an alienated species and an alien species are both related to that of which
they are species. It bears emphasis that they are both related to one and the same
thing. A lifeless human body and an unhealthy human body are, respectively, alien
and alienated species of human body, because they are both related to the primary
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object of anatomical science, which is one thing: a human body which is both living
and healthy. Meanwhile, insofar as chemistry concerns itself with gold, its primary
object is gold that is both real and pure. This is again one thing, in relation to which
fool’s gold and impure gold are, respectively, alien and alienated species of gold. So
there is, as it were, a single center of gravity, around which orbit both of the types of
inessential species.
The second point to observe is that both types of inessential species are char-
acterized, not just by their relation to some unique metaphysical center-point, but,
in particular, by their distance from it. It is easy to lose sight of the fact that an
alienated species is opposed, or contrary, to that of which it is a species, precisely
because an alienated species bears the relevant nature: i.e. it is not just externally
related to that nature, like an alien species of the same thing. One may be struck by
the fact that the alienated species “makes” a certain “cut”: it is “in,” whereas the
alien species is “out.” And struck by the fact that the alienated species is “in,” one
may fail to notice that, nevertheless, it is on its way “out.”
An alienated species of something always shades off into what is an alien species
of the same thing, or into what is no species of it at all. Good teeth rot into bad
ones, and bad ones into little knobs, which are not teeth at all. Perfect vision fades
into imperfect vision, and the latter into blindness, which is not vision at all. And
what is true of the parts, and of their functions, is also true of the whole: a healthy
human body deteriorates into an unhealthy one, and this finally into a corpse, which
at least according to Aristotle is not a body at all. The point is even more striking in
the case of a chemical substance. As the proportion of lead mixed with gold increases
gradually from zero parts in a hundred, pure gold gives way to impure gold, impure
gold to impure lead, and impure lead, finally, to pure lead, which is not gold at all.
An alienated species of something is, thus, poised somewhere on a spectrum, one pole
of which is the paradigmatic case, or first instance, of that of which it is a species,
and the other pole of which is not so much as a case, or not so much as an instance,
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of that.
It should by now be clear that an essential species is opposed, or contrary, to
both types of inessential species. Its opposition to an alien species entails that it is
of interest, rather than of no interest, to an investigation of the relevant nature. Its
opposition to an alienated form entails that is of primary, rather than of secondary,
interest. So if fundamental theory is what explains the nature of a thing, then an
inessential species is that which does not matter for the purposes of fundamental
theory. And an essential species is: not that. That is: not what does not matter.
That is: what matters.
2.5 COMPARISON OF THE FORMS
In order to see more clearly their three distinctive characters, it will be useful to
consider how a species of each variety relates to a contrary species, and how such a
pair of contraries relate to their common genus. In the following figure, B and C are
contrary species of A—“contrary” in the sense that what is A cannot be both B and
C simultaneously—and, within each trio (A, B, C), the underlined terms are prior to
those not underlined.
Accidental
Generality
A
B C
Categorial
Generality
A
B C
Essential
Generality
A
B C
Figure 3
These are of course forms of “specificity” just as much as they are forms of “general-
ity.” Let us consider them in turn.26
26Might there be more than three forms of generality and specificity? Certainly, nothing I have
to say depends on the supposition that there are only three. The figure in the text above suggests
at least the possibility of a fourth:
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If B and C are contrary accidental species of A, then A is prior to B and C alike.
For the same reason that nose is prior to snub nose, it is also prior to aquiline nose.
Such a pair of contrary accidental species are symmetrically related to their genus:
neither enjoys any privileged relation to that which both of them are. A snub nose
is not a nose in virtue of its relation to an aquiline nose, or vice versa; each is a nose
entirely in its own right; and each of them exemplifies what it is to be a nose just as
well as the other.
Contrast and compare categorial generality. If B and C are contrary categorial
species of A, then A is posterior to B and C alike. For the same reason that color is
posterior to red, it is also posterior to blue. So with the transition from accidental to
categorial generality, something important changes: the locus of priority shifts alto-
gether from the level of the genus to the level of the species. But something important
also stays the same: like accidental species, categorial species are symmetrically re-
lated to their genus. Red is not a color in virtue of its relation to any other color,
but entirely in its own right, as every color is.
But now consider the form of essential generality. If B is an essential species of A,
and C is contrary to B, then A and B are coeval, and both are prior to C. For notice
that what is characteristic of an essential species is not characteristic of its opponent.
If the purity of pure gold consists in its being nothing but gold, the impurity of impure
gold consists in just the opposite—that is, in its being, in part, something other than
gold. Whereas the contrary of an accidental species is another accidental species, and
the contrary of a categorial species is another categorial species, the contrary of an
essential species is not itself an essential species, but an “inessential species.”
A
B C
Figure 4
—that is, it suggests the possibility of a pair of contrary species that are coeval with one another
and at the same time coeval with their genus. Perhaps male horse and female horse fall in this way
under horse, as perhaps do immature horse and mature horse. But the larger purpose of this essay
does not require us to consider whether this is really the case, and if so, why, or what it matters.
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An essential species and the opponent inessential species are asymmetrically re-
lated to that which both of them are. An inessential species falls under the genus
only in virtue of its relation to the opponent essential species. Impure gold is gold
only in virtue of its relation to pure gold. And an imperfect circle is a circle only in
virtue of its relation to a perfect circle. Thus, an essential species has a singular role
in the constitution of its genus. An accidental species, like snub nose, has no such
role in constituting what it is to be a nose. And a categorial species, like horse, has
no such role in constituting what is to be an animal.
2.6 THE UNCRITICAL ASSUMPTION OF THE STANDARD
APPROACH
Having gathered the tools for the work to be done, I can now restate my central
thesis as follows. The standard approach in the philosophy of action proceeds on
the uncritical assumption that both of the two canonical divisions—of events, into
mere events and actions; and of actions, into qualified and unqualified actions—are
instances of accidental generality. But the assumption is false on both counts. As for
the first division, action is not an accidental species of event, but a categorial species.
And as for the second, a form of unqualified action, such as intentional action, is not
an accidental species of action, but an essential species.
This may seem a long way to have gone for the mere formulation of a thesis—
and for a predominately negative thesis, at that. But in fact I think that something
important has already been accomplished. Whatever else is true, I think we have at
least isolated the real point of contention in the philosophy of action, the point on
which it turns what sort of method and what sort of account is fitting for the object of
our study. And if that is so, then we have also come to see that the central controversy
is logical or metaphysical in character, and thus vastly more fundamental than any
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disagreement in the philosophy of mind—for instance, between “psychologism” and
“behaviorism.”
Moreover, we now have an interpretation of Anscombe’s claim that intentional
action cannot be explained by appeal to an “extra feature.” At least, we have, I
hope, some idea of what it would mean to affirm or deny it, and to accept or reject
the standard approach on this basis. It is true, of course, that this “interpretation”
is not based on the argument that Anscombe actually gives for the claim. My only
defense is that I think it is harmonious with her principal doctrines and methods.
In the final three chapters of the dissertation, I will argue that action is a categorial
species of event. It is characteristic of categorial generality that the species is in a
certain sense prior to its genus: the genus depends on the likes of it, and not the other
way round. I claimed earlier that something is colored because it is, for example, red;
it is not red because it is colored. My position will be, likewise, that something is an
event because it is, for example, an action; it is not an action because it is an event.
The standard approach depends on the assumption that the genus event is given in
advance. Against this, I will argue, that it is only because there are actions, and only
because there are mere events, and only because of the difference between them, that
there is any such thing as an event “in general.”
Before coming to that, however, I must first argue, in Chapter 3, that the various
forms of unqualified action are in fact essential species. If the argument succeeds,
then it will be possible, afterwards, to set aside the contrast between qualified and
unqualified action, because it will have been established that action is, in the first
instance, action par excellence.
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3.0 ACTION UNQUALIFIED
3.1 INTRODUCTION
An action can fail, in any number of disparate ways, to be a sound expression of the
human will. It can be unintentional, inadvertent, accidental or involuntary. It can be
idle or mindless; drowsy or drunk; spasmodic or reflex. Psychology teaches that action
can be compulsive, addictive, delusional, subconscious, phobic, anarchic, maniacal or
depressed. And of course it can also be estranged, half-hearted, and vicious. But
forms of action such as these seem not to be the main concern of practical philosophy.
On the contrary, the main concern seems rather to be whatever they are opposed to.
For the explicit object of inquiry is, with very few exceptions, always a corresponding
“positive” term: one inquires about action that is, for instance, intentional, voluntary,
purposeful, deliberate, free, whole-hearted or virtuous.
But why should this be so? The practical philosopher is given a distinction
between qualified and unqualified action, and is drawn ineluctably to the latter.
Action
Unqualified ActionQualified Action
Figure 5
The reason, I will argue, is that the various qualified forms of action are its inessential
species. In one way or another, to some degree or another, each of them lacks the
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character of an action. In that case, unqualified action is for the practical philosopher
what a pure sample is for the chemist, and what a healthy body is for the student of
anatomy. But this makes it impossible to explain unqualified action by means of the
standard approach.
3.2 THE STANDARD APPROACH TO UNQUALIFIED ACTION
David Velleman begins his book, The Possibility of Practical Reason, exactly as I
began this dissertation, by quoting Wittgenstein’s question, and by marking the two
canonical divisions.1 The second division is his main concern, and he is quick to
explain that not every manifestation of the will is equally worthy of the name “ac-
tion.” The reason, he says, is that some of them fail to be “autonomous.” In par-
ticular, Velleman points to Freudian slips, and to things that are done “idly and
inattentively—perhaps even unwittingly,”2 like scratching one’s head while reading.
Such cases require us to define a category of ungoverned activities, distinct from
mere happenings, on the one hand, and from autonomous actions, on the other. This
category contains the things that one does rather than merely undergoes, but that
one somehow fails to regulate in the manner that separates autonomous human
action from merely motivated activity. The philosophy of action must therefore
account for three categories of phenomena: mere happenings, mere activities, and
actions.3
Velleman here expresses an interest in a certain specific liability of action: its lia-
bility to be, as he says, “ungoverned” or “unregulated.” If a manifestation of the
will is deficient in this way, Velleman calls it “mere activity”; otherwise, he calls it
“autonomous action.”4
1David Velleman, The Possibility of Practical Reason, (2000), p. 1.
2Ibid., 1.
3Ibid., 4.
4There are two things to notice about Velleman’s terminology. First, it is Velleman’s policy,
if not his consistent practice, to use the term “action” only in its ideal, or honorific employment.
For him, there is strictly speaking no such thing as “defective action”: if a product of the will is
defective, he does not call it “action,” but “activity.” The policy is awkward, but not, I think,
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Velleman presents his distinction between “mere activity” and “autonomous ac-
tion” as holding between an imperfect exercise of the will and a perfect exercise of the
will. He calls a Freudian slip—which for him is a paradigm case of “mere activity”—
“a defective instance of the agent’s making something happen.”5 And speaking more
generally, he says:
Mere activity is [. . . ] a partial and imperfect exercise of the subject’s capacity
to make things happen: in one sense, the subject makes the activity happen; in
another, it is made to happen despite him, or at least without his concurrence.
Full-blooded human action occurs only when the subject’s capacity to make things
happen is exercised to its fullest extent. To study the nature of activity and action
is thus to study two degrees in the exercise of a single capacity.6
Velleman maintains—quite uncontroversially, I would think—that a philosopher of
action must account for a human being’s capacity to act, a capacity that can be ex-
ercised either defectively or undefectively, imperfectly or perfectly. He also maintains
that in order to explain the capacity to act, a philosopher must account for both its
perfect and its imperfect exercise.
The latter notion is, on the face of it, very strange. Normally, an account of
a capacity is exhausted by the account of its perfect exercise.7 In order to explain
entirely unreasonable. Certainly, it is no more unreasonable than reserving the term “circle” for
what is ordinarily called a perfect circle. If we were to adopt such a policy, we would find it
awkward to speak of what is ordinarily called an “imperfect circle”—since, for us, this would involve
a contradiction—but we could simply introduce a new term, and speak instead of an “imperfect
quasi-circle.” And this is in effect what Velleman does: instead of “activity” he could just speak of
“quasi-action,” and also, if the need arose, “defective quasi-action.” What forces him to coin a term
is the decision to reserve the word “action” for action that is undefective.
The second point is closely related to the first. When Velleman refers to his most important
category—both in the passage quoted above, and throughout his book—he speaks interchangeably
of “autonomous actions” and simply of “actions.” This practice, which appears to identify a certain
specific kind of action with action in general, is more or less universal among philosophers of action,
including Anscombe. But one really ought to wonder why. On the face of it, this sort of talk would
seem to involve a grotesque assimilation of species to genus. What on earth can explain the fact that
Velleman is inclined to speak this way, and moreover, that everyone else understands him when he
does so? What, if not the inarticulate sense, shared by all, that the sort of action under discussion
is one whose nature is especially bound up with the nature of action itself?
5Ibid., 8.
6Ibid., 4.
7Naturally, this claim only pertains to those capacities whose exercise can be either perfect or
imperfect. There is no such thing as a defective exercise of iron’s capacity to rust, or of a stone’s
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human vision, for instance, one must explain what it is to see something; but one is
under no additional obligation to explain what it is to fail to see something—in the
sense that one certainly does “fail to see something” if one sees it only blurrily, as the
farsighted see what is near, and the nearsighted see what is far. The reason is that
blurry vision is defective vision: it arises not so much from the capacity as from the
incapacity to see, and is the product not so much of vision as of blindness.8 Certainly,
no one would think to begin an account of human vision by asking after the difference
between blurry vision and clear vision, or between blindness and sight. But that is
exactly how Velleman proposes to account for human agency, by investigating the
difference between that which is defective and that which is undefective.
The very same tendency is also on display in the first quoted passage. From
the fact that there are three distinct categories of phenomena—“mere happenings,”
“mere activities” and “actions”—Velleman immediately infers that the philosophy of
action “must therefore account for three categories of phenomena.” He appears, thus,
to take it for granted that the purpose of marking the canonical divisions could not
be, for instance, to indicate what the philosophy of action must account for, and to
set this apart from something else—something that is of little or no importance.
This is not an eccentric feature of Velleman’s theory, but a necessary consequence
of the standard approach. Velleman describes himself as inheriting a program from
Donald Davidson and Harry Frankfurt.9 According to Velleman, the first important
capacity to warm in sunshine: the contrast between perfection and imperfection simply does not
apply here.
8Here one may wish to object that blurry vision, however feeble, is, in fact, a product of the
capacity to see, inasmuch as it is vision. And of course that is right. To the extent that a nearsighted
or farsighted person sees, this can only arise from the capacity to see. But notice that the same is
not true of the blurriness which clouds her vision: this is not a product of her capacity, but the form
of its limitation. What the objection shows is that the relevant sort of incapacity presupposes the
corresponding capacity. The sort of “blindness” that afflicts a nearsighted or farsighted person—
as distinct from that of a mole or, if you like, a stone—presupposes vision, since, if one is either
nearsighted or farsighted, one must to some extent be sighted. But the reverse is not the case: if
one is sighted, one need not be, to any extent, either nearsighted or farsighted; one might, after all,
have perfect 20/20 vision. This is only another indication of the metaphysical priority of vision over
blindness, of capacity over incapacity and, in general, of the undefective over the defective.
9The paragraph that follows is intended to summarize the brief intellectual history recounted
by Velleman in first fourteen pages of his Introduction. I do not mean to endorse his interpretation
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step was taken by Davidson, who argued that an action is a sound expression of the
will, if it is caused (in the right way) by a desire and a belief. Davidson’s account
is inadequate, Velleman says, because there are various products of the Freudian
subconscious—like slips of the tongue—which are far from sound expressions of the
will, but which nevertheless satisfy Davidson’s requirement. Davidson’s requirement
may describe what an event must be in order to be an action, but it does not say what
an action must be in order to be an action par excellence. According to Velleman,
Frankfurt is significant for helping one to see exactly what more is required. For
Frankfurt argued that an action is a sound expression of the will if it is “regulated”
by a second-order desire to be motivated by one’s first-order desire and belief. In
Velleman’s estimation, this model is an improvement over Davidson’s, but it is still
ultimately inadequate. For if a person’s second-order desire is the product of e.g.
boredom, depression, sloth or perversity, then the resulting action will fit the descrip-
tion proposed by Frankfurt, but it will not yet be a perfect expression of agency.
Velleman presents his own work as addressing the question: “What more is still re-
quired? What more does an action have to be in order to be action in the full and
proper sense?”
Velleman’s answer to this question is in many ways idiosyncratic,10 but the ques-
tion itself could not be more familiar; it is, as Velleman himself points out, a sophisti-
cated version of Wittgenstein’s question. His method thus depends on the assumption
that it is possible to understand what action is prior to understanding the undimin-
ished form of action that is the special object of his interest. He assumes, in other
words, that autonomous action is an accidental species of action.
Davidson or Frankfurt; but I think his interpretation is at very least representative of their reception.
10Velleman’s account of autonomous action is first developed in his book, Practical Reflection,
(1989); the essays collected in The Possibility of Practical Reason, (2002), modify and elaborate
that earlier view.
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3.3 UNQUALIFIED ACTION AS AN ESSENTIAL SPECIES
3.3.1 The Qualifications of Action
Given the existence of essential specification, which I defended in Chapter 2, it is
at least possible that the word “intentional” in “intentional action” and the word
“autonomous” in “autonomous action” are, in fact, each opposed to an alienans
adjective. In that case, neither of them refers to a feature of action that remains to
be accounted for once a philosopher has explained—or, for that matter, just taken for
granted—what action is. And, of course, the same might be true of all of the other
positive-seeming modifiers of “action.”
In a well-known passage, J. L. Austin claims that this is at least true of the word
“free,” and that the failure to recognize this is the source of our trouble about the
freedom of the will:
While it has been the tradition to present this [sc. Freedom] as the ‘positive’ term
requiring elucidation, there is little doubt that to say we acted ‘freely’ (in the
philosopher’s use, which is only faintly related to the everyday use) is to say only
that we acted not un-freely, in one or another of the many heterogeneous ways of
so acting (under duress, or what not). Like ‘real’, ‘free’ is only used to rule out
the suggestions of some or all of its recognized antitheses. As ‘truth’ is not a name
for a characteristic of assertions, so ‘freedom’ is not a name for a characteristic of
actions, but the name of a dimension in which actions are assessed.11
Austin’s claim that “‘freedom’ is not a name for a characteristic of actions” rings
a bell in the present context, reminding one of Anscombe’s claim that “an action
is not called ‘intentional’ in virtue of any extra feature.”12 But Austin’s view of
“intentional” is subtly different from Anscombe’s, and it is different from his own
view of “free.”
The word “free,” like the word “real,” is, in Austin’s patronizing phrase, a “trouser
word.” What this means is that the word “free” may be used to cancel one of a wide
11Austin, “A Plea for Excuses,” (1956), p. 180.
12Anscombe, Intention, (1963), p. 28.
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variety of possible ways of being “unfree,” and that on any specific occasion it receives
what sense it has from its contrary: the negative word “wears the trousers” in the
sense that it has the authority, and dictates the meaning of the positive word (which,
in the logic of the metaphor, wears the skirt). “‘Is he free?’—well, what have you in
mind that he might be instead? In prison? Tied up in prison? Committed to a prior
engagement?”13 Austin is more expansive in his discussion of the “real”:
A definite sense attaches to the assertion that something is real, a real such-and-
such, only in the light of a specific way in which it might be, or might have been,
not real. ‘A real duck’ differs from the the simple ‘a duck’ only in that it is used
to exclude various ways of being not a real duck—but a dummy, a toy, a picture,
a decoy, &c.; and moreover I don’t know just how to take the assertion that it’s
a real duck unless I know just what, on that particular occasion, the speaker has
it in mind to exclude. This, of course, is why the attempt to find a characteristic
common to all things that are or could be called ‘real’ is doomed to failure; the
function of ‘real’ is not to contribute positively to the characterization of anything,
but to exclude possible ways of being not real.14
By attending to possible ways of being not free, Austin hopes likewise to “dispose of
the problem of Freedom.”15 In both cases, his point is that the “positive” term has no
meaning except what it borrows from its wildly disparate contraries. A dummy duck,
a toy duck, a picture duck and a decoy duck are radically dissimilar and lacking in
unity. But the “realness” of a “real” duck—which, depending on the circumstances,
is either not a dummy, or not a toy, or not a picture, or not a decoy, &c.—inherits
that disunity. So that the attempt to give an account of what it is for a duck—or
anything—to be “real” begins to look absurd.
But disposing of “the problem of Freedom” presumably does not mean disposing
of the problem of action. If a qualification like “free” is doubly-negative, in the sense
that it cancels ways of being unfree, this must doom one specific kind of explanatory
project, but not all kinds. It is hopeless to explain what teeth are by reference to the
distinction between real teeth and false teeth—say, by describing a quality that the
13Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, (1962), p. 15 n. 2.
14Ibid., p. 70.
15Austin, “A Plea for Excuses,” (1956), p. 180.
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former possess and the latter do not—but it is not therefore hopeless to explain what
teeth are. And to explain what teeth are is, I suppose, to explain what real teeth
are. It is, at any rate, to give an account of teeth that are not in any way unreal.
Similarly, if we cannot explain what action is by focusing on the contrast between
that which is free and that which is unfree, still, we can explain what action is. And
to explain what action is is, presumably, to explain that which is not unfree.
Austin’s position is different on the topic of intentional action. Whereas, on his
view, “real” borrows all of its meaning from its negative contraries, “intentional” has,
he thinks, a definitive positive sense of its own. Like Wittgenstein, who demurs at
the suggestion that a person can be said to “try” to raise her arm unless something
unusual is preventing her,16 Austin is skeptical that a person can be said to do “inten-
tionally” some ordinary thing in ordinary circumstances. “Only when there is some
suggestion that it might have been unintentional does it make non-misleading sense to
say, for example, ‘I ate my dinner intentionally.’ To this extent, it is true that ‘inten-
tionally’ serves to rule out ‘unintentionally.’”17 But this does not amount to saying
that the qualification “intentional” is like “real” and “free.” It would be “wholly
untrue,” Austin says, “to suggest that ‘unintentionally’ is the word that ‘wears the
trousers’—that is, that until we have grasped certain specific ways of doing things
unintentionally, and except as a way of ruling these out, ‘intentionally’ has no positive
meaning.”18 And while it seems right of Austin to prevent the assimilation of “inten-
tional” to “free,” he has says unfortunately little about the contrast—or, indeed, the
relation—between them.19
Anscombe, for her part, is unconcerned with what we say when, and does not shy
away from the idea that an ordinary action, like eating one’s dinner, is intentional in
16Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, (1953), §622.
17Austin, “Three Ways of Spilling Ink,” (1966), p. 284.
18Ibid., p. 284.
19What he says is: “But in the present case, to mention nothing more, there is the verb ‘intend’
to take into account, and it must obviously have a highly ‘positive’ sense; it cannot just be used to
rule out ‘don’t (or didn’t) intend’,” Ibid., p. 284.
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ordinary circumstances.
The question does not normally arise whether a man’s proceedings are intentional;
hence it is often ‘odd’ to call them so. E.g. if I saw a man, who was walking along
the pavement, turn towards the roadway, look up and down, and then walk across
the road when it was safe for him to do so, it would not be usual for me to say that
he crossed the road intentionally. But it would be wrong to infer from this that we
ought not to give such an action as a typical example of intentional action.20
But she adds: “It would however be equally a mistake to say: since this man’s crossing
the road is an example of an intentional action, let us consider this action by itself,
and let us try to find in the action, or in the man himself at the moment of acting,
the characteristic which makes the action intentional.”
On the face of it, Austin and Anscombe appear to have very different views of the
qualification “intentional,” Austin saying that it has a positive sense and Anscombe
seemingly denying this. But the difference should not be overstated. Austin says that
the qualification “free” lacks a positive sense in part because it is opposed to many
diverse things: depending on the circumstances, it may be opposed to being engaged
for the evening, to being bound in shackles or to being imprisoned. By contrast,
“intentional” is always opposed to only one thing—to being unintentional. Austin
presumably would not say that “unimprisoned” lacks a positive sense. Nor is it a
“trouser word.” And nor do philosophers give theories of it.
Then so long as we take Austin’s point about the versatility of “trouser words,”
and consider a qualification like “free” only in opposition to a definite negative con-
trary, so that it has itself a definite sense, something like Anscombe’s approach can
be taken to all of the privileged forms of action that philosophers discuss. That
is, though it would ordinarily be “odd” to say of someone’s action that it is e.g.
“whole-hearted”—since the question of its “whole-heartedness” does not normally
arise—still, we can take as a perfectly good example of “whole-hearted” action any
action that is not “half-hearted.” And this will not prevent us from saying that one
20Anscombe, Intention, (1963), p. 29.
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cannot infer, from the fact that the action is whole-hearted, that it is possible to
consider the action by itself, and to find in the action, or in the man himself at the
moment of action, the characteristic which makes the action whole-hearted.
The best way to see this is to reflect on the kind of opposition that obtains between
the various privileged forms of action and their negative antitheses, and then to reflect
on the question why the former have a privileged role in the philosophy of action. It
will help again to have a wide variety of examples in view.
X ∼X ∼∼X
action unintentional action intentional action
action un-autonomous action autonomous action
action drunk action sober action
action forced action free action
action half-hearted action whole-hearted action
action involuntary action voluntary action
Figure 6
If forms of action such as those listed in the center column of the chart above are
inessential species of action, then it will follow that the fundamental object of practical
philosophy is some one thing: action that is neither unintentional, nor involuntary,
nor vicious—nor diminished or deprived in any other way.
Right from the start, it can seem a puzzling suggestion that the inessential species
of action are all opposed to some one thing. After all, unintentional action is opposed
to intentional action, and drunk action to sober action, and coerced action to free
action. But these are not the same: an action’s being intentional is not the same as its
being sober; and its being sober is not equivalent to its being free. Here it is helpful
to recall the kind of unity that belongs to the object of a discipline like anatomy. A
lifeless human body is opposed to a living human body; a feverish human body to one
without a fever; and a legless human body to one that has legs. It is true that being
alive is not the same as being without a fever; and that being without a fever is not
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equivalent to having legs. Still, a human body that is both living and in every way
healthy—this is one thing. And this one thing is the fundamental object of anatomy.
Now it is in principle impossible to give a systematic account, or even an exhaus-
tive list, of the inessential species of a thing. The ways that a body can be deformed,
or a family unhappy, or bicycle broken, are numberless and essentially disparate. One
could at best offer something like Austin’s Doctrine of Infelicities, the schematic and
fragmentary character of which he constantly advertised.21 But any corresponding
Doctrine of Felicities must inherit the same disorder. For the essential species of
something are only the reflection of its inessential species. If what can be broken
on a bicycle is any random thing, then what can remain unbroken, is, likewise, any
random thing.
The inessential species of action are likewise disorderly. All that can be said of
them in general is that every such form lacks something of the character of action,
or fails somehow to be sound expression of the will. However, it is possible to draw
two broad distinctions among these forms, and thereby to impose some order upon
the phenomena. Some species of action are inessential because they fail to express
the will directly, others because they fail to express it perfectly. The latter, imperfect
forms of action admit of a further division: some actions are imperfect because of an
imperfection of the will, others because of an imperfection of the circumstances in
which the will is exercised. Let us consider these in turn.
3.3.2 Unintentional Action as an Alien Species
According to Anscombe and Davidson, the contrast between intentional and unin-
tentional action is strictly speaking a contrast between different descriptions under
which a particular action falls. It may be, for instance, that a man who is sawing a
plank in order to build a house is also, but unknowingly, preventing his neighbor from
sleeping and making a pile of sawdust. What this man is doing may be described
21Austin, How To Do Things With Words, (1962), p. 14–45.
62
either as “dividing wood,” or as “preventing his neighbor from sleeping,” or as “mak-
ing sawdust.” Under the first description his action is intentional, under the second
and third it is unintentional.
The distinction is familiar, but why is it significant? Of course, no one doubts that
it is significant. No one thinks that the distinction between what is done intentionally
and what is done unintentionally is comparable to the distinction between what is
done before midday and what is done after. On the contrary, everyone presumes that
intentional action is of the first importance in practical philosophy, and thus, that it
has a very definite priority relative to its opposite, unintentional action. But what
sort of priority is this?
The shape of an answer will begin to emerge, I think, if we set aside the sawyer
and think about his saw—a soulless thing with nary a belief or desire. It is (or was) a
philosophical commonplace that in order to explain what a saw is, one must explain
what it does. And of course a saw saws. But what a saw does on any particular
occasion of its characteristic activity may be variously described: it may described
either as “dividing wood” or, for instance, as “making sawdust.” For on any such an
occasion, the saw is in fact doing two different things at once, the first of which tends
towards there being divided wood, the second of which tends towards there being a
pile of sawdust. And these two things are differently related to what a saw is. Insofar
as we see divided wood as the product of sawing, and the pile of sawdust as a by-
product, we are forced to acknowledge a corresponding asymmetry in the descriptions
of the process itself. We must recognize that under the description “making sawdust,”
the process is only indirectly related to the nature of a saw.
One might suspect that our ability to draw such a distinction depends on the fact
that a saw is an instrument, and thus essentially bound up with human goals and
projects. But not at all. The roots of a tree must be understood by reference to what
they do under the description “growing” and not under the description “breaking up
the sidewalk.” And the human heart must be understood by reference to what it
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does under the description “pumping blood,” and not under the description “making
a thumping noise.”
In each of these cases it is clear which description is metaphysically fundamental.
A saw makes sawdust because it divides wood; it doesn’t divide wood because it
makes sawdust. A tree breaks up the sidewalk because it grows roots; it doesn’t grow
roots because it breaks up the sidewalk. And a heart thumps because it pumps; it
doesn’t pump because it thumps.
My suggestion, then, is that acting intetionally is to the human will as dividing
wood is to the saw, as growing is to the roots of a tree, and as pumping blood is to
the heart. The description under which an action is intentional is a description under
which it is shown to be the product, rather than a by-product, of the will—its direct
rather than its indirect expression.
This would explain why the philosophy of action is especially interested in in-
tentional action. As everyone agrees, the philosophy of action is concerned with a
certain capacity: the human will. This capacity, like any other, must be understood
in relation to its object. The object of this capacity, like that of any other, is subject
to many descriptions, only some of which reveal it to be the object of this capacity.
If this is right, then the standard approach to intentional action is misguided for
reasons that have nothing to do with the capacity to act in particular. It is true of
any capacity that its nature is determined by reference to its product, rather than by
reference to its by-product. And it is in general hopeless to investigate a capacity by
identifying some quality that distinguishes its product from its by-product. Just as
a complete account of the saw could proceed without reference to making sawdust,
and a complete account of the heart could proceed without reference to thumping, so,
also, a complete account of the will could proceed without reference to unintentional
action.
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3.3.3 Defective Action as an Alienated Species
3.3.3.1 Internal Defect An action can be defective or undefective, imperfect
or perfect, only under an intentional description. Think again of sawing. Under
the description “dividing wood” what the saw is doing may be perfect or imperfect;
but under the description “making sawdust” the perfect/imperfect contrast does not
apply to what it is doing. There are flawed and unflawed products, but not flawed or
unflawed by-products.
Action that is not “autonomous” in Velleman’s sense is an imperfect expression
of the will. In order to be “autonomous”, an action must be both intentional—i.e.
considered under the right sort of description—and not subject to some particular
imperfection (it must be not “unregulated”). If a man is relocking all the doors in his
house because he feels himself compelled to do so by an uncontrollable psychic urge,
his action fails to be “autonomous.” But his relocking of the doors is intentional, in
Anscombe’s and Davidson’s sense; it is, as I would say, the direct expression of his
will. After all, the man we have imagined is not acting under the description “wearing
down the keys”, something which, as a matter of fact, he is also doing at the moment.
No, the description under which he acts is “relocking all the doors”: this is what, for
better or for worse, he aims and understands himself to be doing. Still, something is
obviously missing, or amiss.
In the case we have imagined, there is something wrong with the person’s capacity
to act. It is disturbed: that is why the action fails to be autonomous. But then,
the standard approach to autonomous action is inappropriate for reasons that have
nothing to do with the capacity to act in particular. It is true of any capacity whose
product is vulnerable to defect that the nature of the capacity is determined by
reference to its undefective product. We do not explain or understand the archer’s
skill by reference to missed shots, or the baker’s craft by reference to burnt loaves, or
vision by reference to blurry vision, or digestion by reference to indigestion.
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3.3.3.2 External Defect Aristotle’s distinction between voluntary and involun-
tary action draws attention to the fact that the capacity to act, like any capacity,
is what it is in relation to certain external circumstances.22 It is not primarily by
reference to what happens when a human being is under water, or in a dark or smoke-
filled room, that we explain or understand human vision. This because human vision
presupposes e.g. light and smokeless air. Of course, the capacity to see is very of-
ten exercised in unfavorable circumstances. The point is only that such exercises
inevitably fail to exhibit the capacity for what it is.
And just the same is true of the will: there are circumstances unfavorable to
its exercise, and by reference to which it is impossible to explain or understand it.
Aristotle mentions several of these. If a person is forced by a tyrant to choose between
the lesser of two significant evils (e.g. between losing his child and performing some
shameful act); or if he is tortured in a way that overstrains human nature; or if he is
ignorant of some particular feature of the circumstances in which he acts (e.g. that his
goblet contains a tasteless, odorless poison)—if any such thing obtains, the capacity
to act may indeed be exercised, but not in such a way as will show it for what it is.
Just as we must exclude from our basic account of the capacity to see the kind
of seeing that a person does in conditions unfavorable to vision, so, also, we must
exclude from our basic account of the capacity to act the kind of acting that a person
does in conditions unfavorable to the will.
3.4 IDEAL ACTION THEORY
The suggestion that action theory is fundamentally a theory of ideal action runs
against a recent tendency to emphasize precisely the non-ideal.23 Consider the open-
22Nicomachean Ethics, 1109b30-1111b3.
23Perhaps the clearest expression of this is tendency is Nomy Arpaly’s recent book, Unprincipled
Virtue, (2003).
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ing paragraphs of Velleman’s paper, “The Guise of the Good”:
The agent portrayed in much philosophy of action is, lets face it, a square. He
does nothing intentionally unless he regards it or its consequences as desirable. [...]
All of his intentional actions are therefore directed at outcomes regarded sub specie
boni : under the guise of the good.
This agent is conceived as being capable of intentional action—and hence being an
agent—only by virtue of being a pursuer of value. I want to question whether this
conception of agency can be correct. Surely, so general a capacity as agency cannot
entail so narrow a cast of mind. Our moral psychology has characterized, not the
generic agent, but a particular species of agent, and a particularly bland species of
agent, at that. It has characterized the earnest agent, while ignoring those agents
who are disaffected, refractory, silly, satanic or punk. I hope for a moral psychology
that has room for the whole motley crew.24
I have been urging that philosophy of action does not, and should not, portray patho-
logical agents for the same reason that anatomy does not, and should not, portray
pathological bodies: a pathological specimen, just in virtue of being such, fails to
exhibit the nature of that of which it is a specimen.25 In that case Velleman’s com-
plaint is unjustified. In their portrayal of the healthy human body, anatomists do not
neglect the “generic” body in favor of a “bland species” of body. On the contrary,
their depiction is precisely of the nature of the human body in general. And though
they are concerned with this general nature, anatomists have not forgotten about,
or failed to leave “room” for, the existence of pathologies—or, for that matter, the
existence of tattoos and pierced ears. But it is not their business to mention such
things.
Still, Velleman’s remarks do point to something interesting. The standard as-
sumption that (e.g.) intentional action is an accidental species of action has a very
strange consequence: namely, that the discipline calling itself “the philosophy of ac-
24Velleman, “The Guise of the Good,” (1992), p. 3.
25I don’t mean this as a denial of Austin’s (1961) eloquent claim that consideration of the “abnor-
mal will throw light on the normal, will help us to penetrate the blinding veil of ease and obviousness
that hides the mechanisms of the natural successful act,” pp. 179–180. The target of my criticism is
not someone like Austin who thinks that the portrayal of non-ideal action is useful for the heuristic
purpose of throwing light on ideal action, which he admits is more fundamental. My target is only
the person who denies that ideal action is more fundamental.
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tion” is not now, and never has been, very much occupied with the nature of action in
general. For on the standard assumption, “What is action?” and (e.g.) “What is in-
tentional action?” are distinct questions. They are related as “What is a nose?” and
“What is a snub nose?” So to a devotee of the standard approach, it must appear
as though philosophers of action have always focused on the specific question—to
the more or less complete neglect of the general one. And Velleman is right to find
this appearance very strange. One would have thought that the question “What is
action?” was the fundamental question of our discipline.
Of course, this is not a problem if the standard assumption is false, and if inten-
tional action is an essential species of action. For in that case, the questions “What
is action?” and “What is intentional action?” are not distinct. They are for the
philosopher as the questions “What is gold?” and “What is real gold?” are for the
chemist, and as the questions “What is a human body?” and “What is a living human
body?” are for the anatomist. So a book like Anscombe’s Intention may be read as
directly addressing the nature of action in general.
Now if on the standard assumption it is hard to see why philosophers have ne-
glected the general question “What is action?” it is even harder to see why they
have bothered to discuss any of the specific questions. What could possibly justify
our interest in (say) intentional action, if this is really only an accidental species of
action?
There is no mystery if the science of gold takes a special interest in pure gold, for
that interest arises directly and immediately from the nature of gold itself. But it is
highly mysterious if the science of gold focuses instead on Peruvian gold. And on the
standard assumption, intentional action is related to action the way that Peruvian
gold is related to gold. There is indeed an extra feature that distinguishes Peruvian
gold from gold in general, or from gold just as such: namely, its having been dug out
of a mine in Peru. But precisely because this is an extra feature, the science of gold
should have nothing to do with it. Or, again, there is no mystery if the science of the
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human nose takes a special interest in the undeformed human nose, for this interest
arises directly and immediately from the question, “What is a human nose?” But if
the science of the human nose instead takes a special interest in the question “What
is the snub nose?”—this is entirely mysterious.
The devotee of the standard approach must therefore explain why the philosophy
of action is especially interested in e.g. intentional action, rather than its antithesis,
unintentional action—or rather than in something that is common to them both.
From a certain point of view, this may not seem so difficult. One might simply
argue that the philosophical significance of intentional action derives from some other
philosophical topic, one whose significance is not open to doubt. Everyone knows,
for instance, that philosophers care about rationality, both practical and theoretical.
And intentional action would seem to be one expression of that. After all, it is widely
agreed that action done for a reason is intentional, and that intentional action is the
kind that can be done for a reason.——But this sort of maneuver only pushes the
problem back: Why does philosophy take a special interest in action and belief that
is supported by reasons, rather than in action and belief that is not supported by
reasons? In other words, why focus on rationality, rather than irrationality? Or why
not focus on something common to them both?
Perhaps the suggestion will be that the philosophical interest in intentional action
derives from study of Ethics. After all, intentional action is subject to praise and
blame: it is good or bad, right or wrong, virtuous or vicious.——But this answer
seems to forget that Ethics, too, is a rational discipline, one with its own clear set
of priorities. Its central concepts are the right and the good, not the wrong and
the bad.26 It contains doctrines of virtue, not doctrines of vice. It seeks theories of
justice, not theories of injustice.
26This priority is disputed by John Herman Randall, Jr. in his paper, “The Wrong and the Bad,”
(1954). For a compelling reply, see John Wild, “Ethics as a Rational Discipline and the Priority of
the Good,” (1954).
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A science in general puts the “positive” before the “negative”—that is, order
before disorder, law before lawlessness, form before deformity. Why is this? Are
we just optimistic? Is it useful? Is it closer to our hearts? The conclusion looks
inescapable that the asymmetrical concern of a rational inquiry reflects an asymmetry
in the nature of what is inquired about. But if we are going to have to say this in
the end, then why not say from the very beginning that our abiding concern with
intentional action arises directly and immediately from the fundamental question of
our discipline: What is action?
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4.0 ACTION SIMPLICITER
4.1 INTRODUCTION
If action theory is, in the first instance, ideal action theory, and so if, for the time
being, we may set aside the menagerie of deranged and diminished types of action,
along with their undeformed contraries, then it still remains for us to consider the
other of the two canonical divisions, that between an “action” and a “mere event.”
Event
ActionMere Event
Figure 7
Even more than the division between qualified and unqualified action, this one attracts
the standard approach: typically, a philosopher of action will take for granted the
genus event, and then try to say what distinguishes action from everything else within
that genus.
I will now begin developing grounds for rejecting the standard approach to action,
a task that will occupy me for the rest of the dissertation. It bears emphasis that in
leaving behind the distinction between qualified and unqualified action, we are leaving
behind a concern with essential generality, as I called it in Chapter 2, and taking up
the topic of categorial generality. In Chapter 3, I argued that the standard approach
to unqualified action invariably treats as accidental what is really an essential species.
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But there is, I think, a different problem with the standard approach to action. The
problem now is that the standard approach must treat as accidental what is really a
categorial species. From this point forward, my aim will be to argue that action is a
categorial species of event, and one of a distinctively practical kind.
4.2 ACTION AS A PRACTICAL CATEGORY
In the end, what compels the rejection of the standard approach is, I think, that the
basic concepts of practical philosophy—concepts like “action” and “good action”—
have, themselves, a practical character, and define what we might call practical cat-
egories. The practicality of such categories consists in the fact that an agent must
deploy them in the course of bringing about whatever could fall under them: they
are not simply the brainchildren of theory, but are operative in the very phenomena
that a theory must explain.
Certainly, nothing of the sort could be said of the abstract category of events.
The unfolding of an event does not in general depend on anyone’s apprehension that
it is unfolding: when rain drops, or mud slides, no one need have a thought of it. By
contrast, I will argue, the unfolding of an action must be understood as such—that
is, it must be understood as the unfolding of an action—by the agent whose action
it is. The fact that an agent thinks she is acting is part of what makes it the case
that she is, in fact, acting. Nor is the agent’s thought, here, a mere efficient cause,
“triggering” or “guiding” what would anyway be the self-same kind of event. It is
rather that the agent’s thought is constitutive of the kind of event it serves to bring
about.
Although the argument that follows will be limited to the category of action,
I want to point out, if only in passing, that a similar position might also be held
with regard to the category of good action. According to Aristotle and Kant, a
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morally good action is one that is done because it is morally good. This is implicit
in Aristotle’s claim that a virtuous action is done “for the sake of the noble,”1 and
in Kant’s claim that a morally worthy action is one that is done “from duty.”2 A
person cannot be acting for the sake of the noble, in Aristotle’s sense, unless she
herself understands that what she is doing is noble; and she cannot be acting from
duty, in Kant’s sense, unless she herself understands that what she is doing is dutiful.
In that case, however, the fact that the agent thinks that she is acting well is part of
what makes it the case that she is, in fact, acting well.
Now if the latter claim is true, it is, I think, a substantive ethical truth, and not
the sort of thing that philosophy could establish. It is worth noticing, here, that
Kant does not give an argument, at the beginning of the Groundwork, that a morally
good action is one that is done because it is morally good. This, he believes, is a
prephilosophical factum. For he believes it is part of our conception of a good will,
a conception which “already dwells in natural sound understanding and needs not
so much to be taught as only to be clarified.”3 Of course, Hume and many others
would deny the claim that a morally good action is one that is done because it is
morally good. And I do not want to enter that dispute. All I hope to suggest is that
if Kant and Aristotle are right—if what is good, practically speaking, knows itself
to be good—then the category of good action, like the category of action, must enter
into the constitution of anything that falls under it.
The idea of such a category is, to be sure, something deeply puzzling. But suppose
it is not in the end unintelligible; and suppose, further, that action and good action are
two legitimate examples. What follows, I think, is that any attempt to explain these
categories by means of the standard approach will be ruined by circularity. It is, after
all, the aim of the standard approach to give a complete set of noncircular conditions
1Nicomachean Ethics, 1115b12, 1116b3, 1117b9, 1117b17, 1119b15, 1120a23, 1122b6.
2Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 397–401. Kant and Aristotle are helpfully
compared by Christine Korsgaard, “From Duty and for the Sake of the Noble: Kant and Aristotle
on Morally Good Action,” (1996b).
3Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, p. 397.
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under which a member of the relevant genus is a member of the relevant species. Thus,
one attempts to describe a distinguishing mark of action that is intelligible without
reference to action, or a distinguishing mark of good action that is intelligible without
reference to good action. But this cannot be done, if one of the conditions necessary
for an event to be an action is that the agent herself should apprehend that what she
is doing is performing an action, or, again, if one of the conditions necessary for an
action to be a good action is that the agent herself should apprehend that what she
is doing is performing a good action. The reason is, of course, that in specifying the
crucial condition, the accidentalist account would have to mention the very thing it
was needed to explain.
My position will be that the relevant circularity is not itself a problem: it causes
trouble only for a partisan of the standard approach. And because I think the stan-
dard approach ought to be given up, my principal aim in discussing this circularity
will not be to solve a problem, so much as to catch hold of it, and to embrace it, and
to keep it from getting away.
4.3 THE HUMEAN CIRCLE
4.3.1 The Circle Described
As I mentioned, one might object on ethical grounds to a claim that I attributed to
Aristotle and Kant: the claim, namely, that a morally good action is one that is done
because it is morally good. For this implies that an agent, in doing a good action,
must understand that what she is doing is a good action. And that might seem to
involve an overly intellectual conception of moral goodness.
But apart from any ethical concern, there is also a strictly metaphysical objection,
which derives from David Hume. Hume objected that such an account is circular.4
4Hume’s objection is discussed by Christine Korsgaard in “Kant’s Analysis of Obligation: The
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This is a point that reappears a number of times in his Treatise of Human Nature.5
In one passage, Hume observes that we praise an action as morally good, only if we
think that it was done from a morally good motive. And this presents a problem,
he thinks, for anyone who would claim that part of what makes an action good is its
having been done with regard to its goodness:
To suppose, that the mere regard to the virtue of the action, may be the first motive,
which produc’d the action, and render’d it virtuous, is to reason in a circle. Before
we can have such a regard, the action must be really virtuous; and this virtue must
be deriv’d from some virtuous motive: And consequently the virtuous motive must
be different from the regard to the virtue of the action.6
In this particular passage, Hume is concerned with an agent’s motive. But his deeper
point can be made without reference to motivation. In order to be motivated by the
goodness of her action, an agent must think that her action is good. What generates
the Humean Circle is really just the relation between an agent’s thought that her
action is good and the fact that it is good. According to Hume, the fact that an
action is good cannot depend essentially on that thought that it is good, on pain of
its being unintelligible what a good action is. And his argument is very simple: in
order to understand what a good action is, we would need to understand the agent’s
thought that her action is good; however, in order to grasp the content of this thought,
we would need already to know what a good action is. And thus we are caught in a
circle.
Hume of course thought he could avoid this circle. And despite the obvious
interest of the question whether he was right, I will need to set this question aside,
because the answer to it depends, I think, on a prior question, having to do with a
different circle. What is important for my immediate purposes is the fact that Hume
himself believed that the circle he discussed in connection with moral goodness is not
Argument of Foundations I,” (1989).
5David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, (1978), Book III, Pt.I.I, p. 467, 468; Book III,
Pt.II.I, p. 478, 480; Book III, Pt.II.VI, p. 526.
6Ibid., Book III, Pt.II.I, p. 478.
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the only one of its kind. According to him, there are other circles of precisely the
same structure that cannot be avoided, and that cannot be explained away: certain
special things we do are, in his view, “naturally unintelligible.” Examples include
making a promise, signing a contract, giving a gift and getting married. What is
curious about a thing like getting married, and what gives rise to the Humean Circle,
is that it cannot be done unknowingly.
Anscombe discusses these thought-dependent forms of action in a series of arti-
cles.7 She points out that every condition requisite for a marriage might be satisfied—
the priest and witnesses solemnly gathered, the nuptial oaths intoned and repeated,
the rings exchanged, and all the rest—but for this one thing: that one of the parties
to the would-be marriage does not think that what he is doing is getting married.
(Following Anscombe, we may imagine that he misunderstood someone’s remark,
“This is only a rehearsal.”) Well, if he does not think that what he is doing is getting
married, then getting married is not, in fact, what he is doing. For thinking that one
is getting married is essential to getting married: it is an ineliminable constituent of
the fact, when the fact obtains.
It is important to observe two things about an action like getting married. First,
it is not a so-called “mental act.” Most philosophers are happy to affirm that one typ-
ically knows one’s own mind; indeed, many believe it is a necessary truth. So it may
be unsurprising to learn that certain “mental acts” cannot be done unknowingly—
that you cannot, for instance, take the square root of 9, or make a decision, or wish
upon a star, unless you know that that is what you are doing. But it is not this kind
of thought-dependent “act” that interested Hume. Getting married is not, after all,
something that is done in a secret inner chamber of the soul: it is a public affair,
datable and observable. What is remarkable is the fact that there are certain events
in time and space—certain apparently real events—whose existence depends on the
7See especially “On Promising and its Justice, and Whether it Need be Respected in Foro In-
terno,” (1969); and “Rules, Rights and Promises,” (1978). And compare “The Question of Linguistic
Idealism,” (1976).
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thought that they exist.
The second point to observe is that getting married depends on thought, not
merely as an efficient cause, but also for its own internal constitution. It is not as
though the agent’s thought were instrumental in bringing about something whose
existence we could perfectly well understand on its own. Rather, we seem to need
to refer to the agent’s thought in order to understand the substantive fact that is
brought about. A person’s thought that he is getting married is related to the object
of that thought quite differently than his vision is related to the object of that vision.
It is possible to explain what a person sees without making reference to the fact that
it is seen. By contrast, we cannot strip away the thought that one is getting married
and leave its object intact. If we try to strip it away—as in the case where the groom
believes it is only a rehearsal—we find that many of the actions and circumstances
that would otherwise be named among the requisites of a marriage will simply be
annulled: the groom will say “I do,” but he will not make a vow; he will hand a ring
to his would-be bride, but he will not give it to her; and the proceedings will be seen,
but nevertheless they will not be witnessed.
Hume observes that an event like someone’s getting married seems to give rise to
a problem of intelligibility. The problem is this: if it is essential to getting married
that one should think that one is doing so, then we cannot understand what it is to
get married unless we grasp the content of the agent’s thought; however, we cannot
grasp the content of that thought, unless we understand what it is to get married. It
therefore seems to be totally unintelligible what it is to get married, and also what it
is to think that one is doing so.
Anscombe remarks that the difficulty, here, is not that we must attribute an
infinite series of thoughts to the person who is getting married. Now an infinite series
of thoughts might well seem to arise: first, there is the agent’s thought that he is
getting married; then (since his getting married is an event partly constituted by his
thought) there is the thought of his thought that he is getting married; and then (for
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the same reason) there is the thought of his thought of his thought that he is getting
married; and so on without end. But on the assumption that one knows one’s own
mind, this sort of worry is easily brushed aside: for to think something is, in that
case, to think that one thinks it. In any event, Hume’s problem is not to understand
how it could be that I think that I think that I think that I think . . . that p. His
problem is to understand: p.
The Humean Circle should also be distinguished from a well-known Gricean puzzle
concerning epistemic justification.8 A person is getting married, we said, only if he
thinks he is doing so. But one might worry that a person’s thought that he is getting
married can only be justified if he has evidence that he is getting married. Meanwhile,
there cannot be evidence that he is getting married, unless it is true that he is getting
married, and therefore, unless he thinks he is getting married. And so, it seems, his
thought can never be justified. But the Gricean circle can only get turning if we have
already taken for granted the intelligibility of the thought that one is getting married.
The epistemic question is how a thought with a certain content could be justified.
Whereas we are asking: What is the content of this thought?
4.3.2 The Circle Expanded
In Hume’s estimation, the problem of “natural intelligibility” had a fairly limited
scope: it was limited, he thought, to actions that are associated with a human con-
vention or “practice.” And Anscombe, for her part, appears to have agreed, though
she did insist on expanding the class of practice-dependent actions so as to include
the following of a rule, and therefore also the speaking of a language.9
But we are now in position to consider a much more radical expansion of the
Humean Circle. Could it be that action as such is “naturally unintelligible”? Ac-
cording to Hume and Anscombe, thinking that one is getting married is essential to
8H. P. Grice, “Intention and Uncertainty,” (1971).
9Anscombe, “The Question of Linguistic Idealism,” (1976).
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getting married, not just as an efficient cause, but as a constituent of the fact itself.
The question, then, is whether thinking that one is acting is likewise constitutive of
acting.
The idea that action is essentially self-conscious is something of a commonplace,
and will hardly seem a radical thesis. It is implicit, for instance, in Davidson’s
treatment of so-called “deviant causal chains.” On Davidson’s view, an intentional
action is caused by a belief and desire. But it is famously difficult to explain the
relation between an action and these “attitudes.” In Davidson’s famous example, a
mountain-climber wants to rid himself of the danger of holding another man on a rope;
and he believes that he will do so by loosening his grip, and letting the other man
fall to his death. Yet, the climber is so shaken and appalled by the murderousness
of his own calculation, that in his weakened state he begins to loosen his grip on the
rope. As Davidson imagines the case, loosening his grip is not something that the
man does intentionally: it is not an “action” of his; it does not express his capacity
as agent. It is true that the man’s belief and desire cause him to loosen his grip on
the rope, but not in the right way. Davidson says:
Beliefs and desires that would rationalize an action if they caused it in the right
way—through a course of practical reasoning, as we might try saying—may cause
it in other ways. If so, the action was not performed with the intention that we
could have read off from the attitudes that caused it. What I despair of spelling
out is the way in which attitudes must cause actions if they are to rationalize the
action.10
Like his reader, Davidson knows a deviant causal chain when he sees one. And though
he despairs of spelling out the “right” sort of etiology, he does venture to suggest that
it involves practical reasoning. The suggestion is apparently that when there is the
“right” sort of etiology, the agent herself must draw some connection between what
she is doing and a reason for doing it. And yet, obviously, the agent cannot draw this
connection, unless she is conscious of what she is doing.
10Davidson, “Freedom to Act,” (1973), p. 79.
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But Davidson is not the only philosopher who is drawn to the idea that action
is essentially self-conscious. This idea is the guiding thread of Anscombe’s Intention.
On her view, an action is the kind of event to which a certain sense of the question
“Why?” has application—the sense, namely, that asks for a reason. In her effort to
explain that sense, the very first thing that Anscombe says is this:
The question [‘Why?’] is refused application by the answer, ‘I was not aware I was
doing that’. Such an answer is, not indeed a proof (since it may be a lie), but a
claim, that the question ‘Why did you do it (are you doing it)?’, in the required
sense, has no application.11
Thus, the question “Why?” applies only to that which a person thinks that she is
doing. If you ask someone why she is standing on the garden hose, and she says,
truthfully, “Oh, I didn’t know I was,” then the question simply falls to the ground.
Like Anscombe and Davidson, most contemporary philosophers believe that an
action is the kind of event that is, or might be, done for a reason. And it is widely
held that an agent has a special cognitive relation to her reasons: namely, that she
must know, or at least think that she knows, what her reasons are. But it would
seem to follow from this that an agent, in acting, must think that she is acting. For
a person cannot think that she is doing something for some particular reason, or for
no particular reason, or for a reason that eludes her, unless she thinks that what she
is doing is the sort of event for which it is possible to have reasons—that is, unless
she thinks it is an action.
But if thinking one is acting is essential to acting, then it seems that something
like the Humean Circle must arise in connection with action itself: that is, it must
be impossible to understand what action is, until we understand what it is to think
that one is performing an action; and yet, clearly, we cannot grasp the content of
this thought, until we know what action is. That action is essentially self-conscious
is an intuitive, popular and traditional idea. But it may yet be incompatible with the
standard approach in the philosophy of action.
11Anscombe, Intention, (1963), p. 11.
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4.4 IN DEFENSE OF THE EXPANDED CIRCLE
4.4.1 Are Promising and Marrying Exceptional?
It is one thing to say, with Anscombe and Hume, that getting married is an odd
thing to do, and difficult to understand; it is a far different thing to say that the
self-same problem of intelligibility arises in connection with action itself. In making
this transition, our gaze has turned from a certain specific form of action to the
overarching category. It is just as though the topic had shifted from one particular
form of life, such as that of a horse, to the very idea of an organism; or, again, from
a certain natural stuff, like gold, to the category of chemical substance. And this
transition is very likely to seem illegitimate.
There are, I think, three main difficulties. The first and most obvious is that
getting married is, in many ways, a curious thing to do. It may well seem to be
the platypus of action: an improbable freak; something whose existence must be
grudgingly conceded; but certainly not an exemplar. The problem is especially acute,
because what is apt to seem most peculiar about an action like getting married—or,
for that matter, making a promise—is neither its relation to a practice, nor the way
that it involves another person, but precisely its dependence on the agent’s thought.
And this is of course what gives rise to the Humean Circle.
The proposal to expand the circle therefore invites the following objection: “Con-
sidered just as a form of action, or a possible object of intention, getting married is
quite exceptional, in that it cannot be done unintentionally. What cannot be done
unintentionally cannot be done unthinkingly. That is why every instance of someone’s
getting married is accompanied by his thought that he is doing so. The apparent in-
separability, in such a case, of what is done, on the one hand, and the agent’s thought
of it, on the other, is the source of the Humean Circle. But these two things are not
normally inseparable: the normal object of intention is something that can be done
either unintentionally or intentionally—and thus, either unthinkingly or thinkingly.
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Consider examples from Davidson like flipping a switch, or sinking a ship or going to
Katmandu; or consider examples from Anscombe like crossing the street, or sliding on
ice or poisoning a well. All of these things can be done unthinkingly, many of them by
animals, and some of them even by inanimate objects. And it is because such things
can be done unthinkingly that we can explain or understand what it is to do them
without appealing to thought, simply by reference to their unthinking, unintentional
instances. It is only in the odd case that what is done has any essential relation to
thought. And thus it is only in the odd case that the Humean Circle arises.”
We may begin by conceding that getting married is a very unusual member of
the class of “things that can be done,” or of the class of “things that things can do.”
But to say this is to say no more than that getting married is a very unusual form
of event. And of course every form of action is an unusual form of event: that is
why philosophers distinguish an action from a mere event. The only question that
we have to consider is whether its dependence on thought makes getting married an
unusual form of action.
One thing that is unusual about getting married is this: it is a form of action
whose very description announces its categorial status, declaring unambiguously that
it is, in fact, an action. Anything that falls under the super-abstract category of event,
and that is also describable as someone’s getting married, necessarily falls under the
determinate category of action, and not under that of a mere event. Thus, every true
sentence of the form “X is getting married” refers to an example of the special kind of
event that philosophers of action aim to understand. The same is obviously not true
of “X is sliding on ice,” or “X is rolling down the hill,” or “X is destroying a spider’s
web.” After all, that which is destroying a spider’s web might be a child with a stick;
but it might also be an earthquake, or a rain storm, or a falling branch, or a bear.
Unlike “getting married,” an event-description such as “destroying a spider’s web”
can perfectly well refer to an event on either side of the division between mere events
and actions. An event-description like “destroying a spider’s web” is indeterminate,
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in the sense that it gives no indication of the categorical status of the event that it
describes.
But the fact that an event’s description is categorically indeterminate does not
entail that the event itself is likewise indeterminate. It is not even clear what that
would mean. There is no such thing as an event in the abstract: every event must
be either an action or a mere event. And so, a fortiori, every event of destroying a
spider’s web must fall under one determinate category or the other, even if we cannot
tell which on the basis of its description alone.
And there is a parallel point to be made about the object of an agent’s thought.
Someone who is intentionally destroying a spider’s web must in some sense realize
that what she is doing falls under this description. And we have just acknowledged
that this is a description on the basis of which alone it is not possible to infer that
what she is doing is an action, rather than a mere event. But the fact that the
description under which she acts is categorically indeterminate does not entail that
what the agent thinks that she is doing is likewise indeterminate. After all, the agent
might think something about her action that cannot be inferred from its description:
she might think, in particular, that it is an action.
The imagined objection depends on the idea that what is done under a syncat-
egoriematic description like “destroying a spider’s web” is one and the same thing,
whether it is an action or a mere event.12 It is only on this assumption that there can
seem to be cases in which what is done unthinkingly (e.g. by the wind) is identical to
what is done thinkingly (e.g. by a child). For if the assumption is false—if it is one
thing to destroy a spider’s web thinkingly, and another to do it unthinkingly—then
what is done by a child who is intentionally destroying a spider’s web is never done
by the wind, or an earthquake, or a falling branch, or a bear. In that case, it is just
like getting married: it is something which is known to be done, whenever in fact it
is done. And this is what gives rise to a Humean Circle.
12Anscombe sometimes seems to share this assumption. See especially Intention, (1963), pp.
84–87.
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Then what speaks for the idea that what is done under the description “destroying
a spider’s web” is the same, regardless of whether it is an action or a mere event?
Nothing, it seems, apart from the fact that the same description can be used in both
cases. But there is no reason that the same description must be used. If ever the
need should arise, we certainly can disambiguate the descriptions of what is done:
that is arguably the function of the English word “intentional.”13 But in most cases
the need does not arise: it is typically just obvious which category of event is being
described; thus, we do not typically encumber the description with a statement to
the effect that the event in question was, or was not, an intentional action. If what
destroyed the spider’s web was the wind, the event was definitely in one category; if
a child with a stick, probably the other. But, again, the mere fact that an event can
be described in an ambiguous, or categorially indeterminate, way does not entail that
the event described is itself indeterminate. And the event itself is not indeterminate:
it is always belongs—squarely—to one category or the other.
If I intend to destroy a spider’s web, I intend to destroy it intentionally. The
object of my intention—what I intend to do—is not something that, for all I know
or care, may as well be a mere event. The object of my intention is definitively an
action. And likewise the object of my thought. If I am intentionally destroying a
spider’s web, and therefore think I am doing so, I think I am doing it thinkingly—and
not as the wind does; and not as it were indeterminately.
This, at any rate, is what I hope to entitle myself to say. It will take some work
to show that what is done, when a person acts, is always specifically an action. That
is the task of Chapters 5 and 6. But we may note in advance that if the position is
defensible, then what is true of getting married, or making a promise, or signing a
13If what matters in the context is just the fact that there are two homeless spiders, one might
say, “The girl destroyed this spider’s web, and the boy destroyed that one’s,” or simply, “She did
what he did,” even though what she did was unintentional and what he did was intentional. In
fact, we might even say, of these two children, “They did what it did,” referring now to the wind’s
destruction of another spider’s web. But if what matters is, say, how well- or badly-behaved the
children have been, we will not describe what happened by saying that she did what he did.
84
contract, or taking an oath, is true of any other form of action: it cannot be done
unthinkingly—that is, it cannot be done without the agent’s thinking that what she
is doing is: what she is doing. And if what she is doing is a form specifically of action,
then the agent must think that what she is doing is acting.
4.4.2 What is it to Think that one is Acting?
But now, what is it for the agent to think that she is acting? The category of action
cannot figure in her thought in the same way as a specific form of action, like getting
married. This is particularly clear in the present case. In order for someone to think
she is getting married, she must have certain special words in her vocabulary: in
particular, she must possess the predicate “to get married.” Someone who had never
heard of marriage, and who had no idea what a wedding was, could not think that
she was getting married; and as a result, she could be getting married. But “action”
is not the sort of thing that one needs to have heard of in order to do. Thinking that
one is acting is not a matter of deploying the predicate “to act.” And it certainly
does not depend on the possession of philosophical jargon like “intention,” “reason”
and “category.” This is the second difficulty that seems to prevent the envisioned
expansion of the Humean Circle. If not as part of the explicit content of an agent’s
thought, then in what other way does the category of action inform the agent’s
thinking?
The answer is, I think, that the category of action figures in the agent’s thought
by way of her recognition that what she is doing is vulnerable to a certain line of
criticism, liable to a certain kind of failure, subject to a certain sort of explanation,
and, in sum, responsible to a certain question “Why?” The sense of this question is
the topic of the next chapter. But even before coming to that, two things ought to be
clear: first, that the relevant sense of the question “Why?”—whatever it may be—is
something that the agent herself understands; and second, that if the relevant sense
of the question applies to what a person is doing, then she herself must recognize this
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fact.
Neither of these points should be at all controversial. As I said earlier, it is a
familiar commonplace that a person must know, or think that she knows, her reasons
for acting. A person does occasionally act for no particular reason: she might, for
instance, try to balance a penny on its edge, or build a house of cards, not because
this served any purpose, but just for fun, or just because she thought she would.
However, someone who is acting for no particular reason knows that she is acting for
no particular reason. And so, in this case as in the normal one, she knows that what
she is doing is the sort of thing for which it is possible to have reasons.
But “action” is just the name we give to that sort of event. If I am pressing the
button in order to open the elevator door, what I am doing is susceptible to a very
particular kind of criticism, with which we are all familiar. Someone might tell me,
“Ah, but the door won’t open if you press that button,” or again she might say, “Ah,
but the door will open all the same whether you press that button or not.”14 And
“action” is what we call an event that is subject to this sort of criticism, in light of
that sort of reason.
But if an agent must know that what she is doing is the sort of thing for which it
is possible have reasons, or is the sort of thing that criticizable in light of her reasons,
she must understand the reason-requesting sense of the question “Why?” For she
must understand, at least implicitly, what a reason is, and hence, also, the request
for one. Then to explain the relevant sense of the question “Why?,” as I will begin to
do in the sequel, is to articulate a structure that is intelligible from the agent’s own
perspective.
The immediate point is not merely that an agent must possess an understanding
of the question “Why?” as part of her background conceptual scheme. The point is
that she must actually bring this understanding to bear on anything that it applies
to, and that she is doing. The applicability of the question “Why?” is not something
14See Anscombe, Intention, (1963), p. 36.
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about which the agent herself could be mistaken. She could not, for instance, know
full well that she was destroying a spider’s web, and think that she was doing it
intentionally, though in fact she was doing it unintentionally. Nor is this something
about which the agent might, as it were, have no opinion. If the question “Why?”
has application to something the agent is doing, then the agent herself must think
that it does.
This admittedly tells us nothing—or very little—about the relevant sense of the
question “Why?” or what it is for the question to “apply” to an event. But it does
already point to a problem with the standard approach to action. A philosopher of
action cannot first take for granted a theory of events, and then describe an extra
feature of action, because a complete description of that extra feature would have
to mention the agent’s thought. In particular, it would have to mention the agent’s
thought that what she is she doing is such as to attract the reason-requesting sense of
the question “Why?”—and thus, that what she is doing is an action. This means that
a philosopher could say whatever else she liked about whatever else she liked—about
belief-desire pairs, or bodily movements, or brain states, or what have you—but to
anything else that a philosopher might say, she would have to add this one thing in
particular: that the agent, in acting, must think of herself as doing precisely that:
acting. And then everything else would be swept into the circle.
4.4.3 Is the “Naturally Unintelligible” Unintelligible?
Another seeming obstacle to the envisioned expansion of the Humean Circle is the
appearance that it must render action totally unintelligible. To say that something
is “naturally unintelligible” is, I suppose, to say that it is unintelligible on certain
assumptions about what the natural world is like. If one of those assumptions is
that any part of physical reality must be susceptible to explanation by genus and
differentia, then action is indeed “naturally unintelligible.”
But the fact that there is no addendum in virtue of which an event is an action is
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no more troubling or problematic then other similar claims. There is no addendum
in virtue of which a quality is a color, or in virtue of which a color is red. And there
is no addendum in virtue of which a substance is an organism, or in virtue of which
an organism is a horse. Certainly, these things—qualities, colors, substances and
organisms—these things are not unintelligible. And if some philosophical conception
of nature makes them seem to be so, the conclusion to draw is that this conception
is false.
In its expanded form, the Humean Circle is, I think, just a special instance of a
circle that arises in connection with any categorial species. As we saw in Chapter 2.2,
a categorial species cannot be explained by reference to genus and differentia. The
attempt to do so inevitably sends one reaching for something that, upon reflection,
cannot be understood prior to what one is trying to explain. And here again, too. In
this case, what one reaches for—sooner or later—is the agent’s thought about what
is done.
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5.0 WHAT IS DONE
5.1 INTRODUCTION
What is done, when a person acts, is something somehow general. To build a house,
for example, or to open a door, or to walk down the street, or even simply to stand
up, is to do some one thing that many people might do, many times and places, many
different ways. Once having noticed this “one” in these “many,” a philosopher might
begin to wonder about the salient principle of unity. What is it that is the same when
the same thing is done, and yet different when different things are done? What is the
“form” of an action?
Curiously enough, we stumble upon the same question, approaching the matter
from the opposite direction. For although what is done is in one way general, it is also
in another way specific. To be “doing something” is always to be doing something
in particular—tying one’s shoe, as it might be, or turning on the lights. A person
is “acting,” as philosophers say, only because she is, for example, hammering a nail.
Action is something that does not exist in the abstract, but only in its concrete forms.
What, then, is an “action-form”?
Admittedly, this is not a question that philosophers of action have worried much
about.1 But once it has been raised, the question is difficult to ignore. On any view,
1But see Michael Thompson, “Naive Action Theory,” in Life and Action, (2008). The term
“action-form” is an adaptation of Thompson’s “event-form.” Anyone familiar with his essay will
see how thoroughly it has influenced this chapter. See also Donald Davidson, “The Logical Form of
Action Sentences,” (1967); and Jennifer Hornsby, Actions, (1980).
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practical philosophy concerns itself with ends and means, and with their connection
in practical reasoning. Then among its most fundamental questions are, presumably,
these: “What is it to do one thing for the sake of doing another?” and “What it is
to do one thing by means of doing another?” However, the answer to these questions
depends on the answer to this one: “What it is to do one thing as distinct from doing
another?” In what follows I will purse the conjecture that the converse is also true:
that in order to account for the unity of an action, we must come to see how doing
something can be an end to which, or a means by which, one is doing something else.
The pursuit of this conjecture will involve a noticeable change of course. My aim
in the preceding chapters has been predominately negative. I have tried to vindicate
Anscombe’s assertion that the standard approach in the philosophy of action “leads
us into inextricable confusions, and we must give it up” (29). But it is, I think, a
legitimate complaint that we cannot abandon the standard approach in the absence
of a genuine alternative. In this chapter, I will begin to explore a different approach,
the one that Anscombe herself recommends.
Despite this obvious change of course, the argument of the present chapter may
also be seen as continuing that of the last. There, I argued that what an agent is
doing falls under the category of action only if the agent herself thinks that it does.
In order to think of what she is doing as an action, I claimed, the agent must grasp a
certain sense of the question “Why?” and, moreover, she must see what she is doing
as susceptible to that question. But the relevant sense of the question “Why?” is
something I did not explain. I will now begin to do so. I hope, at least, to begin to
make clear what it is to represent something as an action. For the time being, I will
bracket the question whether the action represented is one’s own. In the sequel, I will
return to the topic of the agent’s own thought.
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5.2 ANOTHER APPROACH
What, then, is the alternative to the standard approach in the philosophy of action?
According to Anscombe, the philosopher’s task is not to describe an extra feature of
action, but to display what she calls a “form of description”2—“an order which is
there whenever actions are done with intentions.”3 And this is what she attempts to
do. Near the end of Intention, Anscombe writes:
If one simply attends to the fact that many actions can be either intentional or
unintentional, it can be quite natural to think that events which are characterisable
as intentional or unintentional are a certain natural class, ‘intentional’ being an extra
property which a philosopher must try to describe. In fact the term ‘intentional’
has reference to a form of description of events. What is essential to this form is
displayed in the results of our enquiries into the question “Why?”4
The relevant sense of the question “Why?” is the one that is “given application”
only by an intentional action. Anscombe’s inquiries into this question include the
famous discussion of a man who is moving a handle up and down (“Why?”) in order
to work the pump (“Why?”) in order to replenish the house water-supply. But half
way through the book, Anscombe’s attention turns from the question “Why?” to a
corresponding question “How?” and she takes up the subject of practical reasoning—
the kind of connection between ends and means that Aristotle called the “practical
syllogism.”5 She closes the latter discussion with this:
If Aristotle’s account were supposed to describe actual mental processes, it would
in general be quite absurd. The interest of the account is that it describes an
order which is there whenever actions are done with intentions; the same order
as I arrived at in discussing what ‘the intentional action’ was, when the man was
pumping water.6
2Anscombe, Intention, (1963), p. 84.
3Ibid., p. 80.
4Ibid., p. 85.
5The question “How?” is introduced on page 46 of Intention; the discussion of the practical
reasoning begins on page 57.
6Ibid., p. 80.
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Anscombe’s discussion of the question “Why?” and of the corresponding question
“How?” contain between them the bulk of her positive doctrine. And this might strike
one as strange. After all, accounts of the intentional action do not typically focus on
the structure of practical reasoning. It plays no role either in the “belief-desire model”
associated with Davidson, or in the “hiererarchical model” conceived by Frankfurt.
Noticing this, someone might wonder how, exactly, reflection on ends and means is
supposed to teach us what an action is.7——Does action spring from a syllogism like
a missile from a cannon? Is it led by reason like a dog on a leash?——According
to Anscombe, the interest of the practical syllogism is exhausted by the fact that it
reveals an “order” that is internal to the action itself. The point is not that intentional
action is launched by practical reasoning, but rather that a logical nexus of ends and
means permeates an action throughout, holding it together, and making it one. The
philosopher’s task, on her view, is to peer inside the action and describe its inner
structure—or to break it open, like a pomegranate, and show what it contains.
This is in contrast to the usual psychological account, which is born of the stan-
dard approach, and which aims to describe a mental state that “causes” or “guides”
or “controls” an action. It is characteristic of such an account that it takes no interest
in the action itself. Its primary object of concern is either the relevant mental state
or else the relation between that mental state and the action it produces. But the
action itself is totally untheorized, and may as well be a structureless monad. We
learn absolutely nothing about it, except its relation to something else. It is almost
as though an intentional action had no character of its own.
The alternative will turn our attention back to the action itself. It will inquire
about the structure of what is done, and not what precedes it, or what hovers along-
side. Marx attempted to unfold the the entire capitalist system from the inner struc-
ture of its elemental form: the individual commodity.8 The individual action may
7Anscombe’s discussion of the practical syllogism is for the most part ignored by authors like
Velleman 1989 and 2000, and Setiya 2007, who have tried to enlist Anscombe to the standard
approach.
8Marx, Capital, Ch.1.1, p. 127.
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likewise contain an unanticipated wealth.
*
Admittedly, the alternative is obscure. What, for example, is the “order” that is
supposed to characterize an intentional action? How is the exhibition of such different
from the account of an extra property? And what does it mean for the question
“Why?” to be “given”—or “refused”—“application”?
The obscurity surrounding these issues makes it difficult to see the kind of account
that Anscombe has in view. So much so, that a casual reader of Intention might
even suppose that Anscombe herself is pursuing the standard approach. One might
think, for example, that she defines an intentional action as one that is done for (or
“motivated,” or “caused,” or “explained,” or “justified” by) a reason. She writes:
What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The
answer I shall suggest is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the
question ‘Why?’ is given application; the sense is of of course that in which the
answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting.9
Remarks like this one may give the impression that Anscombe, too, is in search of
an extra feature, and that the feature she ultimately settles upon is an action’s being
done for a reason. But this cannot be so. First, because Anscombe holds that an
account of intentional action just is an account of the relevant sense of the question
“Why?,” and that this just is an account of the corresponding kind of “reason.” So,
on her view, the idea of a “reason” cannot be appealed to as something intelligible
independently of intentional action. Second, because Anscombe does not believe that
an answer to the question “Why?” always gives a reason for acting, but only that
it does so “if positive.” Whatever is meant by the qualification, it is clear that, on
her view, an event may be an intentional action even though it does not possess the
supposed extra feature. Her approach, in that case, cannot be the standard one.
9Ibid., p. 9.
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But it may shed light on the envisioned alternative to consider these two points
in a little more detail. Anscombe acknowledges that there is something slightly prob-
lematic about her appeal to the question “Why?” What is problematic, she thinks,
is precisely that it risks giving a false impression of the progress we make by invoking
the idea of a reason. Thus, to the remark quoted in the previous paragraph, she
immediately appends the following warning: “But this statement”—namely, that the
relevant sense of the question “Why?” is the one that requests a reason for acting—
“is not sufficient, because the question ‘What is the relevant sense of the question
“Why?”’ and ‘What is meant by a “reason for acting”?’ are one and the same,” (9).
Shortly after equating an account of the relevant sense of the question “Why?” with
that of a “reason for acting,” Anscombe equates the latter (and thus both) with an
account of intentional action. She writes:
Why is giving a start or gasp not an ‘action’, while sending for a taxi, or crossing
the road, is one? The answer cannot be “Because the answer to the question ‘why?’
may give a reason in the latter cases”, for the answer may ‘give a reason’ in the
former cases too; and we cannot say “Ah, but not a reason for action”; we should
be going round in circles.10
Why does Anscombe think it is circular to appeal to the idea of a reason in explaining
what an action is? Like most philosophers of action, Anscombe distinguishes two
different kinds of event: the kind that is an “action” (e.g. sending for a taxi or
crossing the road) and the kind that is a “mere event” (e.g. giving a start or gasping).
Of either kind of event, one can request an explanation. That is, one can ask for the
reason why it happened; one can ask: “Why did you give a start?” or “Why did you
cross the road?” And in answer to such a query one may be told the reason why. One
may be told, “The reason I gave a start is that I saw a face in the window.” And
likewise, one may be told, “The reason I crossed the road is that I was walking to
school.” But, according to Anscombe, the two different kinds of event correspond to
two different senses of the question “Why?” and two different determinate species of
10Ibid., p.10.
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“reason.” In that case, it is impossible to define an action as an event that is done for
a “reason.” For the “reason” we invoke must be of one or another determinate kind:
it must be either a “reason for action” or a “reason for a mere event.” The latter
kind of reason is irrelevant, but we cannot appeal to the former without presupposing
what we are attempting to explain. It is clear that there is no non-circular account of
“action” that appeals to a “reason for action,” and thus, none that appeals to “the
sense of the question ‘Why?’ that requests a reason for action.”
But then, one might wonder, how does Anscombe herself manage to avoid “going
round in circles”? She claims to give an account of “action;” and yet, she appeals
without embarrassment to “the sense of the question ‘Why?’ that requests a reason
for action.” Doesn’t understanding the relevant sense of this question depend on
understanding what an action is? And if so, then how can she explain what an action
is by appeal to this question? The answer is that there is a kind of circularity that
Anscombe embraces. Such circularity is a characteristic feature of categorial specifi-
cation; and, on Anscombe’s view, action is a categorial species of event. According to
her, “action,” and the relevant kind of “reason” and the relevant sense of the question
“Why?” constitute a single system of concepts that must be explained together.
*
Before saying more about this, let us consider the other reason I gave for thinking
that Anscombe’s appeal to the question “Why?” is not in the service of describing
an extra feature. Anscombe is quite explicit about the fact that the question “Why?”
may be “given application” even where it has no “positive” answer—a “positive”
answer being one that states a reason for acting. Thus, she is happy to allow that
not every intentional action is done for (or “motivated,” or “caused,” or “explained,”
or “justified” by) a reason:
Now of course a possible answer to the question ‘Why?’ is one like ‘I just thought I
would’ or ‘It was an impulse’ or ‘For no particular reason’ or ‘It was an idle action—
I was just doodling’. The question is not refused application because the answer to
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it says that there is no reason, any more than the question how much money I have
in my pocket is refused application by the answer ‘None’.11
The comparison drawn by Anscombe between the question “Why?” and the question
“How much?” is one we will return to shortly. For now let us focus on Anscombe’s
claim that a person may be doing something, and doing it intentionally, just for fun,
or just because he just thought he would, or for no particular reason. Davidson seems
to balk at this claim, if he does not simply deny it.12 It is certainly denied by those
of his followers who propound a reductive psychological account, according to which
an action is intentional if and only if it is caused (in the right way) by a reason. Like
Davidson and his followers, Anscombe offers an account of intentional action that
makes ineliminable reference to the idea of a reason for action. But unlike them, she
takes in stride the intuitive claim that certain intentional actions, like doodling on
a scrap of paper, are done for no reason. All that matters, from her point of view,
is whether the action is one with regard to which the reason-requesting sense of the
question “Why?” is appropriately asked. If so—if the question “has application,” as
she puts it—then the action is intentional; and if not, not.
Now, although Anscombe thinks that intentional action can be done for no reason,
she also believes that reasonless intentional action is of comparably little philosophical
importance.
[T]he concept of voluntary or intentional action would not exist, if the question
‘Why?’, with answers that give reasons for acting, did not. Given that it does exist,
the cases where the answer is ‘For no particular reason’, etc. can occur; but their
interest is slight, and it must not be supposed that because they can occur that
answer would everywhere be intelligible, or that it could be the only answer ever
given.13
Anscombe refers, somewhat strangely, to the existence of concepts and questions and
answers, but her point can be put in simpler terms. Her point is that if there were no
11Ibid., p. 25.
12Davidson, “Actions, Reasons and Causes,” (1963), p. 6.
13Anscombe, Intention, (1963), p. 34.
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such thing as acting for a reason, there would be no such thing as acting for no reason,
and, thus, no such thing as action. Mention of reasons—or, of positive answers to the
question “Why?”—is therefore essential to an account of what intentional action is.
From a certain point of view, this may seem an untenable position. Can it be true
both that the idea of a reason for action is essential to an account of intentional action,
and that certain intentional actions are done for no reason? It can, if the point of
mentioning a reason for action is to indicate the kind of event that intentional action
is, rather than a property attaching to every member of the kind. On Anscombe’s
view, intentional action is the kind of event to which it belongs to have a reason. We
could put this this saying that every particular intentional action either has a reason
or is missing one. Of course, if we put it like this, we will have to acknowledge that
there are two different ways for something not to be done for the relevant sort of
reason: as when, just for fun, one tries to balance a penny on its edge; and as when,
having seen a face in the window, one gives a sudden start. We will have to say
that giving a start merely has no reason of the relevant, whereas balancing a penny
is missing one. And this means that in regard to the question, “What distinguishes
actions which are intentional from those which are not?” Anscombe’s position will
have to be something like this: that intentional action is that which either has a
reason, of a kind that only intentional action can have, or else fails to have one, in a
way that only intentional action can fail to have one.14 But that is not an unwelcome
result. For it reinforces the idea that Anscombe’s appeal to reasons—or to “positive
answers to the question ‘Why?’”—is circular, and gives us no independent purchase
on the category of intentional action.
14Her official position is that “the answers to the question ‘Why?’ which give it an application
are more extensive in range than the answers which give reasons for acting. This question ‘Why?’
can now be defined as the question expecting an answer in this range,” (28). But she makes no
attempt to define the “range” of answers that give the question “Why?” application: she simply
says that it includes ones like “For no particular reason,” and “I just thought I would.” Elsewhere
Anscombe does attempt to narrow the range of acceptable answers to the question “Why?” by
appeal something that is supposed to be intelligible independently of the question. She says that
the question “Why are you doing A?” is “refused application” by the answer “I didn’t know I was
doing A.” But it is not clear this move is legitimate.
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*According to Anscombe, an intentional action is that about which a certain sort
of question can be raised: it is, as we might say, the object of a certain kind of
thought. What this means will become clear, I hope, if we consider the comparison
that Anscombe draws between the question “Why?” and the question “How much?”
Just as the object of the question “Why?” is, on Anscombe’s view, a distinctive kind
of event, the object of the question “How much?” is, on any view, a special kind of
substance. And just as Anscombe claims that the question “Why?” calls for a certain
sort of reason, everyone must agree, I think, that question “How much?” calls for a
certain sort of quantity.
Any substance is quantifiable, but its quantifiability can take one of two determi-
nate forms, either that of countability or that of measurability. A countable substance
is, as we might say, “a thing,” whereas measurable substance is “stuff.” Linguists
call a word for a thing a “count-noun” and a word for stuff a “mass-noun”: examples
of the former include “river,” “statue,” “horse” and “planet;” examples of the latter
include “earth,” “air,” “fire” and “water.”
The very same distinction could be marked by saying that a thing gives application
to the question “How many?” whereas stuff gives application to the question “How
much?” To represent something as a thing is to represent it as having a certain
logical shape, thanks to which the question “How many?” may be sensibly asked
and answered. Meanwhile, to represent something as stuff is to represent it as having
a different logical shape—a shape that is fitted to a different question, the question
“How much?” Both of these questions are inquiries into the quantity of a substance,
but they call for different sorts of answer. The canonical answer to the question
“How many?” is a number: for instance, 12. By contrast, the canonical answer to
the question “How much?” is an amount: for instance, 12 gallons.
The difference between these questions, and the answers they elicit, is evidently
a formal one. Contrast, on the one hand, the fact that the question “What is the
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quantity?” may be answered with either a number or an amount, and, on the other
hand, the fact that the question “How many?” may be answered with either an
even or an odd number. The difference between a number and an amount is quite
unlike the difference between an even and an odd number. To see why, we might
imagine someone who claimed that an amount is just a number with a certain special
property—for instance, that of being very, very large. An account of this sort is
obviously hopeless. The difference between “12” and “12 gallons” is not the difference
between two kinds of number, but between a number and something else.
If there can be a logical match between a question and what it is about, there
can also be a mismatch. And that is what we find in the present case: the question
“How many?” has no application to stuff; and the question “How much?” has no
application to things. Of tobacco in a pouch, you cannot ask how many there are.
Of cigarettes in a packet, you cannot ask how much there is. The thought “S is 12
in number” (or: “There are 12 S’s”) can only be of a thing: “a thing” refers to the
formal object of any predication of number. Similarly, the thought “S is 12 gallons”
(or: “There are 12 gallons of S”) can only be of stuff: “stuff” refers to the formal
object of any predication of amount.
It is important to emphasize that the questions “How many?” and “How much?”
may both have application even where they have no positive answer. If the number
of cigarettes in a packet is zero, there is no positive answer to the question how
many cigarettes there are. But since cigarettes are countable things, the question
still has application: it still makes sense. What is quantifiable—here, a cigarette—is,
if you like, in the present circumstances “unquantified.” Likewise, there is no positive
answer to the question how much tobacco there is in the pouch, if the amount is
in the pouch is none. But the question “How much?” is not in that case refused
application, because tobacco remains a measurable stuff.
Notice that the formal contrast between stuff and things is marked even in their
absence—that is, even in the difference between “zero” and “none.” The first means
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“not any number”; the second means “no amount.” The distinction between “12”
and “12 gallons” is preserved in distinction between “0” and “0 gallons.” Surprising
though at first it may seem, there are two ways of having no quantity whatsoever—two
ways of being absolutely nothing.
Of course, in many languages, the distinction between “How many?” and “How
much?” is totally unmarked. In French, there is only “Combien?” which is used to
ask either question. (It has the flexibility of “What is the quantity?” in English.)
But the French might say, in the manner of Anscombe, that stuff gives application
to “a certain sense” of the question “Combien?” while a thing gives application to a
different “sense” of the question. Corresponding to these two different senses are two
different forms of quantite´, with two different scales of beaucoup and peu.
Anscombe warns of an explanatory circle that arises in connection with “action”
and the idea of a “reason;” and we can easily imagine an identical circle arising in
connection with “thing” and “quantity.” Someone might ask: “Why is fire or water
not ‘a thing,’ while a horse or a planet is one?” The answer cannot be, “Because the
answer to the question ‘Combien? ’ may give a quantity in the latter cases,” for the
answer may “give a quantity” in the former cases too; and we cannot say “Ah, but
not a quantity of things ;” we should be going round in circles. In order to break out
of the circle, it would be necessary to explain the form of quantity belonging to a
thing, as distinct from that belonging to stuff. We would have to reveal the character
of a thought whose formal object is a countable substance.
And notice what would not seem a reasonable way to proceed, here. It would
not seem reasonable—even remotely—to take for granted a generic conception of
that which is quantifiable, and then to look for an extra feature attaching to the
quantifiable, in virtue of which it is countable. The positive question, how, in that
case, we ought to proceed—whether, say, along the lines of Frege’s Grundlagen, or
in some other way—is admittedly very difficult, but the negative point is perfectly
clear: the method of division is out.
100
It is equally clear that our interest in the questions “How many?” and “How
much?” is a logical or metaphysical one, and has nothing to do with the contingent
possession of the predicates “. . . is a thing” or “. . . is stuff.” One need not possess
the concept “stuff” in order to represent something as a measurable substance: it
is sufficient to grasp the sense of the question “How much?,” and to recognize its
applicability to the substance at hand. That is, it is enough to recognize that the
substance at hand is susceptible to a certain “form of description.”15
Similarly, I claimed in Chapter 4 that in order to represent an event as falling
under the category of action, it is not necessary to possess or deploy the predicate
“. . . is an action”: it is enough to recognize that the event in question as subject
to the question “Why?” According to Anscombe, the term “intentional action” has
exactly the same logico-metaphysical character as “stuff” or “a thing”: it designates
the formal object of a certain kind of thought. This is the meaning of her claim that
“the term ‘intentional’ has reference to a form of description.”
In answer to the positive question, how we ought to proceed, if not by the standard
approach, Anscombe thinks that we must try to exhibit the kind of thought whose
formal object is an intentional action. To do so is to explain the form of the action
itself, and not anything external to it, such as its efficient cause. What is essential to
this form, she says, is displayed in the answers to the question “Why?” and to the
corresponding question “How?” Then in order to exhibit the internal structure of an
action, we must try to explain the sense of these questions.
15Anscombe also compares the question “Why?,” as asked of an intentional action, to the question
“What does it say?,” as asked of a word or a sentence: “It is not that certain things, namely the
movements of humans, are for some undiscovered reason subject to the question ‘Why?’ So too, it is
not just that certain appearances of chalk on blackboard are subject to the question ‘What does it
say?’ It is of a word or sentence that we ask ‘What does it say?’; and the description of something as
a word or a sentence at all could not occur prior to the fact that words or sentences have meaning. So
the description of something as human action could not occur prior to the existence of the question
‘Why?’, simply as a kind of utterance by which we were then obscurely prompted to address the
question,” (83). I have chosen to focus on the questions “How much?” and “How many?” because
it is relatively uncontroversial that the contrast between stuff and things is a logical, or quasi-logical
distinction. The scandalous suggestion that the word “word” also refers to a formal object would
be, in the present context, a needless distraction.
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5.3 WHAT, WHY AND HOW?
Anscombe’s basic thought is this, that what is done intentionally is many things at
once—all of them intentional, all of them related in a systematic way. To exhibit
these relations is, she thinks, to reveal the inner structure of an action, and thus, to
say what action essentially is.
Suppose, then, that what I am doing is filling a cistern with water. Someone
passing by might ask, “What are you doing?” and I might tell him matter-of-factly:
“I am filling the cistern.” However, once it is known what I am doing, the questioner
might wonder why. He might ask, “Why are you filling the cistern?” and I might
say, truly, “I am replenishing the house water-supply.” The answer to the question
why I am doing what I am doing is, in that case, another description of what I am
doing. What I am doing is two things at once: it is filling the cistern and replenishing
the water-supply, and the one for the sake of the other. Notice that in answer to the
question “Why?,” I could have said, “I am filling the cistern because I am replenishing
the water-supply,” or “I am filling the cistern in order to replenish the water-supply.”
Replenishing the water-supply is that in the pursuit of which I am doing something
else: it is, in a word, my end.
It is an end, moreover, to which filling the cistern with water is a means. If what
I am doing is two things at once, then, in response to the question “What are you
doing?” I might just answer straightaway: “I am replenishing the water-supply.” But
having been told what I am doing, the passerby might ask me how. And if asked,
“How are you replenishing the water-supply?” I might explain, “I am filling the
cistern.” At this point, the passerby might pursue his inquiry further: “How are you
filling the cistern?” And I: “I am operating the water-pump” And he: “But how are
you doing that?” And I: “I am moving the handle up and down.” The answer to the
question how I am doing what I am doing, like that to the question why, is another
description of what I am doing. What I am doing is, not two, but many things at
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once. It is replenishing the water-supply, and filling the cistern, and operating the
pump, and moving the handle up and down. Moreover, it is the first by means of the
second, and the second by means of the third, and so on.
The many things that one must do in doing something intentionally are bound
together as the elements of a system. The question “How?” displays them as an
ordered series of means. Given that I am doing D intentionally, the question “How?”
brings out the fact that I am also doing C intentionally, and that I am doing D by
means of doing C. Further applications of the question reveal that I am doing C by
doing B, and doing B by doing A:
D. I am replenishing the house water supply.
C. I am filling the cistern.
B. I am operating the pump.
A. I am moving the handle up and down.
Meanwhile, the question “Why?” presents the very same material in the reverse order,
as a series of ends. Given that I am doing A intentionally, the question “Why?” brings
out the fact that I am also doing B intentionally, and that I am doing A for the sake
of doing B, and so on:
A. I am moving the handle up and down.
B. I am operating the pump.
C. I am filling the cistern.
D. I am replenishing the house water supply.
A series of ends is the puddle-reflection of a series of means, A—D of D—A. It bears
emphasis that these are just two ways of arranging, or looking at, the self-same system
of elements. If we abstract from any specific content, what remains is an ordered list
of things done, which can be read either from top to bottom, or, instead, from bottom
to top:
X is doing A
X is doing B
X is doing C
X is doing D
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Read from top to bottom, the list appears as a series of ends; read from bottom to
top, it appears as a series of means.
That there is a single order, or system, is clear, if only because A—D and D—A
both refer to the same unfolding action. We have not imagined that on Monday in St.
Louis I was moving a handle, and on Tuesday in Pheonix I was operating a water-
pump, and on Wednesday in Pittsburgh I was filling a cistern, while on Thursday
in Seattle I was replenishing a water-supply. Instead we have considered four things
that I am doing here and now. As Anscombe puts it, “There is one action with four
descriptions, each dependent on wider circumstances, and each related to the next
as description of means to end; which means that we can speak equally well of four
corresponding intentions, or of one intention.”16 But what is true of the intention is
true, also, of what is actually done: we can say that I am doing four things, or that
I am doing one—and equally well. “For moving [my] arm up and down with [my]
fingers round the pump handle is, in these circumstances, operating the pump; and,
in these circumstances, it is replenishing the house water-supply.”17 In doing any
one of the things I am doing, I am doing all the rest. I am moving the handle “in”
replenishing the water-supply. And, conversely, I am replenishing the water-supply
“in” moving the handle. Each of them is “in” the other: the one as end the other as
means.
Though they do represent a single order, the two different series, A—D and D—A,
nevertheless correspond to two different aspects of practical life. On the one hand,
the A—D series, unleashed by the question “Why?,” presents itself as an order of
what Davidson called “rationalization.”18 Each item in the series looks to the next
one for its reason, purpose or rationale. What makes it reasonable for me to move
the handle up and down is the fact that my aim is to operate the pump. Operating
the pump is in turn a sensible thing to do in view of the fact that I have undertaken
16Ibid., p. 46.
17Ibid., p. 46.
18Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes,” (1963).
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to fill the cistern. And so on.
One the other hand, the D—A series, heralded by the question “How?,” presents
itself as an order of deliberation. If a boss has given me the order, “Replenish the
house water-supply!” I might need to reflect on how to do that, and I might conclude
that what I should do is to fill the cistern. But at this point the deliberative question
might reassert itself, and lead me to inquire how to fill the cistern, and so on. Of
course, I can be doing B by means of doing A without having deliberated, just as I
can be doing A for the sake of doing B without having attempted to rationalize my
action. The point is simply that deliberation, like rationalization, reflects an order
that is internal to the action itself.
There is a corresponding contrast between two compliementary modes of expla-
nation, and two senses of “because.” One way to explain what I am doing is to show
what makes it necessary, another is to show what makes it possible. The first is
to explain why I must do what I am doing, the second how I can. What makes it
necessary for me to operate the pump is filling the cistern. True, there may be other
ways to do it; operating the pump is not “necessary” in the sense that this is the only
available means to my objective. Rather, it is what Anscombe calls an “Aristotlelian
necessity”: it is that upon which some good depends. If I were filling the cistern
by means other than those I am actually employing, my filling of the cistern would
depend on something else; but as things are, it depends on operating the pump. And
to know this is on the face of it to know something about my operation of the pump.
For we have supposed that, in the circumstances, operating the pump is filling the
cistern. On the other hand, what makes it possible for me to operate the pump is
moving the handle up and down. And, again, in coming to appreciate this, one comes
to have a richer understanding of what I am doing: that is, operating the pump. This
means that there are two associated senses of “because”: the “because” of necessity,
and the “because” of possibility. If asked, “Why must you operate the pump?” I
might answer, “Because I am filling the cistern.” And if asked, “How can you operate
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the pump?” I could explain, “Because I am moving the handle.”
5.4 THE PURPOSIVE UNITY OF AN ACTION
We have been considering the contrast between the question “Why?” and the question
“How?,” between the kind of explanation that appeals to necessity and the kind that
appeals to possibility, between rationalization and deliberation, between ends and
means. Though what is done is many things, it will have become clear that the basic
phenomenon is a two-place relation—a relation between doing one thing and doing
another. The system whose order we want to understand is therefore reducible to
this:
X is doing A
X is doing B
If, for the time being, we forget about the agent, and focus entirely on what is done,
we are left with the idea of two things that an agent might do, about which we know
only that they differ from one another, and that first is a means to which the second
is the end:
To do A
To do B
Now let us ask: What can be the value of these variables? If it is possible to do A in
order to do B, and, conversely, to do B by means of doing A, then doing A must be
different from doing B, and different in such a way that, in the circumstances, to do
be doing A is to be doing B. But what can stand to what in this relation?
There presumably must be some constraint. Not just anything is an end, or a
means, to just anything. Suppose that I am rubbing an apple on my sleeve, and some-
one asks me why. Certain answers are intelligible, others unintelligible. An intelligible
answer is: “I am polishing it,” or “I am scratching an itch.” An unintelligible answer
is: “I am building a fence.” The latter answer is unintelligible, even if I am building
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a fence, because there is, or appears to be, no connection between the doing the one
thing and doing the other. Or suppose I am removing the books from a shelf and
putting them in a box. If someone asks me why, and I say, “I’m making dinner,” this
will not explain my action, because making dinner and boxing books do not stand in
the right sort of relation. The question is: How must doing one thing relate to doing
another, so as for them to be an end and means?
This is a question of what might be called the purposive unity of an action. It
arises because, as Anscombe observes, acting intentionally consists in doing different
things at once, and because an account of intentional action must explain how they
all hang together. In pursuing such an account, the first step is to notice that the
different things done are purposively related. The second step is to inquire what it is
for two things done to stand in a purposive relation.
Of course, one might worry that, once we have taken the first step, and marked
the purposive nexus, we have come to the end of any general theory. And that
would seem to be Anscombe’s position. At any rate, she is not overly concerned with
the question what it is for one thing to be done by means of another. She writes,
“The mark of practical reasoning is that the thing wanted is at a distance from the
immediate action, and the immediate action is calculated as a way of getting or doing
or securing the thing wanted,” (79, original emphasis). Anscombe adds that the thing
wanted “may be at a distance in various ways,” but she does not tell us what they
are, these “various ways.” She seems to be content with the idea that an end and its
means are separated by a “distance.” That, however, is only to say that doing the
one thing is not the same as doing the other, a fact that is already implicit in our use
of the different variables, To do A and To do B.
But at one point Anscombe gestures at something slightly more systematic. She
offers what she calls a “vague and general formula,” the purpose of which is apparently
to characterize the conditions under which it is possible to think of one thing as done
for the sake of another:
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In order to make sense of ‘I do A with a view to B’, we must see how the future
state of affairs B is supposed to be a possible later stage in proceedings of which
the action A is an earlier stage.19
The main problem with Anscombe’s formula is neither its vagueness nor its generality,
but simply that it seems to be false. If a man is moving a handle up and down with
a view to operating the water-pump, operating the water-pump is not a “later stage”
in the proceedings of which moving the handle is an “earlier stage”: for moving
the handle and operating the pump are (or might be) simultaneous—as two different
“stages” presumably cannot be. Anscombe herself says that, “moving his arm up and
down with his fingers round the pump handle is, in these circumstances, operating
the pump,” but an earlier stage of some development is not, in any sense, a later
stage of the same.
Still, Anscombe’s formula points to something important. If an action has a
purposive unity, thanks to which the many things done in the course of its performance
are bound together in a system of means and ends, it also has a temporal unity,
consisting in the fact that it unfolds itself gradually in “phases,” “steps” or “stages.”
And this at least holds out the promise that we may come to see the purposive unity
of an action if we take into account its temporal unity.
5.5 THE TEMPORAL UNITY OF AN ACTION
An action is either complete or incomplete, already finished or still under way. Michael
Thompson has recently argued that attention to an action’s temporal structure is the
key to understanding how it is possible for one action to explain another: if one thing
19Anscombe, Intention, (1963), p. 36, substituting “A” and “B” for “P” and “Q.” Anscombe’s
formula is evidently intended to capture whatever truth is contained in the idea that: “The future
state of affairs mentioned [in answer to the question “Why?”] must be such that we can under-
stand the agent’s thinking it will or may be brought about by the action about which he is being
questioned,” p. 35.
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is done for the sake of another, it is, he thinks, “the progress of the deed itself” that
explains what is done for its sake.20
As Thompson notes and emphasizes, an action can be thought of in two different
ways. The predicable “To do A” may be joined with a subject imperfectly, as in
the past-tense judgment, “X was doing A,” and in the present-tense judgment, “X
is doing A,” or else perfectly, as in the past-tense judgment, “X did A,” a judgment
to which nothing in the present corresponds. The salient contrast is easiest to see
in connection with the past-tense judgments: in the judgment “X was doing A,” we
represent an action as having been incomplete, or under way, or in progress; in the
judgment “X did A” we represent the same action as completed, or finished, or over
and done with.
Past Present
Imperfective X was doing A X is doing A
Perfective X did A
Figure 8
The judgment that something was, or is, in progress is expressed in language by
means of a verb with “imperfective aspect,” as linguists call it, while the judgment
that something happened, or is done with, is expressed by a verb with “perfective
20See Michael Thompson, “Naive Action Theory,” Life and Action, (2008), p. 90. My discus-
sion of this essay will skirt Thompson’s official topic, which is a certain kind of psychologism in
the philosophy of action. In ordinary life, we encounter two apparently different forms of action
explanation: the explanation of action by action, and the explanation of action by want. A person
can explain what she is doing by reference to something else that she is doing, saying, “I am doing
A because I am doing B.” But she also explain what she is doing by reference to something that she
wants to do, saying, “I am doing A because I want to do B.” Thompson defends the unorthodox
view that the explanation of action by action is the fundamental form.
But the question concerning the purposive unity of action is one that arises whichever side one
takes in that dispute. If I cannot explain why I am rubbing an apple by reference to the fact that I
am building a fence, then I cannot explain it by reference to the fact that I want to build a fence.
And if it is unintelligible to say that I am putting books in a box because I am making dinner, it is
also, and equally, and for the same reason, unintelligible to say that I am doing it because I intend
to make dinner. Thus I simply ignore the dispute between Thompson and his opponents.
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aspect.” It will be convenient to refer to these, respectively, as imperfective and
perfective judgments.
The peculiar logical character of these judgments is revealed in the fact that
what is in progress can be interrupted, or broken off and left incomplete. Thus,
an imperfective judgment may be true, even though the corresponding perfective
judgment is false. A person may have been doing something that, in the end, he
never did; and he may now be doing something that, on the day of judgment, he will
not have done. It might be that he was writing a dissertation, although he did not
write one; or, again, that he is writing one now, although he will never finish.
Thompson observes that whenever two actions are purposively related, as means
and end, the end is always incomplete. Thus, if some form of To do A is to figure in
thought as a means, with some form of To do B as its end, the latter can appear either
in the imperfective judgment that “X was doing B,” or in the imperfective judgment
that “X is doing B;” but it cannot appear in the perfective judgment that “X did B.”
This holds whether the means are represented as complete or as incomplete. Thus,
the content of the present tense imperfective judgment, “X is doing B” can explain
that of the present tense imperfective judgment, “X is doing A,” or that of the past
tense imperfective judgment, “X was doing A,” or that of the past tense perfective
judgment “X did A.” For example, the fact that I am making dinner may explain
the fact that I am pulverizing herbs; but it may also explain the fact that, a minute
ago, I was chopping garlic, as well as the fact that, earlier, I peeled a tomato. In
general, A can be done for the sake of B, and B by means of A, only so long as B is
still in progress. This temporal constraint yields the following table of possible forms
of rationalization:
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X is doing B X was doing B X did B
X is doing A
X is doing A
because
X is doing B
X was doing A
X was doing A
because
X is doing B
X was doing A
because
X was doing B
X did A
X did A
because
X is doing B
X did A
because
X was doing B
Figure 9
Thompson’s observation that the end is always still in progress prompts the sugges-
tion of a new formula in the spirit of Anscombe’s original, a formula describing the
conditions under which it is possible to think of one thing done as a means to another:
if X is doing B by means of doing A, and A for the sake of B, then doing A must
advance the progress of B. Of course, the new formula is every bit as “vague and gen-
eral” as Anscombe’s own, but it has, I think, the virtue of being true. And it seems
to explain the emptiness of the empty cells in the table above. The emptiness of the
center cell in the top row is explained by the fact that nothing that X is doing can
advance the progress of what X was doing—unless, of course, the latter continues in
the present, in which case X is doing two things, one of which rationalizes the other,
and the example belongs in the top left cell.21 Meanwhile, the emptiness of the entire
right-hand column is explained by the fact that nothing whatever can advance the
progress of an action that is already finished: what’s done, after all, is done.22
21Thus, it is not enough to say that the progress of one deed can rationalize another. If I was doing
B, this cannot rationalize the fact that I am doing A, even though “I was doing B” is an imperfective
judgment. We need to add that the rationalizing action must be in progress contemporaneously with
what it rationalizes. For B can rationalize A only so long as B is still in under way.
22One might object that, “I did A because I did B,” is a legitimate form of rationalization, which
ought to appear in the bottom-most right-most cell. And of course it might be the case that I did
something, A, for the sake of something else I did, B. But this can only mean that I was doing A
because I was doing B, and I finished them both. In other words, it must be the case that B was in
progress back when I was doing A for its sake. And that is the essential point.
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5.6 WHETHER AN ACTION’S PURPOSIVE UNITY IS ITS
TEMPORAL UNITY
That the explanation of action by action conforms to the pattern of the table above,
and is, in general, a matter of relating the relevant means to a still unfolding process,
is certainly an important observation. But does it explain the purposive unity of an
action? So far, nothing has been said about the value of the variables To do A and
To do B that combine in the way that is shown in the table. Even if, as Thompson
says, it is “the progress of the deed itself” that explains what is done for its sake,
still, it is not just the progress of any old deed that explains the doing of anything.
Thompson’s pithy slogan, “Explanation by the imperfective,” invites the response,
“Yes, but the explanation of what? By the imperfective of what?”
Now Thompson may seem to explain this, too. It is, after all, a theme of his essay
that one action can rationalize another if the first is a “whole” of which the second
is a “part.” The part-whole relation is displayed in the following exchanges:
QUESTION: “Why are you breaking an egg?”
ANSWER: “I’m making an omelet.”
QUESTION: “Why are you crossing the street?”
ANSWER: “I’m walking to school.”
QUESTION: “Why are you writing the letter ‘a’?”
ANSWER: “I’m writing the word ‘action.’”
All of the examples in Thompson’s essay are carefully selected to be of this kind: each
of them is meant to exhibit the distinctive relation that obtains between egg-breaking
and omelet-making. Of course, one wants something more than a list of examples
and the woolly intuition that they all go together: one wants an account of what it is
for one thing done to be a “part” of another. Thompson’s view is seemingly that to
understand what a “part” is, it suffices to grasp the idea of an action’s being under
way, rather than complete.23 In other words, he identifies the contrast between “part”
23At any rate, he provides no other account of what it is for one action to be a “part” of another.
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and “whole” with that between “imperfection” and “perfection.” If he is right, then
an action’s purposive unity is its temporal unity.
But on the face of it this looks doubtful, if only because, as Anscombe says, the
end can be “at a distance” from the means “in various ways.” Even in advance of any
account, it is obvious that the kind of “distance” separating a “part” from a “whole”
is one among many. It is certainly possible to break an egg for the sake of making
an omelet, as Thompson has observed. But it is also possible to raise one’s hand
for the sake of casting a vote. The relation between hand-raising and vote-casting
is not mereological: raising one’s hand is not part of casting a vote, but the whole
of it, thanks to a pre-given custom. And so, alongside Thompson’s list of intuitively
similar examples, we can produce a list of different sort:
QUESTION: “Why are you tugging your ear?”
ANSWER: “I’m giving the batter the signal to bunt.”
QUESTION: “Why are you handing her those slips of paper?”
ANSWER: “I’m paying my rent.”
QUESTION: “Why are you making those squiggly marks?”
ANSWER: “I’m writing calligraphy.”
Such examples are of course common in the literature. Where Anscombe discusses
this kind of case, she characterizes the means as something “brute” relative to which
the end is something “conventional.”24
The relation between a brute means and a conventional end is altogether different
from the one that is featured in Thompson’s examples. Intuitively, there is more to
making an omelet than breaking an egg; and there is more to walking to school than
crossing a street; but there is nothing more to writing calligraphy than making certain
squiggly marks—nothing, that is, apart from the custom in virtue of which making
such marks is writing calligraphy. Of course, what is meant by “more,” here, needs
The reader must conclude either that Thompson intends his treatment of imperfection to elucidate
the idea of a part, or that he has nothing to say about what a part is.
24See Anscombe, “On Brute Facts,” (1958a); and “Modern Moral Philosophy,” (1958b).
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to be explained, but no one, I think, will deny the difference.
The difference is particularly clear in view of the fact that a conventional action,
like making the sign of the cross, is an end that gathers into itself means of both kind.
In order to make the sign of the cross, one must do something brute: one must make
a certain gesture with the hand. But in order to make this gesture, one must perform
the actions that are its parts: one must first touch the forehead, then the belly, then
the right shoulder, then the left. Touching one’s forehead is to making the gesture
as breaking an egg is to making an omelet. One touches one’s forehead for the sake
of making the gesture; and one makes the gesture for the sake of signing the cross.
But the relation between the gesture and its parts is different from that between the
gesture and its significance.
If it is possible to break an egg for the sake of making an omelet, and to raise one’s
hand for the sake of casting a vote, it is also possible to eat a peach for sake of eating
a piece of fruit. (Suppose, for example, that my doctor has told me that I need more
fruit in my diet.) The relation between peach-eating and fruit-eating is certainly not
mereological, but neither is it conventional: it is, instead, the relation between doing
some specific thing and doing something general. One can easily devise a third list
of intuitively similar examples:
QUESTION: “Why are you taking a course in ancient philosophy?”
ANSWER: “I am fulfilling the college’s humanities requirement.”
QUESTION: “Why are you painting the house?”
ANSWER: “I am sprucing it up.”
QUESTION: “Why are you running?”
ANSWER: “I am exercising.”
If I am eating a peach for the sake of having some fruit, then this is not the only way
that I could have achieved my end. I could have had a pear; I could have had a plum;
I could have had a medley of peaches, pears and plums. But what I am in fact doing
is eating a peach—nothing more and nothing less. Given my purposes, this will do.
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For I am hereby having some fruit.
A general end, like eating fruit, gathers into itself a specific means, like eating
a peach, but also various parts. To eat a peach, one must take a bite, and then
another, and then another—and so on to the stone. Of course, the same process
could be described by saying that first I eat a bite of fruit. Obviously, eating a bite of
peach is eating a bite of fruit, and eating a peach is eating a piece of fruit: this is the
“is” of genus and species, not the “is” of part and whole. But given the relation of
genus and species, it is possible to move back and forth between the parts of the thing
specifically described and the whole of the thing generically described, and between
the parts of the thing generically described and the whole of the thing specifically
described. Because a fish is a species of animal, and because a fin is a part of a fish, a
fin is a part of an animal. And similarly, because eating a peach is a species of eating
a piece of fruit, and because eating a bite of peach is part of eating a peach, eating a
bite of peach is part of eating a piece of fruit. But, again, the relation between eating
a peach and taking a bite is on the face of it very different from that between eating
a peach and having some fruit.
There seem to be at least three different purposive relations between doing one
thing and doing another—three formally distinctive ways that a means can be sub-
ordinate to an end. In that case, we will need at least three different tables modeled
on the one in the previous section. In the first, doing A and doing B will be replaced
by examples like the ones that are featured in Thompson’s essay; the pairs will relate
as “part” to “whole,” like egg-breaking and omelet-making. In the second table, by
contrast, all of the variables will be replaced by pairs that are related as something
“brute” to something “conventional,” like hand-raising and vote-casting. Meanwhile,
the third table will feature pairs like peach-eating and fruit-eating, which relate to
one another as something “specific” to something “general.” All three charts will
exhibit exactly the same pattern of temporal combination. Each of them will have
the same empty cells, and for the same reason. Each will display what Thompson
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calls “explanation by the imperfective.”
It begins to look as though Thompson’s principal thesis—that an action is ratio-
nalized by reference to what is in progress—has nothing in particular to do with the
part-whole relation. For it appears that, as far as his main thesis is concerned, he
could just as well have used examples that were exclusively of the brute-conventional
variety, or that were exclusively of the species-genus variety. Or he could have done
like most philosophers of action, and availed himself of a wide assortment of examples,
drawn at random from all three lists.
But in fact it is not yet clear whether Thompson is wrong to identify an action’s
purposive unity with its temporal unity. One might reply, on his behalf, that the
part-whole relation is important in a way that no other purposive relation is; that
what Thompson has isolated, by the careful selection of his examples, is not just a
fundamental form of means-end relation, but the fundamental form; and that what
makes it so is that it is identical to the relation between what is in progress and what
is complete. Just as every intentional action admits of a contrast between perfection
and imperfection, Thompson argues that every action admits of a contrast between
whole and part. And nothing has been said to contradict this claim. On the contrary,
it has come out that a conventional action, like making the sign of the cross, is a whole
comprised of parts, and also that a general action, like eating a piece of fruit, is a
whole comprised of parts. If anything, the foregoing discussion has supported the
idea that the part-whole relation is an exceptionally important feature of an action’s
inner structure.
Certainly, no similar importance could be claimed for the relation between a
brute means and a conventional end. If Thompson is right, then every intentional
action contains within it the contrast between part and whole. But who would think
to say that every intentional action involves the doing of something conventional?
Walking, dragging, tearing, holding, pushing, biting, lifting, crushing: these do not
depend on custom—or not in the way that voting does. They are, as it were, merely
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physical, merely animal things to do, and are aptly called “brute.” To understand
a conventional form of action, like making the sign of the cross, one will have to
understand everything that is involved in the underlying brute action, and a whole lot
more besides. In particular, one will have to understand the nature of a “convention”
or “custom” or “social practice”—whatever kind of thing it is that accounts for the
fact that making a certain gesture with one’s hand is making the sign of the of the
cross. And while this clearly is an important topic in practical philosophy, it just as
clearly does not belong to the basic account of an action.
But what about the relation between a specific means and a general end? In
what follows, I will argue that, unlike the relation between a brute means and a
conventional end, the species-genus relation is a fundamental form of purposive nexus,
and essential to the structure of any intentional action. In this, I think, it is like the
relation between the part of an action and the whole of it. An important aim will be
to show these are two coeval and mutually-dependent forms of doing one thing for
the sake of doing another.25
25It may be of interest to say how this relates to the main argument of Thompson’s essay, the
argument against psychologism in the philosophy of action. Thompson constructs a sixteen-celled
table of forms of rationalization: rationalization of and by what one is doing, what one is trying to
do, what one intends to do, and what one wants to do, (Life and Action, (2008), p. 99). He points
out certain logical features of the table’s inner structure—certain vertical and horizontal entailment
relations that are consequent upon the fact that doing something intentionally entails trying to do
it, which entails intending to do it, which entails wanting to do it—and he sets himself the task
of explaining the table’s unity. Thompson encourages the reader to imagine that the schematic
letters in each cell of his table stand for actions that are related to one another as egg-breaking and
omelet-making. That is, he encourages the thought that the unity of his table has something to do
with the part-whole relation. But for every appearance of “doing A” in Thompson’s table, we could
substitute “eating a peach”; and for every appearance of “doing B,” we could substitute “eating a
piece of fruit.” This substitution would have no effect whatsoever on the vertical and horizontal
entailment relations that hold among the tabulated judgments. The table would maintain the same
“appealing squareness,” but none of the tabulated judgments would exhibit the explanation of part
by whole. If the arguments for Thompson’s main thesis are sound, then all of the tables will display
explanation by the imperfective. With a look toward any one of them we could say: “To frame a
naive rationalization is to associate the thing “grounded” with an intrinsically imperfective state of
affairs as “ground”—that is, with a state of affairs that can only be grasped through an imperfective
judgment, or expressed in forms of speech that admit an imperfective interpretation,” ibid., p. 129.
This explains why I have been so careful to avoid the term “naive,” which appears in the title of
Thompson’s essay. The term is introduced in the essay’s second paragraph, after a list of examples:
“The special character of what is given, in each response, as formulating a reason—[1] a description,
namely, of the agent as actually doing something, and, moreover, [2] as doing something of which
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But first it will be necessary to establish a distinction that has so far only been
insinuated, the distinction between an action’s purposive unity and its temporal unity.
Disambiguating these two aspects of an action’s inner structure will require us to look
more carefully at the relation between a part of an action and the whole of it. If I
am right, Thompson leaves this relation unexplained, because he mistakenly supposes
that to understand what a “part” is, one only needs to grasp the idea of an action’s
being in progress, the latter being a topic about which he has much to say. The first
task, then, is to distinguish the parts of an action, which are purposive elements, from
its phases, which are temporal.
the act queried might be said to be a part, phase or “moment”—marks each of our exchanges as
an instance of what I will call nave action explanation or, more generally, naive rationalization,”
(ibid., p. 86, numbers added). According to Thompson, naive rationalization has two marks: it is
an explanation of action by action, “and, moreover,” it is an explanation of part by whole. Then
if there are other types of rationalization that relate the action explained to something an agent is
“actually doing”—types, that is, which are not underwritten by a part-whole relation—they will not
count, for Thompson, as “naive.” By his very terminology, Thompson invites one to suppose that
the explanation of action by action is, as such, the explanation of part by whole.
But it is not just his terminology that encourages the assimilation. In the climactic section of his
paper, where he identifies the “red thread” that runs through and unites all his tabulated forms of
action explanation, Thompson writes: “The unity that pervades our table of forms of straightforward
rationalization resides on the present view in this, that the sort of rationalization registered in it
is in general a form of explanation by the imperfective, or by the ‘incomplete.’ In particular, the
type of explanation of action at stake in action theory, whether naive or sophisticated, is uniformly
a matter of locating the action explained in what might be called a developing process,” Ibid., p.
132, italics added. The first sentence of this passage expresses the idea that rationalization relates
the action explained to a developing process, but the second sentence refers to a specific type of
relation: Thompson implies that relating an action to a developing process is “uniformly” a matter
of locating it in one. He clearly has in mind the part-whole relation, the relation between e.g. egg-
breaking and omelet-making. Elsewhere he will describe the explaining action as “overarching” the
action explained (133). But I am in no sense “locating” the explanandum “in” the explanans if I
say that I am raising my hand with a view to casting a vote, or that I am eating a peach with a
view to eating some fruit. Absent some argument to the effect that there is only one explanatorily
significant relation between an action and a developing process—to wit, the relation between part
and whole—the italicized claim must involve a severe and unjustified constriction of what is “at
stake in action theory.”
Despite passages like these, I think it is consistent with the predominant tendency in Thompson’s
thought to pry the term “naive” loose from the part-whole relation, so that any explanation of action
by action will count as “naive rationalization,” and any theory that prioritizes these explanations
will count as “naive action theory.” After all, it is the contrast between action-action explanation,
which is so common in ordinary life, and action-want explanation, which is so common in the pages
of philosophy, that makes it apt to speak of “naivete” and “sophistication” in the first place.
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5.7 THE PARTS AND PHASES OF AN ACTION
5.7.1 That a Phase is not a Part
The temporal unity of an action is such that, if it is complete, an action has a
beginning, a middle and an end. That a tragedy should have this form is a famous
doctrine of Aristotle’s, but the reason for the doctrine is less well-known: the reason
is that a tragedy should imitate an action.26 The same tripartite structure belongs
to the life of an animal or plant, which also has a kind of “plot,” and which divides
itself, if complete, into youth, maturity and old-age.
Such a division of an action is a division into phases. It is natural to want
to compare it to the spatial division of a line—although, as we will soon see, the
comparison leads to certain problems.
Figure 10
That Aristotle divides an action into exactly three phases is not entirely arbitrary.
Like a person’s life or a tragedy, an action is something that begins and ends: it has
limits; and it must have something between its limits. Thus, the threefold division
provides a kind of minimum temporal structure. On the other hand, though, there
is clearly something arbitrary about dividing an action into three, since, as Aristotle
would surely admit, each phase can be divided into further phases, and these into
further ones, and so on ad infinitum. But what is important is this, that however
finely the phases of an action are divided, they cannot possibly overlap: like the
segments of a line, phases always arrange themselves end-to-end. And so, as the total
26Poetics, 1450b21–31.
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length of a line is the sum of that of its segments, the total duration of an action is
the sum of that of its phases.
The division of an action into phases marks the grades or degrees of its imperfec-
tion. Until now, we have followed Thompson in approaching the temporal structure
of an action by way of the contrast between “X was doing A” and “X did A.” The
danger in this approach is that it tends to produce the false idea that imperfection
and perfection are two poles of an opposition. Indeed, attention to the logical and
linguistic data can only reveal a brute duality: it may teach us that the predicable
“To do A” has two different forms, which we call “perfective” and “imperfective;”
but it cannot show us how they are related. For it lacks the resources to distinguish
among different degrees of imperfection, and treats every imperfection as equal. But
if it is true to judge that “X was doing A,” a somewhat more precise judgment is
necessarily also true: for instance, that “X was just getting started doing A,” or that
“X was in the middle of doing A,” or that “X was almost finished doing A.” What
makes it the case that “X did A” is the culmination of a development. Thus, the
contrast between imperfection and perfection is not to be compared with the ON
and OFF positions of a light switch. A progressing development is “imperfect,” if
you like, but it is also “perfect” to a degree. Not only that, but it is “perfect” to an
ever increasing degree—indeed, to a degree whose increase is inversely related to the
degree of its imperfection. An action may be far from done, half done, close to done,
or—finally and simply—done. As the imperfect gives way gradually to the perfect,
action dawns.27
The dawning of an action is represented in our ordinary descriptions of how some-
27Thompson describes imperfection and perfection as two “poles” of an “opposition” throughout
“Naive Action Theory,” but see especially Life and Action, p. 130–134. Thompson is, I think, right
to lay emphasis on the contrast between the perfective and the imperfective. But in the section of
the essay titled, “Event-forms, Event-types and Individual Events,” he takes what is to my mind an
excessively stark view of the matter, as though completion was an all or nothing affair. Thompson
criticizes the failure to appreciate how different the imperfective is from the perfective. But how
different is an action that is complete from one that is all but complete? Less different, I would
think, than it is from an action that has just begun. And in that case completion is a matter of
degree.
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thing is done. If I want to make an omelet, the way to do it might be this: by first
breaking some eggs, then mixing and seasoning them, then doing some other thing,
and finally something else. And if, now, I need to go to the grocery store, the way to
get there might be this: by first going one block north, then cutting eastward through
the park, and finally going north again until I see it on my left. A typical action, like
making an omelet, or going to the grocery store, has what we might call a “temporal
frame,” into which it gathers other actions. The temporal frame is expressed with
the words, “First . . . , then . . . , finally . . . ,” and divides an action like the chapters
of a book, or the acts of a play, distinguishing what is done at the beginning, what is
done in the middle, and what is done at the end.
The actions that are gathered into such a temporal frame are the “parts” of the
action that gathers them up: they are things that are done for its sake. But the parts
of an action are different from its phases. The phases of an action are the sequentially
ordered and infinitely divisible stages of its development; its parts, by contrast, are
the actions performed during its phases. If lines and measures are the phases of
a sonata, the parts of it are, for instance, notes, chords and rests. In general, the
phases of an action are marked by a “First . . . , then . . . , finally . . . .” framework, and
its parts are represented by whatever fills in the ellipses.
A phase is a fragment or a portion of an action; but, importantly, it is not itself
an action. A phase is not something that an agent does ; it is not an object of the will,
or of intention: it is as it were a piece of such. By contrast, a part of an action is an
action, with a beginning, a middle, and an end. That is why it misleading to compare
the phases of an action to the segments of a line. If you divide a line in half, what
you get is two lines. But if you divide a tragedy in half, you do not get two tragedies.
And if you divide a sonata in half, you do not get two sonatas. The problem, here,
is not that one division is temporal and the other spatial. After all, if you divide
a chair in half—e.g. with a saw—you do not get two chairs. The problem is that
a line represents only one dimension: it can only depict an action’s length—that is,
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its duration. But in addition to its temporal length, a process also has a kind of
width: for at any one point in its development, a process may comprise many distinct
subprocesses. Any set of ellipses in a “First . . . , then . . . , finally . . . .” framework
may be filled in by two simultaneous actions. The second step in making an omelet
might involve both beating the eggs and adding milk; for I might have to add the
milk while beating the eggs. Indeed, at any given moment in the performance of an
action, an agent may be performing numerous other actions that are subordinate to
the first, and parts of it. It might be, for instance, that I am nearly done beating
the eggs for my omelet, though I have just begun to season them, and for several
minutes now I have been slowly warming some butter in a pan. Except perhaps at
the very beginning or the very end of her action, an agent is always beginning some
parts of it, midway through others, and concluding others still. Let the following
two-dimensional staff represent a completed action, with the horizontal lines as its
several parts.
Figure 11
Like fibers in a piece of thread, or notes in a piece of music, the parts of an action
overlap. And so, although the total duration of an action is the sum of that of its
phases, it is not the sum of that of its parts.
Parts and phases relate differently to interruption. The fibrous overlapping of
parts entails that to interrupt an action is always to interrupt many distinct but
simultaneously developing subordinate actions, and to terminate each of them at a
different stage in its own development. As I said, phases are not actions—they are
not any sort of process—so they cannot be interrupted. Nevertheless, interruption
is definitive of a phase. Just as every point where you might divide a line is the
boundary-point of a segment of that line, every moment when you might interrupt
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an action is the limiting moment of a phase of that action: the infinite divisibility of
phases corresponds to the infinity of such moments.
There are many things that tend to obscure the distinction between parts and
phases. First, and most superficially, the English word “part” is commonly used in
reference to what we are calling a phase. One speaks of the first part of a recipe,
or the last part of a person’s life, or the next part of whatever it is one is doing.
And an incomplete process is one that is only “partially” complete. The word thus
glides easily across categories. (Notice, though, that the word “phase” is not likewise
promiscuous: it makes no sense to speak of two simultaneous or overlapping phases of
the same process.) Another thing that tends to obscure the distinction between parts
and phases is the fact that parts and phases share the uncommon property of being
constituted by more of the same: parts by more parts, and phases by more phases.
Finally, consider that parts and phases are each thoroughly bound up with the other.
Any durative action has phases; and since the parts of an action are actions, parts
have phases, too. Moreover, any action that is part of another action unfolds during
a phase of the action of which it is a part. So the one idea has application anyplace
the other does.
The distinction between parts and phases is particularly difficult to see if attention
is focused on examples of locomotion. When called upon to identify the parts of an
action like walking from A to C, one is likely to mention walking from A to B and
walking from B to C, but not e.g. hacking away the underbrush or looking out for
snakes. All four of these actions are, or might be, parts of walking from A to C,
subordinate to it, and explicable by it, in precisely the same way. But the first
two are an extremely unusual pair, as far as parts go, and exclusive attention to
them is apt to distort one’s understanding of the part-whole relation. Notice that
hacking away the underbrush and looking out for snakes are things that might be
done simultaneously; moreover, either of them, or both of them, might be done while
one was walking from A to B, or while one was walking from B to C, or, indeed, all
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the while that one was walking from A to C. By contrast, it is impossible that an
agent should be walking from A to B while she is walking from B to C : one cannot be
two places at once, so the first action must end before the second can begin. Actions
whose descriptions are produced by dividing a single trajectory stand to one another
in a serial relation: like the divisions of a line, they cannot possibly overlap. If we
isolate a class of serial parts, and exclude from consideration all the other parts of the
same action, it will be natural to conceive the part-whole relation on the model of a
line and its divisions. And then it will be irresistible to assimilate parts to phases,
which, we have seen, are also arranged in serial order.28
These difficulties notwithstanding, the distinction between parts and phases can
be summarized as follows. A phase of an action is not an action, but a fragment
of one. By contrast, a part of an action is itself an action. Interruption divides
between phases, but it cuts through parts. Like the chapters of a book, or the stages
of a life, the phases of an action cannot overlap; whereas the parts of an action are
simultaneous and intertwining. The duration of a completed action is, consequently,
equal to the sum of that of its phases, but not to that of its parts.
5.7.2 That a Phase is not a “Stretch of Time”
If, as I claim, a phase is not a part, then it seems that it must be “a stretch of time.”
A stretch of time is an amount of time—it is, let us say, ten minutes. But a phase
is not a magnitude: as I have said, it is a portion or fragment of something: of an
action. Just as a painted fragment of the Berlin Wall, which is now on display in
some museum, has (not is) a spatial magnitude that can be measured in inches and
feet, so, also, a fragment of a development has (not is) a temporal magnitude that
28One might still think there was some philosophical justification for isolating a class of serial parts:
namely, that the central cases of intentional action always involve movement, which is always across
some trajectory, whose geometrical division will always yield such a set of parts. But this is not a
reason to isolate a set of serially related parts unless there could be some act of intentional locomotion
whose only parts were serially related. For an argument that such locomotion is impossible, see
Section 7.3, below.
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can be measured in seconds, minutes, hours, days, weeks, months or years. And just
as the magnitude of a fragment of a wall is a fraction of the magnitude of the wall as
a whole, the magnitude of a fragment of a development is a fraction of the magnitude
of the development as a whole. A phase is not a stretch of time any more than a
hunk of wall is a stretch of space.
Admittedly, it sounds strange to speak, as I have, of a “portion” or a “fragment”
of an action. But here it may help to consider an analogy. There are two ways to
divide a fish that is dead but otherwise undisturbed. A cook who is preparing stew
might chop it in half with a butcher’s knife, midway between the nose and the tail.
Then he might chop the halves in half; and then the quarters; and so on. The cook’s
division of the fish is spatial : he cleaves by reference to the fish’s length. But there
is another way to carve a fish—another principle by reference to which the same
whole can be divided. A physiologist might dissect the fish with a scalpel, carefully
removing its organs and members, cutting, so to speak, along the fish’s natural line
or grain. Such a division of the fish is functional : it is the fish’s anatomy, and not its
geometry, that determines each incision.
Corresponding to these two ways of dividing a fish, there are two kinds of element
into which a fish can be divided. The product of a spatial division is a portion of
the fish; the product of a functional division is an organ or member. Portions of
the fish can be divided spatially into smaller portions, and organs functionally into
smaller organs. But portions and organs have two very different kinds of unity, and
are related in two very different ways to the fish as a whole. To speak of a “portion”
of a fish is like speaking of its “front” or “back” or “top” or “bottom;” and this is
obviously quite different from speaking about its “nose” or “tooth” or “heart.” And
though a portion of a fish is not one of its organs, it is not just a stretch of space,
either—it is not, say, three inches. Rather, it is three inches of something: of a fish.
Since a fish is an organized thing, a portion of fish will have organs in it. Still, an
organ and a portion are different kinds of element.
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That they are different is also clear from the following. The organs of a fish have a
functional integrity much like that of the fish as a whole—we will speak, for instance,
of the anatomy of a heart, as well as that of the creature to which it belongs. But
we have no regard for the integrity of a fish’s organs if we divide it spatially, like the
cook. A chop of the butcher’s knife does not separate organs: it cuts right through
them. Not only will a single chop cut through several organs, but it will cut through
each of them at a different place in its own anatomy. The chop that divides a fish
in half will perhaps cut through the middle of its spleen, the front of its bladder and
the back of its stomach.
My thought is of course that the parts and phases of action are likewise two
different kinds of element—that parts are like the organs of a fish, and that phases
are its temporal portions. The interruption of an action is, in that case, like the chop
of a butcher’s knife. In terminating the action, the interruption also terminates its
parts. And these parts, which have a functional integrity similar to that of which
they are part, are terminated by the interruption at different stages in their own
development: some when they are just beginning; others when they are half-done;
others when they are wrapping up. An interruption does not cut along a natural line
or grain. It is a violent intrusion from without.
5.7.3 That Imperfection is a Missing Phase
The contrast between what is in progress and what is complete depends on the idea
that an action is divisible into elements. It is definitive of the fact that I am in
the middle of performing a certain action that some of it is already behind me and
some of it still lies ahead. But since an action is divisible in different ways, into
different kinds of element, the question arises which kind of division, and which kind
of element, is operative in the contrast between imperfection and perfection. When
we say of an unfolding action that “some of it” still lies ahead, do we refer to the
space of overlapping parts, or, instead, to that of sequential phases?
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The answer should by now be clear. It is the idea of a phase, and not the idea
of a part, that is operative in the contrast between imperfection and perfection. To
represent an action as being in progress is to represent it as missing a fragment or
chunk or portion of itself, and not a purposive or functional element. It is of course
true that any process that is missing a phase will also be missing whatever parts are
scheduled to unfold during that phase—just as, if a cook chops a fish in half, each of
the resultant portions will have numerous organs inside it. Still, “the front half of the
fish” does not refer to any organ; and “what remains to be done” does not describe
an object of the will. An unfolding action is like a fish that, as it were by magic,
increasingly has less of itself chopped off.
Figure 12
One might object that the relevant analogy between a temporally-extended de-
velopment, like an action, and a spatially-extended substance, like a fish, really only
applies to a development that has already come to completion. The whole fish exists
before it is chopped in half. And similarly with a line: the segments into which it
is divisible are already there—potentially—before the line is divided. In general, one
might say, a “division” presupposes the existence of the divided whole. So only a
development that has already occurred is temporally divisible into phases. The sug-
gestion that an incomplete action is a “portion” or “fragment” of a complete one is
therefore inadmissible, because the relevant whole does not exist so long as the action
is still in progress.
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But on these grounds, the objector will have to dismiss as nonsense many familiar
judgments about on-going processes. As I have mentioned, it is common to judge,
not just that someone is doing something, but also that she has a certain amount of
it—maybe less, maybe more—still left to do. It is a perfectly ordinary thought that
“X is far from finished,” or that “X is half-finished,” or that “X is nearly finished
doing A.” And, as the second one makes clear, all three of these judgments concern
the proportion of the action that is behind the agent relative to that which still lies
ahead. Thus, we seem to grasp the idea of a “half”—and of more, and of less than
“half”—even in the absence of any “whole.”
But this is common also in the case of material things. On a construction site,
we may see, and know that we see, the bottom half of a house, even though the top
half remains unbuilt. There is, in that case, half of something, despite the fact that
no whole exists. And if one will admit the existence of half a house, there seems no
reason to deny that a person can be half-finished building a house. And in that case,
he might be half-finished building a house even at the moment when he is killed in a
fatal accident, the result of which is that a whole house will never in fact be built.
Admittedly, this is all extremely puzzling. How is it possible to judge that a
process is far from finished, half-finished or nearly finished—before that process is
finished? The judgment is clearly quantitative. But what, exactly, is being quantified?
And how can we know—or even think that we know—the relevant proportions of
whatever that is?
The matter may come to seem less puzzling, if we leave it for now, and proceed
with the account. But first let us pause to remind ourselves of what we doing and
why. We are pursuing an account of the internal structure of an intentional action.
In the course of performing an intentional action, an agent does many things, all of
which are intentional. Not only are they all intentional, but they are all related to
one another as ends and means—as answers to the question “Why?” and answers
to the question “How?” Then to understand what an action is, we must understand
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how the many things done in the course of acting intentionally all hang together in
one purposive system. But that is only the beginning, because in addition to its
purposive structure, an action also has a temporal structure, thanks to which there
is a contrast between an action’s being in progress and its have been completed.
And an action’s temporal and purposive structures are intimately related. For the
temporal structure of an action constrains what can be a means to what: in order
for one action to be a means to another, the first must advance the progress of the
second. On the face of it, there appear to be several different ways to advance an
action’s progress, among which two stand out as especially important: one action can
advance another’s progress, either by being a part of it, or by being a species of it.
I say that this is how it appears, but we have been considering the possibility that,
in fact, the appearance is deceptive. One might think that the contrast between a
part of an action and the whole of it is just identical to the contrast between what
is in progress and what is complete; and if that is true, then the purposive structure
of an action is, at bottom, the same as its temporal structure. But, as we have just
seen, they are not the same. The contrast between what is in progress and what is
complete is different from the contrast between a part of an action and the whole of
it. Having liberated the purposive unity of an action from its temporal unity, we can
now go forward and investigate what it is for one action to be a purposive part, or a
purposive species of another.
5.8 PURPOSIVE PARTS
5.8.1 Part and Whole
What it is for one action to be a “part” of another has already been explained in a
preliminary way. As we saw, an action has a temporal frame—a beginning, a middle,
and an end—into which numerous other actions are gathered: these are the parts
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of what gathers them up; they are done for its sake, and must somehow further its
progress. But in view of the fact that there are different ways to advance an action’s
progress—e.g. as the brute advances the conventional, and the species the genus—
one still wants to know what is distinctive about the way that a part of an action
advances the progress of a whole.
At first glance, it might look as though the distinctive nexus between part and
whole had something to do with their relative duration. A brute form of action takes
just as long to do as the conventional form for the sake of which it is done: gesturing
with the hand takes just as long as making the sign of the cross. But touching one’s
forehead—which is part of the gesture—takes less time than the gesture as a whole.
And similarly, a specific means has the same duration as its general end. If one is
going to school by riding the bus, doing the one thing takes just as long as doing the
other. Yet waiting for the bus, while making a transfer—which is part of riding the
bus to school—takes less time than the trip as a whole. On these grounds, one might
suspect that a part’s contribution to the progress of the whole was best understood
temporally.
But this is a mistake. A part of an action is sometimes shorter than the whole to
which it belongs, but frequently it is not. Suppose, for example, that I have carried
a bundle of kindling from A to Z, balancing it on my right shoulder. In that case,
balancing the kindling was part of carrying it; but it was a part that lasted as long
as the action as a whole. And although carrying the bundle and balancing it had
exactly the same duration, it is clear that I balanced it for the sake of carrying it,
and not the other way round. With a little more strength, I might have balanced
two bundles, one on each shoulder, each for the whole time, and each for the sake
of carrying them both.29 The distinctive contribution of a part is, thus, not to be
29The reader may suspect that there is some temporal discrepancy between the two things done in
this example: some time during which the carrying was going on, but not the balancing. And there
might be, depending on how we imagine the case. But need there be? If it helps, one may imagine
that A and Z are both within a desert strewn with land-mines; and that carrying the kindling has
therefore required me to look out for land-mines the whole time. Indeed, we may imagine that I was
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understood temporally.
Still, there is obviously something right in the idea that doing part of an action is
“less” than doing the whole of it, and requires something “more.” One conclusion to
be drawn from the previous section is that the relevant surplus is purposive, rather
than temporal. We need to look for additional means, and not for extra time.
Thankfully, additional means are easily discovered. For reasons that will soon
come out,30 a part of an action is never the only one: there is always at least a second
part—a “partner,” as we might say, to the first. The same is not true of a specific
or a brute means. If I want to eat a serving of fruit, then I can either eat a peach,
or eat a pear, or eat a plum, or eat some combination of the three; but doing more
than one of these will not, and cannot, serve my purpose. Similarly, if I want to pay
my rent, and hand my landlord a few slips of paper, which thanks to convention are
money, that is all there is to it. Like the specific means, the brute is sufficient to its
end. But it is definitive of a purposive part that it does not suffice by itself: it is
never enough to achieve its purpose; it requires that something else be done. If doing
A is part of doing C, there must be some B, that is also to be done for the sake of
doing C.
In that case, the relation between part and whole entails a relation between part
and partner. Thus, one thing that makes the contribution of a part different from
that of a brute or specific means is that a part’s contribution is always as it were
cooperative. What governs this cooperation is the whole to which the parts are sub-
ordinate, or the partnership in which they are joined. It will therefore be essential to
see how the whole coordinates its parts.
looking out for land-mines even as I walked to A, where I began carrying the kindling, and even as
I walked away from Z, where I put the bundle (carefully) down.
30See Section 7.3 below.
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5.8.2 Part and Partner
What I am doing has the power to explain, both other things that I am doing, and
things that I am forbearing to do. For example, the fact that I am making a pie may
explain, both, why I am rolling a crust, and also why I am not eating a peach that I
picked this afternoon (tempting though it may be): the peach is for the pie. The fact
that I am driving to work may explain, at once, why I am pressing the accelerator,
and also why I am not reading the newspaper (much though I might like to): my
eyes are needed on the road. The governing action asserts itself positively, through
its commands, and negatively, through its prohibitions. With whatever authority it
can muster, it enjoins what will advance its progress, and forbids what will impede
it.
This double-authority, both positive and negative, of the whole over its parts,
determines how two partners relate to one another. In the first place, negatively, no
part of an action must prevent another’s being done. If A and B are both for the sake
of C, then, by undermining B, A would undermine C. There is, then, a requirement of
mutual non-interference—a requirement issuing from the action itself, that, in doing
any part of it, I forebear impeding another part.
And we may safely assert, of every action ever completed, that no part of it was
ever incompatible with another. This is not to deny that mistakes have been made.
If, on my way to Kathmandu, I turned left at a fork in the road, though Kathmandu
lay to the right, this was a mistake, tending to prevent me from doing various other
things that needed to be done—for instance, passing through Bhimphedi. But if I
made it to Kathmandu in the end, then the other cooperating parts of my action
must have compensated for my mistake, and restored the original harmonious order.
Perhaps I turned around, and went back the other way—back to the fork, through
Bhimphedi, and on to Kathmandu. Or perhaps I decided to change my course, and
drove there by a different route. Either way, all of the parts were compatible in the
end. The proof is that I got there.
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One might question how my wrong left turn, at the fork near Bhimphedi, can be a
part of my drive to Kathmandu. We call it a mistake because it tended to undermine
the action as whole, by undermining the other things that needed to be done. And
yet, a part of an action is a means, and a means is something that furthers, not
undermines, its end. Then how can we see my left turn both as a means and as a
mistake?
The answer is that we cannot see it any other way. That is, we can see my left
turn as a mistake only if we see it as a part of my drive to Kathmandu, and thus a
means. For if it were just something else that I happened to do, then nothing would
be wrong with it: it would have, in that case, no responsibility to the other parts and
to the whole. A part is an action that has this kind of responsibility, and that either
forbears impeding its partners, or else is subject to criticism on the ground that it
does not.
An analogy. Over the past several hours and days, the various organs of my body
have done a variety of things, the result of which is that I am still alive. And this was
their purpose. This was the reason that what was done, by each of my organs, was
done. What they did, in this fateful period, displayed a certain harmony, such that
nothing done by any of my organs interfered with what the others did. Or not too
much. To be sure, certain of them did certain things that were somewhat untoward.
But nothing done by any of them was so irreparably bad that my other organs could
not, and did not, compensate for it, doing what otherwise they would not have done,
for the sake of keeping the whole on its feet. And the proof is that I am still alive.
The parts of any completed action are similarly harmonious.
Then in addition to the negative requirement of mutual non-interference, there is
also a general positive requirement of mutual aid. What one part of an action needs
another must prepare. Doing virtually anything presupposes that certain objects and
instruments be ready and available. And, at very least, these must be readied and
made available. To this extent, we can say of any completed action—again with
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certainty—that whatever was needed for the performance of any single part of it was
provided ahead of time by another part. And the proof is again that the action was
done.
In fact, the relation between a preparatory part and the partner it prepares for is
very much like the relation between any single part and the whole to which it belongs.
As I pointed out, an action has a double-authority with respect to all of its parts:
it enjoins those actions that further its progress, and prohibits those that impede it.
Well, the same is true of an action that is prepared-for: it requires, both, that certain
things be done, and that certain others not be done.
Thompson observes that what a person is doing can be rationalized, not just by
something else she is doing, but also by something she is going to do.31 To our original
list of examples of parts and wholes (see Section 5, above), compare the following:
QUESTION: “Why are you buying eggs?”
ANSWER: “I’m making an omelet.”
QUESTION: “Why are you putting on your shoes?”
ANSWER: “I’m walking to school.”
QUESTION: “Why are you opening a box of chalk?”
ANSWER: “I’m writing the word ‘action.’”
This is how we talk; but one might argue that the way we talk is misleading. For if
I am at the store, buying eggs, then I am not—not yet—making an omelet. So this
case is somewhat different from the one in which I say that I am making an omelet
in answer to the question why I am breaking an egg: if I am breaking an egg, the
omelet-making has already begun. And similarly with the other examples. Perhaps
I will give the same answer whether I am asked, at 8:00, why I am putting on my
shoes, or, at 8:05, why I am crossing the street: namely, that I am walking to school.
And perhaps I will say that I am writing the word “action” whether I am asked why
I am opening a box of chalk, or, a moment later, why I am writing the letter ‘a.’ But,
31Thompson, Life and Action, (2008), p. 132.
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still, there is a difference.
And though there is, indeed, a difference, the sense that it is very deep may relax a
bit once one has noticed that the relation between a preparatory action and the action
prepared-for is one we find within an action, between its parts. Take two things that
are uncontroversially part of making an omelet—two things about which there can be
absolutely no doubt that, if I am doing either of them, omelet-making has begun: for
example, breaking an egg and mixing an egg-batter. Now the first is preparatory to
the second. And, if we want to be strict and narrow in our descriptions of my action,
we will say that these two actions are such as not to overlap, that my egg-breaking
must end before my batter-mixing can begin. Notice, though, that if I am asked why
I am breaking an egg, I can answer that I am making an omelet, but I can also say:
“I am mixing an egg-batter.” Thus, my action can rationalized, either by appeal to
the whole, or by appeal to a partner—one it is preparing for.
5.8.3 The Ineliminability of Parts
What we are looking for is, in Anscombe’s words, “an order which is there whenever
actions are done with intentions.” But is every intentional action a whole comprising
parts?
Thompson argues that it is.32 He points out that in moving from one place to
another, a person necessarily moves along a trajectory that is infinitely divisible into
smaller sub-trajectories, along which one also moves. If I have intentionally walked
from A to Z, then I must have walked to the midpoint, Y. Furthermore, it was true,
back when I set out from A, that I was walking to Y as well as to Z. Not only that,
but it seems that I was walking from A to Y intentionally, and that I was doing so
32Assuming, at least, that “the object of the philosophy of action is legitimately restricted, in the
first instance, to a category of intentional action that excludes acts of mind, startings-to-act and
other such non-durative actions-by-courtesy—to intentional action proper, as we call it,” Life and
Action, pp. 111–112. I will follow Thompson in assuming that the fundamental cases of intentional
action involve physical movement. For Thompson’s argument, see Ibid., Chapter 7, Sections 1 and
2.
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for the sake of walking from A to Z. It seems, in other words, that walking from
A to Z was my end, and that walking from A to Y was the means. But then, if I
walked from A to Y, I must also have walked to the midpoint, X, and I must have
been doing the latter for the sake of doing the former. By the reapplication of such
considerations, one arrives at the conclusion that my action of walking from A to Z
is a whole comprising infinitely many purposive parts.
The same is true if I moved, not myself, but something else: for instance, if I
pushed my car from the side of the road to the gas station. In that case, I moved the
car along an infinitely divisible path, and I moved it along each division of the path
for the sake of moving it along the whole. Naturally, the situation is no different if
what I am moving is, not my car, but my hand, and I am raising it from its resting
place at the side of my leg to somewhere over my head—as when, for example, I am
voting.
On the assumption that the central cases of intentional action involve some kind of
movement, Thompson’s argument is meant to show that for every intentional action,
it is possible to find a second one, which is part of the first, and done for its sake.
But the argument faces a number of objections. One worry concerns very short
trajectories. The road I have travelled in walking from A and Z is infinitely divisible.
And so, in walking it, I have travelled distances that are vanishingly small. But did I
really have any intention with regard to these infinitesimal trajectories? Is there not
some distance shorter than which I cannot intend to move?
Another worry concerns trajectories that are, though not infinitesimally small,
nevertheless quite complex. Many ordinary actions, like tying one’s shoe, require
moving both oneself and other things in very intricate ways. Sure, there are trajecto-
ries traversed, but in what sense are they given to the agent? The agent can neither
describe, nor even think about the way he moves his fingers in the course of tying his
shoes, except perhaps under the description,“the way I move my fingers in the course
of tying my shoes.” But under this description, it is not clear that the movement in
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question is geometrically divisible. Is “the way I move my fingers in the course of
tying my shoes” something of which there is “half”? If not, then the Zeno-paradoxical
division will grind to a halt with this description.
Rather than consider the merit of these objections, let us instead observe some-
thing about the argument at which they are aimed: namely, that it concerns the
movement of what may as well be an extensionless point floating across a line. The
austerity of Thompson’s conception of movement, and of the “folk-geometrical tru-
isms” that he permits himself to assume, will assure that his argument is relevant to
any movement whatsoever. But it may also be the source of the skeptic’s doubt when
the discussion turns to intentional action.
In any event, the austerity is out of place. The philosophy of action is not con-
cerned with the imaginary “movement” of geometrical points, nor with the flight of
angels. We do not aim to understand the to-ing and fro-ing of wind-blown leaves, nor,
again, the ascent of helium balloons. All that matters is the real self-movement of an
organized substance. Quite unlike the balloon, the leaf, the angel and the geometrical
point, a self-moving organism has moveable parts. And it has, not one, but many of
them. In moving itself, or something else, from one place to another, an organism
must do one thing with one part of itself and another thing with another part, if only
hold it still.33 Even the inchworm, as it inches, must firmly plant its rear during each
heroic forward thrust; and just as firmly, it must plant its front while dragging up
the rear. I, as I walk, must move my own two legs.
The skeptical thesis may therefore be granted, that there is some trajectory, A to
B, smaller than which I cannot possibly intend to walk. Still, in walking just from
33This idea is the starting-point of Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium: “If one of the parts [of an
animal] moves, there must be some part at rest; and it is for this reason that animals have joints. [...]
In any case, the origin relative to which the motion takes place, qua origin, is always at rest when the
part below it is moved, as, for example, when the forearm is moved the elbow remains at rest, but
when the whole limb is moved, the shoulder. And when the lower leg is moved, the knee, but when
the whole leg is moved, the hip. It is obvious, then, that each animal must have something at rest
within itself as well [sc. as without], to provide that which is moved with its origin, and supporting
itself against which it will move both all at once as a whole and part by part,” 698a14-698b8.
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A to B, I will be doing one thing with one leg, and another with the other. And so,
for the sake of walking what is, by hypothesis, the minimum distance intentionally
traversed, I will in fact be doing two things at once, and both of them intentionally.
It may likewise be conceded that the movements I make in tying my shoe are
given to me under that very description. Still, to tie my shoe, I use both of my hands
and all ten of my fingers. Among other things, I bend at the waist, and crook my
knee, and hold my foot more or less still. I do all of these things, with all of these
parts, intentionally. Each of them is responsible to the others, and responsible to the
enterprise as a whole: they are all parts of what I am doing—parts of tying my shoe.
Someone might object that, nevertheless, it is possible to do just one thing, with
just one part of one’s body: to simply raise one’s hand, for example. But in raising
my hand (from fingertips to wrist), I also raise my lower arm (from wrist to elbow)
and my upper arm (from elbow to shoulder). And that is to say nothing of the rest
of my body. If my knees and ankles buckle, I will not raise my hand, but crumple to
the floor in a heap. If, at the crucial moment, I bend forward ninety degrees at the
waist, I will send my hand straight out in front of me: I will not raise it—my vote
will not be cast. If I am actually to raise my hand, I must see to it that the rest of my
body cooperates. And the cooperating movement, or stillness, of my other moveable
bodily parts is intentional, and is part of what I am doing.
This, I think, is enough for the claim that the part-whole relation is essential to the
structure of any intentional action. What matters, for these purposes, is not the thesis
that Thompson defends—namely, that every action is a whole with parts—but rather
the more modest and disjunctive thesis that every action is either a whole with parts,
or a part of a whole, or a partner to another part.34 The truth of the disjunction is
secured by a fact that Thompson’s austerity prevents him from considering: namely,
that the agent herself has parts. A person cannot move herself, or anything else,
34It may well be that each of these disjuncts entails all of the others, but we need not concern
ourselves with that. For even if only the disjunction is true, the part-whole relation may be safely
said to belong to “an order which is there whenever actions are done with intentions.”
138
from one place to another, except by moving a part of herself. And yet, she cannot
move a part of herself, except by moving or keeping still another part of herself. This
guarantees that she will always be doing at least two things at once, both of which
belong to the kind of mereological structure whose purposiveness we have just done
a little to explore.
5.9 PURPOSIVE SPECIES
5.9.1 Species and Genus
Aristotle observes that the movement of an animal from one place to another admits
of a division into species as well as into parts:
If locomotion is a movement from here to there, it, too, has differences of form—
flying, walking, leaping, and so on. And not only so, but in walking itself there
are such differences; for the whence and the whither are not the same in the whole
racecourse and in a part of it, nor in one part and in another.35
According to Aristotle, the difference between walking from A to C and flying from
A to C is a difference of form; and the difference between walking from A to B and
walking from B to C is a difference of form; and these are different differences.
Of course, when Aristotle mentions flying, walking and leaping as three different
forms of locomotion, he is presumably not thinking that these are three different ways
for a human being to get from one place to another, but rather that they are the forms
of locomotion proper to e.g. a bird, a man and a frog. Nevertheless, his observation
points to a distinction among the things that can be done, which is orthogonal to
that between part and whole, and which we confront in our practical life.
Nothing is more common than to want to go from one place to another. One finds
oneself at A; one wants to be at C; and so one goes to C. Typically, what one wants
35Nicomachean Ethics, X.4, 1174a.
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is nothing more than to get to one’s destination, because, for whatever reason, that
is where one wants to be. But in order to get there, one cannot simply “go” there.
One must do something else, something more determinate: one must walk, or run, or
ride on horseback, or drive a car, or take a train. The only way to go somewhere is
to go in some specific way, by some specific means.
The same is obviously true if what one wants to move from one place to another
is, not oneself, but something else. If I have a bundle of kindling and want to get it
home, I must push, or pull, or drag, or yank it; or put it on a donkey; or carry it on
my shoulder. Or I must do some combination of these. But I cannot do what I want
to do—which is really just to get it home—except by some specific means.
The subordination of a specific means to a general end is even more striking in
a complicated action. If one’s aim is to kill a group of political party chiefs who are
prosecuting a murderous war, there are many ways to do it: one way is to poison
them; another is to shoot them; another is to blow them up with bombs. Should
one choose to poison them, the question will arise how. One ingenious method is to
introduce a slow-acting but deadly toxin into the water-supply of the house where
they live. But here again are choices to be made. One way to introduce the toxin—
though certainly not the only way, and not the most obvious, or even the most likely
to succeed—is to pump water into the cistern from a source that has been laced with
it. This is the deed that Anscombe imagines. For the sake of killing the party chiefs,
the man she describes is poisoning them, by just such means as these. For the sake
of doing something general, he is doing something more specific.
Once one sees the pattern, one sees it everywhere. Davidson writes of an officer
whose aim is to sink the battleship Tirpitz, and who adopts the available, but not
inevitable means of shooting it with a torpedo; of a queen who wants to kill her
husband, and who kills him by—of all things—pouring a vial of poison in his ear; of a
man who wants to illuminate a room, and who does so in the usual, but certainly not
the only way, by turning on the lights. In all of these examples, what the agent wants
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to do is doable in many ways; and among these many, exactly one is chosen; and this
one way is the means to the end. The object of the will, the heart’s desire, what one
wants, is general. It is to go over there; or to sink that ship; or to kill that man; or to
light this room. Precisely because of its generality, the end is, as Anscombe says, “at
a distance;” and by adopting some specific means, one brings the end back to oneself,
back to something that one can do.
To bring one’s end back to something that one can do is the characteristic work of
deliberation. The question “How?” that corresponds to Anscombe’s question “Why?”
is, as I mentioned, a deliberative question; and it is paradigmatically answered by a
specification of the agent’s end. If getting something to eat is my end, then my end
will be achieved when I have gotten something to eat. But the question immediately
arises how I am to procure this food: Am I to buy it, or steal it, or make it, or what?
Suppose I decide to make it. There is no such thing as making food in general, but
only food of one or another kind. So the deliberative question reasserts itself: Am I
to make soup, or bread, or an omelet, or what? Suppose I decide to make an omelet.
Getting Food
Making Food
Making an OmeletMaking BreadMaking Soup
Stealing FoodBuying Food
Figure 13
When the omelet is made, food is made; and when food is made, food is procured.
So my end will be achieved as soon as I have made the omelet. In moving from my
end, getting food, to a certain means, making food, and then to a certain subordinate
means, making an omelet, I have made a familiar sort of advance in my deliberative
thought.
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5.9.2 Object and Instrument Specification
As the reader will perhaps have noticed, the specification of an end can assume a
number of different linguistic guises. Sometimes it appears in the place of the verb, as
when deliberation goes from an end like “killing the king” to a means like “poisoning
the king,” or when it goes from “getting food” to “making food.” But specification
can also show up in the verbal object, as when one makes the deliberative advance
from “making food” to “making an omelet.” Or, again, it can show up in the sort
of verbal modifier that would be expressed in Greek by the so-called “instrumental
dative,” as in the movement from “sinking the battleship” to “sinking the battleship
with a torpedo,” and from “going from A to C” to “going from A to C by bicycle.”
Of course, these formulations are often interchangeable. Sometimes, a language
will have a special verb to describe doing something with—or by means of —a certain
instrument: to go somewhere by bicycle is to bicycle there; and to harm someone
with poison is to poison him. Other times, there is a special verb to describe doing
something to—or on, or against, or at, or through—a certain object: if what one is
hunting is fish, then what one is doing is fishing. How many such transformations
are possible in a language is obviously a contingent matter, and of no philosophical
interest.
But this raises the worry that perhaps I have failed properly to distinguish the
action itself from its circumstances, or external conditions. We are supposed to be
considering what is done; not where it is done, or when, or by whom—or any number
of other things that could be said about an action. If it is asked of Socrates what he
is, the answer is not that he is fat, or in the agora; the answer is that he is a human
being. His being fat, or in the agora, are mere accidental qualities, and do not speak
to the man himself. But then, have I not made a similar mistake with regard to
action? For have I not confused what is done with what it happens to be done with,
or what it happens to be done to?
This is related to another concern. I have said that what an agent aims to do
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is doable in many “ways”; and I have spoken of the chosen “way” as the product
of deliberation, and thus, as the means to an end. But what is the relevant kind
of “way”? Do the descriptions “walking down the street with a parrot on one’s
shoulder” and “walking down the street with a ferret on one’s shoulder” refer to two
different “ways” of walking down the street? What about building a bird house in
the morning and building one in the afternoon—are these two different “means” to
the “end” of building a bird house? Is roasting a turkey on Kilimanjaro one “species”
of the “genus” roasting a turkey, to be contrasted, perhaps, with roasting a turkey on
Everest?
This points to the need for a general distinction, such as we find in the category
of substance, between what is done on some occasion and that which is merely true
of it. Clearly, the difference between roasting a turkey on Mt. Everest and roasting a
turkey on Mt. Kilimanjaro is of no practical significance: the recipe does not change;
a cook might perform exactly the same actions, in exactly the same order, for exactly
the same reasons. On the other hand, it does affect what must be done whether one
is roasting at a high altitude or at a low one; whether one is using a gas oven or
a wood-burning stove; whether one is roasting a turkey or a cornish hen. Nothing
depends on whether one is hunting on Tuesday or on Wednesday; but everything
depends on whether one is hunting fish or fowl; and if one happens to be fishing,
whether one is using a rod, a spear or a net.
In his analysis of Jones, who buttered a piece of toast in the bathroom with a
knife at midnight, Davidson finds that what Jones did was to butter a piece of toast,
and that this was in the bathroom, with a knife, at midnight.36 Thus, Davidson treats
the time and place of the action as being on par with the instrument employed: the
fact that the action was done with a knife is just one among an infinite number of
things that could be said about it. Given this approach, it should surprise one that
Davidson does not consider Jones’ action to be simply: buttering. After all, this can
36See Davidson, “The Logical Form of Action Sentences,” (1967).
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be done with tools other than knives, in places other than bathrooms, at times other
than midnight, and to things other than toast—to muffins, to cobs of corn, even to
steak. What principled reason could Davidson have for including mention of the toast
in his description of what was done by Jones?
There seem to be a pair of simple tests that will distinguish what is done, on
some occasion, from what is merely true of it. They suggest that Davidson was right
to include the toast, wrong to exclude the knife, and right to exclude the bathroom
and the hour, in his description of Jones’ action. The tests correspond to an action’s
purposive structure, on the one hand, and to its temporal structure, on the other.
With regard to anything one might care to mention about an action—that it was
done in this place, at this time, with this instrument, to this object, etc.—we can
ask, on the one hand, whether this affects what it would be good or bad to do for
the sake of the action, and, on the other hand, whether it affects how long the action
takes.
Spreading butter on a piece of toast requires a technique that is markedly different
from spreading it on a corncob. Thus, what it would be good or bad to do for the
sake of spreading butter varies according to what one is buttering. Yet, if we hold the
buttered object constant, and vary the buttering instrument, we find that it requires
one technique to butter toast with a knife, while it requires a very different technique
to butter it with, say, a toothpick. Moreover, these differences of technique correspond
to differences of time. To butter toast with toothpick undoubtedly takes longer than
to butter it with a knife. Meanwhile, if we hold constant the buttering instrument,
it requires the same technique, and takes the same amount of time, to butter e.g. a
piece of toast in the bathroom as in the kitchen, and at midnight as at noon. The
object and the instrument are practically significant, the time and the place are not.
By why should we concern ourselves with the results of these purported “tests”?
Geach emphasizes that judgments employing what he calls “attributive adjectives,”
like “big” and “small” and “good” and “bad,” presuppose a conception of what the
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judgment is about.37 At least some judgments of the form, “This is a good O,” and,
“This is a big O,” appeal to a standard that is set by the nature of an O. Thus, it is
by reference to some generic conception of what it is to be an O that one judges of
some particular O that it is a good one or a bad one, a big one or a small one. To be
eight inches in length is perhaps big for an earthworm, but small for an electric eel.
Bigness and smallness are relative to a kind. To have two tires is good for a bicycle
but bad for a car. The goodness and badness at issue here are also relative to a kind.
In the same sense that “good” and “bad” and “big” and “small” are attributive
adjectives, “well” and “badly” and “slowly” and “quickly” are—in at least some
employments—attribute adverbs. In the same way that attribute adjectives appeal
to an understanding of what the modified object is, attributive adverbs appeal to an
understanding of what the modified action is.
Just as certain judgments to the effect that this is a big or small O presuppose a
generic conception of how big an O is, so, also, certain judgments to the effect that
X is doing A slowly or quickly—or, that it is taking a long or short time for X to
do A—presuppose a generic conception of how long it takes to do A.38 And just as
certain judgments to the effect that it is good or a bad for an O to be such-and-such
presuppose a generic conception of what it is to be an O, so, also, certain judgments
to the effect that doing such-and-such is a good or a bad thing to do in the course of
doing A presuppose a generic conception of what it is to do A.
The fact that changes of location and hour do not affect what counts as spreading
butter slowly or quickly, or badly or well, shows that location and hour are mere
37Peter Geach, “Good and Evil,” (1956). J. L. Austin (1962a) says of such an adjective that it is
“substantive hungry”: in addition to “good” he mentions “real” and “the same” and “one,” p. 69.
38We are constantly judging that such-and-such was slowly or quickly done; but it might strike
one as a strange suggestion that we are just as often thinking, at least implicitly, about the time
it takes to do things. After all, how long something takes is an empirical question. On the other
hand, as Marx writes in Capital : “In all situations, the labor-time it costs to produce the means of
subsistence must necessarily concern mankind, although not to the same degree at different stages
of development.” Marx points out that, “among the ancient Germans the size of a piece of land was
measured according to the labor of a day; hence the acre was called Tagwerk, Tagwanne (jurnale,
or terra jurnalis, or diornalis), Mannwerk, Mannskraft, Mannsmaad, Mannshauet, etc.,” p. 164.
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externalities, which do not enter into the constitution of the action. And the fact
that changes of object and instrument do affect evaluative and temporal judgments
shows that these “conditions” are internal to what is done.
The point is that not all of the “conditions” of an action are equal. Water must
be mentioned in an account of what it is to swim: swimming is a certain sort of loco-
motion through water. As water is to swimming, and air is to flying, and solid ground
is to walking, some set of conditions is to every physical action. Such conditions are
internal to an action and are definitive of what is done.39
Thus, my constant comparison of an action to a material substance is not a mere
analogy. The objects we deal with when we act have both parts and species. It is
because they do, and because action is constituted by the objects dealt with, that
actions, too, have parts and species. This does not mean that the structure of action
is somehow derivative of the structure of things, but only that it is no coincidence,
and it should not surprise us, if the will and the world have a similar constitution.
5.9.3 The Mutual Dependence of Parts and Species
If my aim is, as it often is, to get something to eat, and if I have decided to make
myself an omelet, this is not the end of my deliberation. In order to bring my end
within reach, it is not enough to bring it downward from the genus; I must also bring
it backward from the finale. For I have to determine what to do now. And this is
the question how to begin. In order to complete my deliberation, I must resolve my
action into parts, which are bound together in a temporal frame. Making an omelet
39This is why the opening sentence of Faulkner’s novel The Sound and the Fury is unintelligible:
“Through the fence, between the curling flower spaces, I could see them hitting.” Hitting what?
With what? The paragraph continues: “They were coming toward where the flag was and I went
along the fence. Luster was hunting in the grass by the flower tree. They took the flag out, and they
were hitting. Then they put the flag back and they went to the table, and he hit and the other hit.
Then they went on, and I went along the fence. Luster came away from the flower tree and we went
along the fence and they stopped and we stopped and I looked through the fence while Luster was
hunting in the grass.” It is not until second paragraph that the reader is told what the “hitting” is
all about. What the man hit was: a golf ball. What he hit it with was: a club.
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has a plot—it has a beginning, a middle and end—and I must see to it that the first
things are done first. If the first step in making the omelet is to get some eggs and
break them, then this is also the first step in getting something to eat.
These two deliberative movements—downward from the genus, and backward
from the finale—are mutually dependent. On the one hand, the decomposition of
an action into parts always presupposes a certain degree of specification. Obviously,
what I should do first depends on whether I am making an omelet or stealing a loaf of
bread. On the other hand, the parts into which an action is resolved are themselves
in need of further specification. All of the deliberative questions raised by getting food
are raised anew by getting eggs.
Since the act of deliberation mirrors the act of rationalization, the interrelation of
parts and species can also be seen in answers to the question “Why?” Someone might
ask me why I am taking the eggs from the refrigerator, and I might tell him, “I’m
making an omelet,” effecting a movement from part to whole. But then he might
ask, “Why are you making an omelet?” and I might at this point change direction,
explaining my action, not by reference to a still more encompassing whole, but instead
by reference to something more general: “Oh, I just wanted to fix myself something
to eat.” Or, again, it may be that I am running from A to B because I am running
from A to C (part-whole), and also that I am running from A to C because I am
exercising (species-genus).
5.9.4 The Ineliminability of Species
But is the purposive relation between a species and its genus one that belongs to
intentional action as such? I argued above, in Section 5.8.3, that every intentional
action is either itself a whole comprising parts, or part of such a whole, or partner to
another part. What is done is such as to stand in one of these relations to something
else that is also done. The part-whole relation is, therefore, an ineliminable feature
of the purposive structure of action.
147
But I also pointed out that not every distinctive purposive relation has the same
fundamental importance.40 No one is likely to say, I think, that the relation between
a brute means and a conventional end belongs to the essence of action. For huge
swaths of our practical life are unrelated to custom, and transpire entirely at the level
of the “brute.” Things like walking, lifting, pushing and eating are not themselves
conventional; nor are they typically done for the sake of something that is. This is
not to say that e.g. eating something is all the same whether it is done by a mere
animal or a human being. On the other hand, it is certainly no coincidence that much
of what we do is describable in terms of animal movement. And the actions of ours
that are so describable seemingly form a foundation, or base, upon which is built the
superstructure of convention. Or so one might think. In any case, the question before
us now is whether the species-genus relation is, like the part-whole relation, basic, or
foundational.
We may begin by observing that the virtues, and the moral law, are traditionally
thought to provide an agent with general ends—with ends that are satisfied, if at
all, by doing something quite specific. And many philosophers still believe that it is
constitutive of action that it may be done for the sake of, e.g., doing what is just, or
treating someone as an end in herself. If that is in fact the case, then, certainly, the
purposive relation between a species and its genus must be counted as fundamental.
But, clearly, this is not decisive. Many philosophers deny that there is any internal
relation between the nature of an action and ethical ends. For all we know, there
might be practically rational creatures whose only ends are appetitive. (Some believe
40Arguably, it is possible to do something general for the sake of something more specific. If it
were prophesied that a newborn child would eventually dethrone the king, but the king did not
know which child, he might order the death of every single one. Just to be safe. Similarly, one
might perform a “whole” action for the sake of doing a “part” of it. One might go all the way from
A to C for the sake of going some shorter distance, from A to B. For example, if I want to leap
over a puddle, I might leap a distance that is twice as long as the puddle itself. Just to be safe. I
submit without argument that the relation between part and whole is obviously more fundamental
than that between whole and part, and that the relation between species and genus is likewise more
fundamental than that between genus and species. But, so far as I can see, nothing much depends
on the question, either way.
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that we are such creatures.)
But this only reminds us that a wolf may hunt a rabbit for the sake of getting
something to eat, and that so of course may I. Appetite sets one general ends to be
satisfied by specific means. The end might be to get some food and the means might
be to pick a peach, or, again, to snare a hare. And what could be more fundamental,
for a practically rational creature, than the sort of connection contained in the thought
that extracting the sap of a certain desert cactus is a way of procuring something to
drink, or that one might get rid of an unwelcome snake by prodding it with a stick,
or that inclement weather could be kept away by finding, or building, some kind of
shelter?
But let us prescind from ethical life, from animal movement, and from appetite.
Let us, in fact, deny ourselves the whole material world, and consider the matter from
a purely geometrical perspective. Between any two points are an infinite number of
lines, the shortest of which is straight. From this it follows that even one of the
angels, if it travels through space, or an organless, motorless, extensionless dot, must
proceed along some path or other as it “moves” to its destination. A continuous line
is not, after all, its whence and whither alone, but also the way between them; and it
is one way among many. Thus, despite the austerity of our starting-point, we arrive
at the same conclusion: that decisions must be made—to go this way or that; by one
route or another. The very idea of a line contains both the contrast between a whole
and its parts and the contrast between a genus and its species—a fact which shows
how thoroughly the one depends upon the other.
At this point, returning to the world of movement proper, and to animal life, we
may avail ourselves of the obvious fact that, in the central cases of intentional action,
a human being must move herself, or something else, from one place to another. In
doing so, she must necessarily move in some specific way for the sake of moving at
all.
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5.10 THE FORM OF AN ACTION
I began this chapter by asking about the form of an action. There is, as I said, no
such thing as “acting” in general, but only, for example, opening a jar or reading a
magazine. Doing something is always doing one thing or another, as an organism is
always, say, an owl or a whale. Life and action have in common that we find them
only in their concrete forms. But what stands to an action as a life-form stands to a
living thing? What is an action-form?
A general answer can now be given. The form of an action is what is done when
someone acts intentionally. As we have seen, what is done on any occasion is, in fact,
many things, but many things that hang together in one purposive system. This is
a system of ends and means, and is governed by two main principles: that the part
should be done for the sake of the whole, and the species for the genus. So an action-
form is what rationalizes the parts and species of it, and what, in turn, is rationalized
by that of which it is a part or species.
But such a system of ends and means also has a temporal structure. It divides
into successive phases—into a beginning, a middle and an end. That it so divides
itself depends on its having a definite form. It is impossible to judge that someone
is just getting started, or half-way through, almost finishing with what he is doing,
except insofar as one has an idea of what he is doing. An action-form is what makes
it possible to think of an action as being under way.
On the one hand, an action’s form is that with a view to which its parts and
species are rationalized, or represented as good; on the other hand, it is that with a
view to which the action itself is seen to be progressing. But these two points are
intimately related. For, recall, doing one thing can be a means to doing another only
if it advances the other’s progress. Thus, what rationalizes a part of an action, or a
species of it, is its contribution to the progress of the action to which it belongs.
To describe an action’s purposive and temporal unity is to give an account, how-
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ever incomplete, of the reason-requesting sense of the question “Why?” and of the
corresponding question “How?” For it is to give a general description of any possi-
ble answer to these questions. And that, according to Anscombe, is the task of the
philosopher of action.
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6.0 CONCLUDING REMARKS ON
PRACTICAL THOUGHT
What has been said up to now lies open to the objection that a mere unthinking
brute—a dog, for example, trotting along a fence—does many things at once, and
one for the sake of another. A dog may go a little way for the sake of going a
longer way, doing something partial for the sake of something whole. And a dog may
trot to its destination simply in order to get there, doing something specific for the
sake of something general. Here, too, one thing is done to advance the progress of
another. Here, too, is a system of ends and means. It may therefore seem that all we
have managed to isolate is the field of animal movement; whereas, presumably, the
philosophy of action has a narrower concern.1,2 What we mean by “action,” and aim
1Anscombe sees animal movement as coming within the scope of her topic in Intention, (1963);
see pp. 68–69, 84–87. See also “‘Under a Description,’” (1979).
2Thompson acknowledges that his own account, in “Naive Action Theory,” applies to the “ac-
tion” of sub-rational animals: “Of course, this particular etiological relation of happenings to an
imperfectively present over-arching process—the relation that constitutes the unity of such hap-
penings with one another in an intentional action, though it can also extend beyond it—cannot be
supposed possible except where the agent’s thoughts have come potentially to subserve it. It may be,
then, that our formula “explanation by the imperfective” can stand only as the isolation of a genus,
and that the specific difference of straightforward rationalization will emerge properly only with its
intellectual aspect. This last, though, is a matter I have put outside the scope of the present essay,”
Ibid., pp. 132–133. Thompson continues in a footnote: “In defense of this we may note that it is
presumably only because its exercises can be supposed somehow to subserve this sort of development
and its articulation into narrower subordinate processes that a capacity can be characterized as a
capacity for thought at all. If this is right, then the questions, (i), how thought figures in rational-
ization, and (ii), what thought is, can in any case not be handled independently. Alternate forms of
‘explanation by the imperfective’ might be found in connection with the operations of sub-rational
animals, of course, and even, but in another way, in the operations of plants and of the parts of
plants and animals alike. The philosophers’ emphasis on ‘teleological explanation,’ which is really a
limiting case of this sort of account, inclines us to overlook it,” Ibid., p. 133, n. 16.
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to understand, is something unavailable to a mere unthinking brute—and precisely
because it is unthinking. In that case, one wants to know: What is the role of the
agent’s thought?
The question is especially pressing in view of the overall argument of this essay.
In Chapter 4, I claimed that the agent herself must recognize that what she is doing
is an action, if, indeed, it is one. She need not possess the predicate “. . . is an action”;
but she must grasp a certain sense of the question “Why?,” and she must see what she
is doing as subject to that question. The relevant sense of the question was discussed
in Chapter 5. That discussion was meant to explain what is it to think of an event
as an action. On the account given, to think of an event as an action is to think of
it as a temporally-ordered system of ends and means. But this cannot be the whole
story. For I have so far said nothing about the agent to whom the action belongs.
As it stands, the account does not distinguish between, on the one hand, a person’s
thought that she herself is acting, and, on the other hand, her thought that someone
else is. But the agent’s thought of her own action clearly has a special importance.
After all, to think that someone else is acting is, among other things, to think of her
that she thinks of herself as acting.
So the account is not yet totally complete. On the other hand, though, there is
not very much to add; in fact, there is only this: that the temporally-ordered system
of ends and means, which is a person’s action, is one whose inner structure the agent
herself apprehends. We have already seen that what the agent is doing, in the course
of acting intentionally, is many things at once, all of which are intentional, and each
for the sake of the others. But the agent’s various ends and means are not connected
behind her back: she herself can see the connection—in fact, it is she who connects
them. Of each thing she is doing, she thinks that she is doing it: of each means,
that it is a means; and of each end, that it is an end. If something done is partial,
and done for the sake of something whole, this is what she thinks it is, and why she
thinks she is doing it. And if it is specific, and done for something general, this, too,
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is what she thinks. The entire system is thought to have the very structure it does
have. And the agent’s thought is the ligament that holds it all together.
*
This, then, is the answer to the question what it is to think that one is acting. To
think that one is acting is to apprehend the purposive unity of all that one is doing
in the course of performing an intentional action.
One might complain that, far from answering the original question, I have simply
multiplied it. For I have said, in effect, that in order to think that something I
am doing is an intentional action, I must think that something else I am doing is
also an intentional action; and, moreover, I must think of them as standing in some
purposive relation. And, one might say, if the question is how I can think of one
thing as intentionally done, the answer had better not be that I must think of two
things as intentionally done.
But why not? After all, this just reflects the inner complexity of the action itself.
It came out in Chapter 5 that to do one thing intentionally is in fact to do many things
intentionally, all of which are purposively related. The suggestion now is merely that
what is done, on the one hand, and the agent’s thought of it, on the other, have
exactly the same complexity.
*
We are in any case very far from the idea, mooted in Chapter 4, that what is done
under a description like “sliding on ice” or “destroying a spider’s web” is the same,
whether it is a mere event or an action. It was this idea, recall, that seemed to open
up a gap between what is done—at least, in a typical case of intentional action—and
the agent’s thought of what is done. Hume observed that there is no such gap if the
action in question is making a promise, or getting married: one cannot do such a
thing unless one thinks that one is doing it. And this was the source of the circle he
found: that we cannot explain what is done, before we explain what is thought to be
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done; and we cannot explain what is thought to be done, before we explain what is
done. But this can look—and did look to Hume—to be an exception, and not the rule.
One might suppose—and Hume apparently did—that most things that can be done
intentionally, and thus thinkingly, can also be done unthinkingly, whether by a human
being, a dog, or a stone: for example, sliding on ice, or destroying a spider’s web.
Moreover, one might suppose—as again Hume apparently did—that whatever can
be done unthinkingly can also be explained by reference to its unthinking instances.
In that case, what is done will not always, or even typically, give rise to a Humean
Circle.
I raised the question whether promising and getting married really are exceptional
forms of action in virtue of their dependence on thought. In particular, I questioned
the presupposition that what is done under a syncategorematic description is the
same, regardless of its category. At a minimum, I pointed out, their being the same
does not follow from their having the same description. So one cannot just take it
for granted. What is done by a child, intentionally, with a stick, and what is done
by a sudden gust of wind, may both be described as “destroying a spider’s web.”
To determine whether the same thing is done by the child and by the wind, it was
necessary to consider what is done when a person acts.
On the account I have since given, the thought-dependence of promising and
marrying is not at all exceptional. What is done intentionally, and thus thinkingly,
is never done unthinkingly. For what is done intentionally has a particular kind of
temporally-ordered purposive structure. And that which does not have this structure
is not the same as it, no matter how it is described.
A stone, skirting across a frozen pond, is certainly doing many things at once;
but none of them are ends, and none of them are means. It will certainly go a little
way before it goes a longer way; but it will not do the former for the sake of doing
the latter. And while it will go from here to there, it will not slide there in order to
get there. What is done by a stone under the description “sliding on ice,” or by a
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wind under the description “destroying a spider’s web,” is not a system of ends and
means.
Unlike a stone, or the wind, a dog has ends and means, of a sort. But they cannot
be of the same sort as those of a person who is acting intentionally. For what is done
by a dog is not such as to be understood by the dog as done for the sake of, or by
means of, what else the dog is doing. Its ends and means are joined, so to speak,
behind its back. It does not think the system together. What is done by the dog is,
thus, not action proper.
Then every form of action is a form, specifically, of action. In virtue of its in-
ner constitution, what is done intentionally—whatever it is: whether it is making a
promise, or crossing the street, or sliding on ice—is different from anything else that
happens. Whatever it is, there are no unintentional instances of it ; and it is never
done unthinkingly. In that case, a person cannot be doing it, unless she thinks she
is doing it. And this is the circumstance that Hume identified. On the one hand, we
cannot understand what it is to do the thing, until we understand what it is to think
that this is what one is doing. On the other hand, we cannot grasp the content of
such a thought, until we know what it is to do the thing. Thus, the Humean Circle
must arise with respect to any form of action, any object of intention, anything one
might have a mind to do.
*
In saying, as I have, that a brute does not apprehend the connection between the
various things it is doing, I do not take myself to be explaining anything, but only to
be availing myself of something that everyone knows already. It is, I take it, common
ground that action proper is such in virtue of the fact that a person does it thinkingly.
Thoughtful action is what action theory is a theory of. What I have wanted to say is
that this thoughtfulness—which everyone admits is special, and is not to be found in
the life of a dog—is constitutive of action, and not just an accoutrement. The agent’s
thought does not stand outside what is done, as a mere psychological cause: it is as
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it were the connective tissue that holds an action together from within, and without
which it would disintegrate.
One point of this maneuver is to relocate certain topics in the philosophy of action.
The interest of things like “practical knowledge,” “practical reasons” and “practical
reasoning” is often thought to be that they stand in some important but external
relation to action. And that is a very different conception from the one presented
here. Following Anscombe and Thompson, I tried to redirect attention back to the
action itself, and to its inner structure. If this structure is represented in the agent’s
own thought, then action and its representation cannot be separated in the usual
way. For “practical knowledge,” “practical reasons” and “practical reasoning” in
fact constitute what such knowledge is of, what such reasons are for, and what such
reasoning is about. On this conception, action is permeated with practical thought,
so that interest in such thought is identical with an interest in its object.
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